Machinery of Government Review Sub-Committee: Final Report.

STATES OF JERSEY

MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT REVIEW SUB-COMMITTEE: FINAL REPORT

Presented to the States on 9th September 2013 by the Privileges and Procedures Committee

STATES GREFFE

2013   Price code: D  R.105

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

We believe that our machinery of government in Jersey should uphold certain key principles. These are – in no particular order of importance –

• accountability,
• sound corporate governance
• objectivity,
• prudence, and
• transparency.

The systems and processes we have in place now do not, in our view, align well with these core principles. Addressing that lack of alignment will, we believe, improve public  confidence  in  the  States  and,  quite  possibly,  bring  about  greater  voter engagement.

There  remains  a  pressing  need  to  address  blurred  lines  of  accountability  and  a prevailing silo mentality. Lines of communication across the States must be improved and the relationship between the executive and the Civil Service needs rebalancing. Further changes are required to maintain inclusive government and utilize the talents and expertise of States Members whilst clarifying the parts that executive and non- executive Members play in government.

We have endeavoured to devise a coherent single package of measures to bring about the necessary improvements in short order. Our task has been a challenging one. There remain some fundamental differences of perspective between those who favour a pure ministerial  system  and  those  who  would  prefer  to  see  either  the  restoration  of committee government or the development of a hybrid system.

There  are  essentially  2 options  available  given  the  balance  of  opinion  we  have detected. The States can move closer to the model proposed by the Clothier Panel and give  that  model  sufficient  time  to  demonstrate  that  it  can  deliver  the  remedies envisaged in December 2000. Alternatively, they may choose to pursue a ministerial/ committee hybrid, perhaps of the kind proposed in P.120/2010, or by blending some executive/non-executive roles as per the system in place in the Isle of Man.

In our view, the hybrid model is the more viable option. The States Assembly would continue to be responsible for the direction and oversight of government on behalf of the Public and be accountable to the Public for all States business. The executive function would still be delegated to the Council of Ministers, who will have a clear reporting line to the States through the Chief Minister. Monitoring of the executive will  be  enhanced  by  complementing  the  existing  Scrutiny  function  with  Non- Executive Members (NEMs), who will provide real-time oversight of matters arising within departments. Importantly, the executive would remain in the minority and would be subject to structured scrutiny by a clear majority of States Members that would not be holders of any positions within the executive. Members' skills and abilities will necessarily be utilized to the full if these functions are to be fulfilled.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Final Report Recommendations

1. The  period  between  election  day  and  the  election  of  a  Chief  Minister Designate should be shortened by one week.
2. Newly elected/re-elected Members should benefit from a formal mechanism through  which  they  might  express  an  interest  in  serving  in  a  particular executive or non-executive capacity, supported by a brief rationale for wishing to pursue those particular roles.
3. Standing Order 115 should be amended to require that written statements setting out a vision for a strategic policy and the manner in which a candidate proposes to discharge their duties as Chief Minister should be published not less than 5 working days before the meeting at which the Chief Minister Designate is to be elected.
4. Standing  Order  116(5)  should  be  amended  to  allow  up  to  one  hour  of questioning of each candidate for the office of Chief Minister.
5. The size of the executive should continue to be constrained in accordance with the Troy rule.
6. The Chief Minister should be empowered to change ministerial portfolios and determine the optimum number of Ministerial appointments once he or she has been elected as Chief Minister Designate.
7. A  Chief  Minister  Designate  should  continue to  be required  to  secure  the endorsement of the States Assembly for his or her ministerial team.
8. Only the Chief Minister Designate should be able to nominate candidates for Ministerial positions.
9. The timescale outlined at Standing Order 112 should be amended to require that  the  Chief  Minister  Designate  nominate  his  or  her  preferred  slate  of Ministers to the States within 5 working days.
10. The States should vote for or against the list of proposed Ministers on an individual basis.
11. The  Chief  Minister  Designate  should  be  able  to  propose  a  maximum  of 3 Ministerial teams.
12. The Council of Ministers should be bound by collective responsibility.
13. Assistant  Ministers  should  also  be  bound  by  collective  responsibility  in respect  of  any  matters  falling  directly  within  the  ministerial  portfolios  to which they are attached.
14. The  precise  terms  and  limitations  of  collective  responsibility  should  be specified within the Code of Conduct for Ministers, which should be adopted

at the very first meeting of each new Council and, subsequently, be presented to the States as a report in the R.' series.

15. The Council of Ministers should be invested with sufficient powers to direct individual departments if necessary.
16. The  title  Junior  Minister'  should  henceforth  be  substituted  for  that  of Assistant Minister.'
17. The States of Jersey Law 2005 should be amended to make Junior Ministers the default port of call for an executive decision whenever the Minister is out of the Island or is otherwise indisposed.
18. One  Junior  Minister  should  by  default  represent  their  department  at  the Council of Ministers whenever the Minister is out of the Island or is otherwise indisposed.
19. Junior Ministers should have identical rights of access to information to those of their Minister.
20. The members of the Public Accounts Committee who are not States Members should be selected for recommendation to the States Assembly through a recruitment process overseen by the Jersey Appointments Commission.
21. Following a resignation or dismissal, the Chief Minister alone should be able to propose a new Minister. He or she would require the endorsement of the States for that appointment.
22. A Chief Minister should be entitled to 3 attempts to appoint a new Minister.
23. The Chief Minister should require the prior endorsement of the States for any reshuffling of Ministers between existing portfolios.
24. The period for development of the draft Strategic Plan cited in Article 18(2)(e) of the States of Jersey Law 2005 should be reduced to a maximum of 60 days.
25. NEMs should be appointed to provide advice and other assistance to each Minister.
26. NEMs should be appointed by the States on the recommendation of the Chief Minister.
27. NEMs  should  only  be  selected  from  members  of  the  Assembly  who  are actively available to participate in scrutiny reviews.
28. PPC should consider establishing procedures to define and ensure that NEMs are actively' available to participate in scrutiny reviews (such procedures to be implemented at the same time as NEMs are created).
29. NEMs should be permitted to serve on scrutiny committees but not the SMC, and not in respect of any ministerial portfolio for which they act as a NEM.

