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Comment

Non-Elected Members on Scrutiny Panels and change in Troy Rule. (P.46/2025): comments

Published on: 19 June 2025

Presented by: Scrutiny Liaison Committee

Debate date: 24 June 2025

Reference: P.46/2025 Com.(2).

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STATES OF JERSEY

NON-ELECTED MEMBERS ON SCRUTINY PANELS AND CHANGES TO THE TROY RULE (P.46/2025): COMMENTS

Presented to the States on 19th June 2025 by the Scrutiny Liaison Committee

STATES GREFFE

2025  P.46 Com.(2)

COMMENTS

The proposition lodged by Deputy M.R. Scott asks, in essence, firstly that unelected persons are appointed to Scrutiny Panels and secondly that the colloquially known Troy Rule' is adjusted from determining a Minority Government to ensuring that a principle of Majority Government is established in Jersey. Given the remit of the Scrutiny Liaison Committee (SLC), these Comments focus on the first matter, though it is the case that significant concerns with both aspects have been discussed by the Committee.

As is the case with committee work across parliamentary democracies, the Scrutiny function in Jersey is a core parliamentary feature, and the work undertaken by Panels is a key responsibility of the States Members (elected representatives) engaged in the Assembly's activities. In the same way it would appear undemocratic for the roles of Ministers and Assistant Ministers to be undertaken by unelected persons, the Committee would suggest that it is no more appropriate for Scrutiny Panel membership to be seen any differently and to influence legislation and policy. It cannot be appropriate that somebody who is unelected should hold the same level of influence over Government legislation and policy as an elected Member. The SLC is not aware of any comparable jurisdiction where lay members are appointed to the equivalent of Scrutiny Panels (e.g. UK Select Committees).

Whilst the proposition makes reference to the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), where lay members are engaged in that Committee's work (a situation not without challenges on occasion), the SLC would highlight key differences between the roles of PAC and Scrutiny Panels. Panels are involved in holding Ministers to account and reviewing draft legislation and policy, meaning they engage in work that is inherently political' in context and the influence they exert, with safeguards established through Standing Orders and Codes of Practice to promote, amongst other matters, the important principle of objectivity that underpins such work. It is right and proper that this work should be the preserve of elected Members. The PAC looks at matters which are typically  based  on  recommendations  from  the  Comptroller  and  Auditor  General (C&AG)  and  directed  towards  the  Chief  Executive,  Chief  Officers  and  other Accountable Officers as opposed to Ministers. It is inherently less political in nature and influence.

In respect of access to expert knowledge, advice and analysis, it is unclear what problem it is that the proposition seeks to fix. Scrutiny Panels have a range of options already available  to  them,  including  the  use  of  specifically  identified  expert/experienced advisers (paid or unpaid) and expert witnesses, and ensuring evidence gathering is robustly targeted to gather all relevant knowledge and views. In addition to a team of skilled officers and researchers, Scrutiny Panels also have the ability to co-opt additional States Members to reviews, should the Member have relevant experience in the subject matter being reviewed.

Additional practical concerns with enabling non-States members to join Scrutiny Panels include the limited time they have available to give to the role (which for many scrutineers accounts for a considerable majority of their time as a States Member) and the  impact  this  would  have  on  the  speed  of  work  and  productivity;  determining appropriate recruitment criteria and processes and; ensuring/enforcing due safeguards and accountability around such politically influential  positions - from recruitment through to the execution of the roles. In addition, conflicts of interest from lay members would need to be considered.

In view of the above the Committee is unable to support the Proposition.

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P.46/2025 Com.(2)