30. NEMs should have full and unfettered access to information held by, and the officers working within, the States departments falling within the relevant Minister's portfolio.
31. PPC should consider bringing an amendment to the Code of Conduct for Elected Members to take account of the creation of NEMs.
32. There should be a Scrutiny Management Committee (SMC) consisting of 5 non-executive States Members elected by the States, together with the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee.
33. Only non-executive States Members should be permitted to cast votes during the election of the SMC or for a replacement member of the SMC.
34. Dismissal and replacement of individual members of the SMC should be a matter  determined  by  the  States  following  debate  on  a  no confidence proposition, to be lodged by a member of the non-executive only.
35. There should be scheduled opportunities for new Members to visit States departments and meet senior management teams.
36. Any  questions  regarding  the  responsibility  for  cross-cutting  review  topics should be resolved by the Scrutiny Management Committee.
37. The Code of Practice for Scrutiny and the PAC would need to be reviewed to take account of the changes we recommend.
38. Any non-executive States Member not already serving on the SMC should be able to volunteer to serve on a scrutiny committee established by the SMC to conduct a topic review.
39. Scrutiny committees formed to conduct a review of a particular issue should be comprised of between 3 and 5 non-executive members.
40. Membership of scrutiny committees should be approved by the SMC.
41. Terms of reference for individual scrutiny committees should be approved by the member of the SMC with oversight responsibility for that topic area.
42. A scrutiny committee constituted to conduct a particular topic review will be authorised to approve its own final report for presentation to the States.
43. Responsibility  for  conducting  legislative  scrutiny  should  remain  with  the established Scrutiny function.
44. The  Council  of  Ministers  should  ensure  that  all  Ministers  are  obtaining appropriate input from the Law Draftsman's Office on significant pieces of draft legislation prior to lodging.
45. Junior Ministers should not be permitted to serve on Scrutiny.

46. Thestructure andresourcing of the Scrutiny Office should bereviewed with a view to enhancing internal research capacity and enabling easier access to specialist external advice.
47. An Ombudsman should be appointed to hear and determine complaints of maladministration  by  Departments.  This  recommendation  should  be implemented either in advance of, or at the same time as the recommendations concerning greater authority for the Executive.
48. An additional research resource should be made available to non-executive States Members to assist them with the development of draft policy proposals.
49. A  public  register  of  Chief  Officers'  interests  should  be  accessible  on www.gov.je  and this register should be displayed alongside copies of the respective codes of conduct applicable to both Chief Officers and other public servants.

2. Interim Report Recommendations

1. Advisory or oversight groups that are intended to progress the development or revision of policy falling within the remit of 2 or more Ministers should be constituted by the Council of Ministers, with a commensurate decision being recorded in the Part A (open) minutes of the Council wherever possible.
2. A decision of an individual Minister to form an advisory or oversight group to assist with the development or revision of policy within his or her remit should –

1. be recorded by way of a formal and public Ministerial Decision; and
2. that Ministerial Decision should record at least the outline terms of reference, the membership and anticipated duration of each group and, where relevant, the budget allocated to the group to complete its work.

3. The Council of Ministers should be required to publish, and to keep updated, a collated  list  of  all  advisory  and  oversight  groups  formed  to  progress  the development or revision of policy.
4. PPC should lodge au Greffe' an amendment to the States of Jersey Law 2005 that, if adopted, would empower the Chief Minister to dismiss a Minister.
5. The Council of Ministers should have as a standing item on its agendas a documented summary update on the work programmes of each individual Minister.
6. Minority government must be retained in the ongoing absence of political parties and irrespective of the outcome of the forthcoming referendum on the constitution of the States Assembly.
7. The  Chairmen's  Committee  should  be  invited  to  consider  the  Electoral Commission's subsidiary recommendation on legislative scrutiny and report its views to the PPC.

CHAIRMAN'S FOREWORD

An effective democracy requires not just an executive but the balance of a strong assembly which hold the executive to account and scrutinises its actions as well as contributing  to  the  formation  of  policy.' –  Report  of  the  Review  Panel  on  the Machinery of Government in Jersey (Clothier'), 2000

Discussions surrounding improvements to the Machinery of Government are not a recent thing. Whilst Clothier is nowadays largely associated with Electoral Reform, in the mind of the public, his report also made a series of recommendations regarding the internal  workings  of  the  States  Assembly,  some  of  which  were  either  ignored, amended or not fully implemented. It is perhaps no surprise, then, that over 7 years down the line, the same questions relating to accountability and efficiency are still being raised.

Political opinion on our sub-committee was in many ways a microcosm of that which we know also exists in the States Assembly. These are explained in more in the executive summary at the beginning of our report. As such, we are under no illusion that not all of the recommendations will find favour with all members.

The States Chamber currently counts 51 Elected States Members and there are no doubt 51 corresponding solutions' to the machinery of government – all slightly or very different from the others.

It has been our experience, during our interviews with a total of 48 States Members and Senior Departmental Officers, that the vast majority believe the current system is sub-optimal.

As a result, our methodology was to identify key principles which we think can be universally, or near-universally, accepted and to work from there.

The elephants in the room

Whilst some lament the absence of the inclusiveness of the old committee system, others simply accept that the price a devolution of power from States Assembly to the Executive  (Ministers,  and  their  CEOs)  is  the  price  worth  paying  for  the  added efficiency of the Ministerial system. With this in mind, I envisage that the one of main themes of future debate will surround collective responsibility, the ability of the Chief Minister to hire and fire' and the question of just how much power, if any, the Assembly should cede to whoever becomes Chief Minister. These have certainly been considerable pre-occupations for the sub-committee.

Another consideration is the absence of formal Party Politics in the Island. It is clear that our work would have been much simpler, were it for the pre-existence of Parties. In  their  absence,  mechanisms  such  as  the  selection  of  Chief  Minister,  Ministers, mandate, accountability and even the ability of the public to influence policy remain even more critical.

Members can rest assured that a considerable amount of discussion, deliberation and work have gone into the various drafts that have resulted in this final report. We hope it will provide the basis for constructive discussions, which we will seek to put to an in committee debate at the earliest opportunity.

Finally, I would like to thank all those who engaged with the process of this report. They include: the members of the public that made submissions; States Members; Civil Servants; the Sub-Committee Members for their often painstaking work and input, and finally, but foremost, our Clerk who has worked tirelessly on this task, with other competing pressures.

1. DEFINING THE PROBLEM

Throughout the Sub-Committee's review of the machinery of government there have been 2 points of consistency. The first point, on which practically everyone appears to agree, is that the existing system is sub-optimal and warrants rather more than mere tinkering at the margins. The second is the lack of consensus on how the system might be improved. Even within the Sub-Committee, there are areas which have not gained unanimous approval. We are of the view that the same is likely to be the case for any proposals  brought  directly  to  the  Assembly  for  consideration.  We  are  therefore recommending that members should have the opportunity to consider the details (and options) within our report in the form of an in-committee debate which can then inform the final outcome of our deliberations.

Our interim report (R.39/2013) served to highlight –

1. the  need  to improve  the  availability  of  information  regarding  the various  advisory  and  oversight  groups  involved  in policy development;
2. a  consensus  of  opinion  among  Members  that  the  Chief  Minister should  be  granted  the  power  to  dismiss  a  Minister  but  that  the endorsement  of  the  Assembly  should  be  required  for  Ministerial appointments;
3. the case for ensuring that the Council of Ministers receives regular documented summary updates on the work programmes of individual Ministers;
4. the need for the executive to remain in the minority; and
5. the scope for the Chairmen's Committee to consider the Electoral Commission's subsidiary recommendation on legislative scrutiny and report its views to the PPC.

We stand by the recommendations in that report and we are grateful to note that the responses of the Chief Minister and the Chairmen's Committee have, in the main, been firmly supportive.

In this final report we propose what we believe to be a cohesive reform package that delivers  against  broadly  the  same  key  principles  we  cited  in  R.39/2013.  These principles are – in no particular order of importance –

• accountability,
• sound corporate governance,
• objectivity,
• prudence, and
• transparency.

Implementing a system that aligns well with each of our key principles would, we believe, enhance public confidence in the States significantly. A consequent increase in voter engagement could conceivably follow.

Our work has been informed by our desktop study of the functions performed by other comparable  democratic  governments,  by  our  series  of  one-to-one  interviews  with some 48 States Members and senior officers and by several iterations of internal and external consultation.

Having tested our current system against the above key principles, we consider that it falls short in a number of respects. Our interim report summarises our provisional assessment of the problem in the following terms –

1. blurred lines of accountability, and
2. a prevailing silo mentality.

We suggested that the following additional issues could also be a factor –

3. insufficient inclusivity,
4. insufficient use of States Members' talents and expertise,
5. ineffective lines of communication, and
6. a Civil Service that potentially wields too much power.

Having given the matter further thought, we conclude that (1), (2), (3) and (5) are largely the root of the problem.

Accountability

Shortcomings in accountability and corporate governance have been explored at  some  length  in  successive  Public  Accounts  Committee  (PAC)  reports, including  the  PAC's  4th  report  of  2011.  It  is  precisely  because  existing structures, roles and responsibilities are unclear that there is not always a shared view on where the buck stops. For example, the Assembly and the Council  of  Ministers  might  feel  justified  in  looking  to  each  other  when considering why more time is needed to hit the £65 million savings target set for the Comprehensive Spending Review.

The silo mentality

Some  States  Members  have  also  told  us  of  their  concern  that  there  is ultimately nothing short of the nuclear' vote of no confidence to deter an individual  Minister  intent  on  exercising  their  corporation  sole  status independently of their executive colleagues. We recognise the problem. The risk of silo thinking that comes with corporation sole status can be mitigated by  making  those  Ministers  accountable  to  the  States  through  the  Chief Minister.  Additional  powers  for  the  Chief  Minister,  the  application  of collective responsibility and our proposal for supplementary oversight by non- executive States Members will mitigate the risk.

Inclusivity

Inclusivity is a rather more challenging issue to bottom out. Arriving at a single definition is difficult because a discussion of inclusivity tends to draw out fundamental differences of perspective between those who favour a pure

ministerial system and those who would prefer to see either the restoration of committee government or the development of a hybrid. It highlights also the difficulty in progressing from 51 individual election manifestos to a cohesive government strategy for a 3–4 year term and, arguably, an imbalance in the resources available to executive and non-executive members. As a starting point, we conclude that when Members are calling for inclusive government they are expressing a collective desire to see the executive, scrutiny and the States Assembly as legislature working effectively and in relative harmony to achieve consistently good outcomes for the benefit of the public. Those who cite a lack of inclusivity are, quite simply, concerned that the system is falling short  of  this  ideal.  We  contend  that  a  modification  of  the  oversight arrangement proposed in P.120/2010 will help address this issue.

Communication

Turning to lines of communication, we comment in our interim report on the scope  to  improve  the  transparency  of  the  policy  development  process  by publishing  more  information  about  the  various  ministerial  advisory  and oversight groups that now exist. We acknowledge also that the Council of Ministers is proceeding with implementation of the Freedom of Information (Jersey)  Law  2011  by  January  2015.  This  process  should  result  in  more government information being shared with the public. The feedback we have received  does,  however,  indicate  that  more  needs  to  be  done  to  improve information  flows  between  the  executive  and  non-executive  branches  of government.

Whereas we are clear that the above 4 issues all need addressing directly, we now conclude that use of Members' talents and expertise and the potential power of the Civil Service are perhaps better described as symptoms rather than problems in their own right.

Members' talents and expertise

The range of work conducted by all 3 branches of government is, we believe, sufficiently challenging and diverse as to provide ample opportunities for all Members  to  contribute.  If  some  cannot,  then  the  blockages  preventing Members  from  undertaking  that  work  must  be  removed.  Our  research indicates that information flows are one blocking factor and that executive and non-executive resourcing may be another. Both are discussed in more detail later in this report. A solution for the latter can be achieved through better utilisation  of  existing  resources,  rather  than  by  calling  for  more  public expenditure.

The Civil Service

If the potential excess power of the Civil Service is being cited by some, it is perhaps because Ministers may be turning to senior civil servants for policy advice  with  some  frequency  in  the  absence  of  other  sources.  Where  this happens, it may well be a function of Ministers' relative isolation from other States  Members  now  that  they  occupy  offices  within  their  respective departments.  The  absence  of  party-based  policy  support  structures  and specialist advice that politicians in some other jurisdictions enjoy may be compounding factors. One of the benefits of the old committee system was that it required various different combinations of States Members to mix and

work  constructively  with  each  other  on  a  regular  basis.  Furthermore, committee decisions were independently minuted and were available to all States Members. That ceased on the move to ministerial government. There are those who feel that opportunities for constructive political discussion and cross-pollination of ideas are less common under ministerial government than before and that something must be done to improve the position. We have some sympathy with this view.

The States have little appetite for a direct return to the committee system. This leaves 2 options  for  reform.  The  States  can  move  closer  to  the  model  proposed  by  the Clothier Panel and allow sufficient time to demonstrate that the Clothier model really can deliver the improvements envisaged 13 years ago. Alternatively, the States may implement a hybrid system, perhaps by blending some executive/non-executive roles as the Isle of Man does, or by refining in some other way the proposals set out in P.120/2010. Having tested both against our key principles, we conclude on balance that the hybrid model is the stronger of the 2 because it provides a more constructive blend of inclusivity, whilst at the same time allowing for improved clarity as to where the  power  of  decision actually  lies.  A  hybrid  option  is, therefore,  the  option  we commend to the States.

We should place on record that several of our number remain concerned that the strengths of ministerial government or variants thereof may always be outweighed by a number of weaknesses. There is a view that ministerial government needs political parties to function properly, but that our Island's population may simply be too small to allow for the development of stable parties. Some Members are given to wonder whether the States were too quick to discount the various refinements to the long- standing committee system that were made in its final years. We are satisfied, for now, that  those  calling  for  a  return  to  the  committee  system  remain  in  the  minority. Nevertheless,  should  it  become  readily  apparent  within  the  next  decade  that  our ministerial  system  is  fundamentally  flawed  in  the  Jersey  context  and/or  cannot function without the emergence of credible political parties, we consider that the States should surely give the most serious consideration to the reintroduction of a committee system of government, albeit one with further suitable refinements made to reflect the modern age.

The recommendations that follow will not undermine the ultimate responsibility of the States Assembly for the direction and oversight of government on behalf of the Public. To quote the Clothier Report –

the States Assembly is or should be the power unit which drives the Island's government and is therefore its most important component. Over and above its primary functions as a national assembly it will have other functions which are internationally recognised. These include:–

* Making laws;

* The determination in debate of major internal and external policies;

* The consideration in debate of the management of those essential services which every government must provide;

* The  public  airing  of  apparent  serious failings in the  provision  of essential services, such as health and education;

* The  determination  of  an  annual  budget  and  the  estimates  of expenditure.'

Although the executive function has been delegated to the Council of Ministers, there would be a clear and definitive reporting line to the States through the Chief Minister. Importantly, we are proposing that the executive remain in the minority and be subject to structured scrutiny by a clear majority of States Members that are not holders of positions within the executive. The requisite governance framework must, of course, be put in place, and this must extend beyond the straightforward clarification of roles and responsibilities that we are proposing. In our view, a key part of this framework will  involve  the  creation  of  a  new  non-executive  oversight  role  for  Members  to perform. The existence of this new role will strengthen corporate governance and aid inclusivity. We believe that Members' skills and abilities will be utilized to the full if this new function and the others across government are to be fulfilled.

The success of our proposals hinges on the States accepting nothing less than sound administration from both the executive and scrutiny functions, backed by the culture of openness and transparency that the new Freedom of Information Law promises. Existing standards of administration are demonstrably not high enough. This statement is  made  in  the  light  of  the  findings  noted  in  various  reports  of  the  PAC,  the Comptroller and Auditor General and the States of Jersey Complaints Panel. It also reflects  comments  received  during  our  interviews  from  both  politicians  and  civil servants. Public expectations of standards that should be adhered to, both here and in other jurisdictions, are rising. The States should expect those higher standards to be achieved.

Our  specific  recommendations  for  reform  are  outlined  in  detail  in  the  following chapters and in a broadly chronological manner, starting with the number of Members to be returned following a public election.

2. HOW MANY MEMBERS?

This question has been debated almost constantly by stakeholders during the course of our review. There are essentially 2 schools of thought. One believes that the preferred number of States Members should be determined first and that the machinery of government should then be designed in order to make best use of that number of Members. The other believes that the optimum machinery should be determined first, following which one can determine the minimum number of States Members needed to make the system work.

We are mindful that the Electoral Commission made the running on this issue on 2012, when it first indicated that a 42 Member Assembly would form part of its recommendations. The Commission's rationale was, we believe, based on 2 facts in particular. First, the majority of submissions made to the Commission called for fewer States Members. Secondly, the Commission was advised by Dr. Alan Renwick of the University of Reading that while the existing States Assembly was not notably large in international comparison... a reduction in its size to somewhere between 30 and 50 would not make it unusually small.'

We  have,  perhaps  unsurprisingly,  identified  a  split  among  those  who  feel  that  a 42 Member Assembly would be viable and those who are concerned that even the 49 Member Assembly that will be delivered by default in 2014 risks leaving Members with too much to do to cover the full range of political duties that the Public will expect them to carry out. Consequently, we have endeavoured to come up with a model  that  would  function  under  both  eventualities;  however,  we  judge  that  our proposals would achieve optimum efficiency with a minimum of 46 States Members.

3. THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING AN ELECTION

We start with the assumption that our electoral system will continue to leave the task of selecting a Chief Minister to the States Assembly. As long as that remains the case, we believe that it will be difficult to cut short the period between election day and the appointment of a Chief Minister. However, it seems reasonable to argue that Members voted  out  of  office  in a public  election  should  not  be  in  a  position  to take  any significant decisions affecting the public once the votes have been counted.

There is another angle to consider. Several newly elected or re-elected candidates may have declared their intention to stand or may be considering standing for the office of Chief Minister. Those candidates will have well-formed policy proposals that they might wish to test the viability of before they make their case for appointment to a position  that  will,  if  our  other  recommendations  are  implemented,  become fundamentally more significant than it is now. Given the absence of political parties and independent think-tanks' in Jersey, an obvious place for candidates to go to for such  advice  is  the  policy  and  research  division  within  the  Chief  Minister's Department. This advisory process may take a little time, especially if there are more than one or 2 candidates for the position. It may also be resource-intensive, to the extent  that  the  Chief  Minister's  Department  might  need  to  call  upon  additional specialist resources from other States departments for a finite period.

Advice from one of our 3 Chief Ministers indicates that prospective candidates might not  need  4 weeks  to  conclude  their  preparations  (the  period  of  time  available  to candidates in 2011). Of course every Chief Minister to date has been a member of the executive  for  the  previous  3 year  term.  If  Jersey  were  to  have  a  newly  elected candidate for Chief Minister, as was the case in Guernsey during 2012, it is possible that such a candidate might benefit from having a little longer to prepare. We therefore propose a compromise solution.

Recommendation 1. The period between election day and the election of a Chief Minister Designate should be shortened by one week.

We are mindful also that newer Members may need time, not only to determine which roles they would like to put themselves forward for, but also to determine who they might wish to support for election to the various other executive and non-executive roles.

In line with the spirit of inclusivity and consensus government, there is a need for some  structure  to  be  applied  to  the  process  of  role  allocation.  We  propose  a mechanism, to be administered by the States Greffe, whereby Members would indicate their preferences by having their names added to lists supplied on request to those wishing to run for Chief Minister and who are considering the make-up of their future Council, or for the chairs of a particular committee to do likewise. Our understanding is  that  a  broadly  similar  system  was  operated  by  the  States  Greffe  prior  to  the commencement of ministerial government and was thought to be helpful. Although the function is now performed to some extent by the Chief Minister's Department, this appears to be relatively informal and covers executive positions only.

Recommendation 2. Newly elected/re-elected Members should benefit from a formal mechanism through which they might express an interest in serving in a particular executive or non-executive capacity, supported by a brief rationale for wishing to pursue those particular roles.

Separate measures could be implemented to limit the scope of executive decision- making during this transition period.

4. ELECTION OF A CHIEF MINISTER

The  existing  2 day  period  within  which  States  Members  can  assess  the  policy statements of the candidates for Chief Minister is simply insufficient. Newly elected Members  are  likely  to  need  rather  longer  to  consider  matters  arising  from  the published statements and to research potential implications before they arrive at the States Assembly to ask questions and cast their vote. This notice period is likely to become more important if our subsequent recommendations regarding the process for devising  a  Strategic  Plan  are  adopted.  Our  proposals  would  cause  candidates' statements to become even more politically significant than they are now.

Recommendation 3. Standing Order 115 should be amended to require that written statements setting out a vision for a strategic policy and the  manner in which a candidate proposes to discharge their duties as Chief Minister should be published not less than 5 working days before the meeting at which the Chief Minister Designate is to be elected.

Notice  of  policy  statements  aside,  our  feedback  indicates  that  Members  find  the substantive process for electing a Chief Minister broadly satisfactory as it now is. We therefore have only one further recommendation to make in this regard. On the basis that we are elevating the importance of the election of a Chief Minister, we consider that the period of questioning for each candidate needs to be a little longer than it currently is.

Recommendation 4. Standing Order 116(5) should be amended to allow up to one hour of questioning of each candidate for the office of Chief Minister.

We have considered whether candidates for Chief Minister should be required during the election campaign to declare their intention to stand. Our conclusion is that it might be counter-productive to do so, insofar as it would prevent Members from persuading  an  eminently  suitable  candidate  from  standing  who  had  hitherto  not considered  the  position.  Election  candidates  with  a  clear  intention  to  pursue  the highest office may nevertheless feel duty-bound to make those intentions known to the electorate during the election campaign.

Then  there  is  the  question  of  whether  a  candidate  for  Chief  Minister  should  be required  to  disclose  the  Members  he  or  she  proposes  to  appoint  to  particular ministerial offices. Such a disclosure might help Members by indicating at an early stage the political direction that the candidate is likely to pursue. It might also be regarded as an unhelpful constraint on candidates that might, for genuine reasons, have yet to finalise their thinking. We have declined to recommend a requirement for disclosure because we are concerned that the constraint argument is important.

5. THE SIZE OF THE EXECUTIVE

Following the election of a Chief Minister, perhaps the next question to consider is the relative sizes of the teams to carry out the executive and non-executive functions.

The  concept  of  a  minority  executive  can  be  traced  back  to  Clothier's recommendation 13.  This  recommendation  was  then  repeated  in  the  principal machinery of government reform proposition of 2001 (P.122/2001 refers), which was in turn amended successfully by the then Deputy P.N. Troy of St. Brelade . Deputy Troy 's amendment called for the margin by which the non-executive would be in the majority to be at least 10% of the total membership of the States, with any resulting fraction of one being regarded as one. The 10% margin survived through to the commencement of ministerial government in December 2005 and quickly became known as the Troy rule.'

There are Members in both the executive and the non-executive that believe the voting patterns within the States demonstrate the absence of a need for the Troy rule. We are nevertheless clear that these Members remain in the minority. Our view, which aligns with the majority, is that the Troy rule strikes a considered balance between the Clothier Panel's preference for minority government and the respective resourcing requirements of the executive and scrutiny given the diverse range of political issues facing a modern government.

Recommendation 5. The size of the executive should continue to be constrained in accordance with the Troy rule.

Our position on this matter has hardened since our interim report was published, albeit that  we  are  not  unanimous  in  our  view.  Feedback  from  members  of  Scrutiny  in particular has left us in little doubt that, given the prevailing pressure to reduce the size  of  the  Assembly,  a  straightforward  minority  executive  would  leave  too  few Members available for scrutiny duties, for the Planning Applications Panel and for the various other tasks that Members are called upon to perform.

We  are  aware  from  our  discussions  with  the  Chief  Minister's  Department  that consideration has been given to classifying Assistant Ministers as members of the executive in certain circumstances only – perhaps on the occasions when they would be bound by collective responsibility in the manner we propose below. In this regard, our view is that an Assistant Minister could not practically perform both an executive and a scrutiny function concurrently and that the scope for conflicts of interest would simply be too great.

Notwithstanding the above, we are relatively relaxed on the question of the precise structure the executive should take. The existing rigidity of the size of the Council, the allocation of ministerial portfolios and the ratio of Ministers to what are currently known as Assistant Ministers are each elements of the executive framework that we envisage successive Chief Ministers might want to adjust. We consider it logical to

grant the Chief Minister that power and for him or her to be able to exercise it once appointed by the States to that office. As such, we can foresee a Chief Minister Designate coming to the States with a list of proposed Ministers that differs in number, and with different portfolios, to that of his or her predecessor.

Recommendation 6. The Chief Minister should be empowered to change ministerial portfolios and determine the optimum number of Ministerial appointments once he or she has been elected as Chief Minister Designate.

6. ELECTION OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Merging 51 independently devised election manifestos into a Strategic Plan for a 3 or 4 year term of office is always going to present something of a challenge. It is perhaps during the election of a Chief Minister and a Council of Ministers that States Members begin to calculate in earnest how many of their election pledges are likely to be delivered by the executive. Under the current system, the States choose the Chief Minister and then interview and select the members of his or her ministerial team. Then,  over  the  next  4 months,  they  review  and,  potentially,  amend  the  political direction the Council of Ministers propose to take, before adopting the Strategic Plan, as per Article 18(2)(e) of the States of Jersey Law 2005.

Some of those we consulted believe that the above arrangement has already caused the States to cede too much control to a minority of Members. Others believe that the process of electing a Chief Minister designate – on the basis of various oral and documented political pledges and following questioning thereon – should already have given the States the means to set a clear political direction for the new term of office. The latter argue that the executive and scrutiny functions, and the Assembly as a whole,  having  chosen  the  Chief  Minister,  should  then  be  getting  on  with  their respective jobs. For the States, that would mean delegating sufficient authority to let the Chief Minister designate pick his or her team and devise the strategy to deliver the vision the States voted for. We see both points of view.

There  is  inevitably  a  weighing-up  of  political  visions,  team  management  skills, personal  reputations  and  certain  other  factors  when  the  States  choose  the  Chief Minister designate. What is important, however, is that the contest is rigorous and that it sets an outline political direction for that term of office. This was arguably the case on 14th November 2011, when the present Chief Minister was elected. A review of the Chief Minister's speech on the day reveals an emphasis on getting people back to work, reform of government and the public sector, and other key priorities that were subsequently expanded upon in what became the Strategic Plan 2012. In short, the outline political vision was set. With a Chief Minister appointed to lead the States to that destination, it is arguably anomalous to give the States the primary role in picking the team the Chief Minister works with to complete the journey.

To be clear, we are not suggesting that the States should have no direct part to play in selecting the Council of Ministers as we believe is the case in the Isle of Man system. To claim that selection of a Council of Ministers is all about devising the best team to deliver, and not about what is to be delivered, would be to oversimplify our political dynamics. The States need to have the final say but, in recommending that they retain a veto over the Chief Minister's preferred team of Ministers, we think the States should be obliged to consider carefully whether any dissatisfaction with one or more of the proposed Ministerial candidates is worth the risk of losing its first choice for the top job.

Recommendation 7. A Chief Minister Designate should continue to be required to secure the endorsement of the States Assembly for his or her ministerial team.

Recommendation 8. Only the Chief Minister Designate should be able to nominate candidates for Ministerial positions.

In making the above recommendation, we note that there is not unanimity within the Panel on this matter, and indeed we suspect that it may well be a matter of some discussion by Members of the Assembly in the proposed in-committee debate. Whilst this remains the recommendation of the Panel, we would welcome views of Members, for example, as to whether the status quo should remain as regards the appointment of Ministers, and the ability for the Assembly to continue to be able to nominate its own candidates from the floor of the Assembly.

Those who have experienced this whole process at first hand have indicated to us that 2 working days is too short a period for a Chief Minister Designate to devise a Council of Ministers. A significant extension of this period would, however, extend the period within which decisions would be made by the outgoing Chief Minister and Ministers. By the time they stand for election, candidates for Chief Minister will have had the benefit of the list produced in accordance with our recommendation 2. Moreover, they will have had the benefit of 3 weeks between the public elections and the election process for Chief Minister, during which they could consider their preferred cabinet.' Our preference, therefore, would be for a modest extension of this period.

Recommendation 9.  The  timescale  outlined  at  Standing  Order  112  should  be amended to require that the Chief Minister Designate nominate his or her preferred slate of Ministers to the States within 5 working days.

The Chief Minister should explain his preferred choice of Ministers by way of a written  proposal,  to  be  published  by  the  Greffier  of  the  States  at  the  point  of nomination. The proposal should name the preferred candidates and summarise the rationale underpinning the Chief Minister Designate's choices. This written proposal may be deemed sufficient to negate the need for questioning of individual candidates, although we have stopped short of making a recommendation in this regard.

We  envisage  that  the  States  would  reconvene  2 working  days  after  the  list  of Ministerial nominees is published. The States would vote for or against each nominee individually and the results of the ballot would be made public once the votes had been  cast  in  respect  of  all  nominees.  The  Council  of  Ministers  would  not  be constituted unless all nominees were to be accepted by the States. In the event of a negative vote, the series of individual votes outlined above would allow the Chief Minister Designate to identify which of his or her ministerial portfolios was proving to be controversial.

Recommendation 10.  The  States  should  vote  for  or  against  the  list  of  proposed Ministers on an individual basis.

A  negative  vote  would  prompt  the  Chief  Minister  to  return  to  the  Assembly  at 09.30 hrs the following day with an alternative list, albeit that we would not wish to prevent the Chief Minister from returning to the States within a shorter period.

Rejection of a third Ministerial team would trigger the dismissal of the Chief Minister Designate  and  a  new  election  for  Chief  Minister,  in  which  the  dismissed  Chief Minister Designate would be excluded from standing. This position would concentrate the collective mind of the Assembly in that at the point of the 3rd election of a slate,

Members would be required to weigh very carefully any relevant concerns regarding one or more prospective Ministers against the perceived benefit of maintaining their first choice of Chief Minister.

Recommendation 11.  The  Chief  Minister  Designate  should  be  able to propose  a maximum of 3 Ministerial teams.

Appointing a team of Ministers in this way will be broadly in accordance with both the original Clothier recommendation and the Standing Orders as they were originally envisaged when the States of Jersey Law 2005 was lodged au Greffe.' It would not be unreasonable  to  expect  the  resulting  Council  of  Ministers  to  operate  more collaboratively as a result and, subject to the making of certain other changes we have in mind, to be more clearly accountable to the States Assembly through the Chief Minister.

7. COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY

We have several measures in mind to improve accountability in the States. Enhancing the Chief Minister's appointment powers is one. Collective responsibility is another. Still more recommendations are made later in this report.

First we should reaffirm what we mean by collective responsibility. We mean that, following any full and frank discussions at the Council table that may from time to time be necessary, all members of the Council should speak and vote together in the States, save in situations where the Chief Minister and the Council themselves agree to make an exception. Maintaining the effectiveness of those full and frank discussions at the Council table that will be needed to arrive at the right decision will, in turn, require that  the  Chief  Minister  and  his  or  her  team  maintain  the  requisite  degree  of confidentiality.

Recommendation 12.  The  Council  of  Ministers  should  be  bound  by  collective responsibility.

At present, Assistant Ministers tend not to be regular attendees at Council of Ministers meetings or to have sight of all the papers and briefings that Council members receive. For that reason, it does not seem right to propose that collective responsibility should always apply to all Assistant Ministers just because they play an executive role. They cannot reasonably be bound by a decision to which they are not a direct party.

Notwithstanding the above, collective responsibility could and, we believe, should bind Assistant Ministers (or any successor post) in respect of matters falling directly within the remit of their respective departments. As an example, we consider that existing Assistant Ministers for Economic Development should be bound in respect of a new draft licensing Law that his or her Minister lodged au Greffe' with the prior endorsement of the Council of Ministers.

Recommendation 13.  Assistant  Ministers  should  also  be  bound  by  collective responsibility in respect of any matters falling directly within the ministerial portfolios to which they are attached.

Once again, this is not a unanimous view of the Panel. There are thoughts that again, the status quo should prevail, and that Assistant Ministers should not be bound overtly by collective responsibility, even to their Minister. Again, we would ask Members to consider this matter in advance of the in-committee debate.

The obvious place to define the scope and limitations of collective responsibility is in the Code of Conduct for Ministers. In this regard we note that, whereas the UK Prime Minister has their cabinet adopt such a code of conduct in precise terms and very early in the life of the government, successive Councils of Ministers have relied on the original Code of 2006 (R.14/2006 refers). This is despite both the Council of 2008 and 2011 having indicated, in their own minutes, that the 2006 Code was not quite fit for purpose.  We  observe  also  that  paragraph 2.5  of  the  PAC's  first  report  of  2012 (Compromise Agreements: Following up the investigations of the Comptroller and Auditor General') includes an almost identical key finding.

Our recommendation below is made primarily in the hope that future Councils will acknowledge the importance of such a document, both in terms of acknowledging public expectation and making the rules of engagement clear for all members of the executive.

Recommendation 14. The precise terms and limitations of collective responsibility should  be  specified  within  the  Code  of  Conduct  for  Ministers,  which  should  be adopted at the very first meeting of each new Council and, subsequently, be presented to the States as a report in the R.' series.

Such an arrangement would align well with the requirement for sound, disciplined government  with  a  clear  direction  and  clear  accountability  to  the  States  for  its performance. The obligation to sign up to the Code of Conduct promptly would also concentrate  the  minds  of  those  Members  contemplating  whether  to  pursue  an executive role given the platform on which they stood for election.

We  recall that  Clothier  saw  a  need  for  the  Council  to  have  the  power to direct departments if such direction became necessary. This seems to us to be a sensible addition to the powers of a Council bound by collective responsibility. Any such direction would need to be clearly defined by way of deadlines and targets so as to enable the Council to monitor compliance.

Recommendation 15. The Council of Ministers should be invested with sufficient powers to direct individual departments if necessary.

Before we move away from the subject of collective responsibility, it would perhaps be appropriate to reference Recommendation 5 in our interim report, which cites a need  for  a  standing  item  on  Council  of  Ministers  agendas  that  would  provide  a summary update on the work programmes of individual Ministers. We stand by this recommendation and note that such a summary update need only be noted briefly before Ministers move onto the pressing agenda items of the day.

8. ASSISTANT MINISTERS

P.122/2001 envisaged that the role of Assistant Ministers would be to –

• provide advice and assistance to a Minister in relation to his/her executive work;
• assist the Minister by, for example, taking the lead under her or his direction in a given area of work. This could include acting under delegated authority;
• deputise for the Minister in her or his absence.

This seems to us to be an entirely sensible description of the duties an Assistant Minister should  be performing  and,  were  those  the  roles  being  performed  by  all Assistant Ministers today, this chapter would have been brief. What is clear, however, is that while a very small number of Assistant Ministers have a remit that is arguably equivalent to that of a Minister, relatively few Assistant Ministers are being permitted to perform all 3 roles. In one or 2 cases, the remit given has been minimal.

In highlighting the above, we are not identifying a new problem. The first review of the ministerial system was conducted by the Privileges and Procedures Committee in 2007. Paragraph 4.3.2 of the resulting report (R.105/2007), outlines the Committee's conclusions regarding the role of Assistant Ministers in the following terms –

despite certain steps taken by Ministers during the last 18 months, the rôle of Assistant Ministers is unclear, varied and there is great uncertainty among States members (including some Assistant Ministers themselves) about the exact purpose and function of the position.'

Some Assistant Ministers cited a lack of access to information and involvement in departmental decision-making, which in turn made it difficult for them to stand in for their Minister during a period of absence. While some were given significant political remits within their departmental portfolios and substantial delegated responsibilities to match, others had no delegated responsibility at all and appeared to feel underutilized. Given that these very same issues have been drawn to our attention in 2013, we believe some significant changes are called for. These changes fall within 2 categories. Firstly,  we  propose  some  changes  designed  to  ensure  that  the  existing  Assistant Minister positions are performing the 3 roles. Secondly, and in a subsequent chapter, we propose an additional oversight mechanism to complement the advise and assist' role Assistant Ministers are, to varying extents, performing.

Our first specific proposal concerning Assistant Ministers is that they be renamed Junior  Ministers'.  The  existing  name  seems  to  have  developed  rather  negative connotations to the extent that we see merit in dispensing with it. There does not, however, seem to be any need to alter the process by which Junior Ministers are appointed, other than to note that their appointment should formally oblige them to adopt the Code of Conduct for Ministers as approved by the Council.

Once again, we anticipate that some Members would prefer the States to be given some form of power of endorsement/veto (on a Minister by Minister basis) over the appointment of a Junior Minister, particularly if they are given delegated decision- making authority. If, as we hope, our final report becomes the subject of a prompt in-

committee debate, this may be a topic for discussion. For now, we note that whilst the rejection of a nomination for the post for Junior Minister might be unfortunate, it should not prove catastrophic for the Minister/Chief Minister in the event of rejection.

Recommendation 16. The title Junior Minister' should henceforth be substituted for that of Assistant Minister.'

Once appointed, the role of Junior Minister should be consistent across ministerial portfolios  and  become  a  rather  more  important  position  than,  in  some  cases,  it currently is. The role should provide up-and-coming Members with the opportunity to shadow a more experienced colleague and learn the ropes, just as succession planning is expected to work in the Civil Service. Junior Ministers should be the default port of call for an executive decision and to represent their department at the Council of Ministers table whenever the Minister is out of the Island or otherwise indisposed. The present position, which is largely defined by Articles 27 and 28 of the States of Jersey Law 2005, seems to be unnecessarily complex and restrictive. It could ultimately leave a relevant ministerial portfolio unrepresented at the Council of Ministers when a major new cross-cutting policy is to be discussed.

Recommendation 17. The States of Jersey Law 2005 should be amended to make Junior  Ministers  the  default  port  of  call  for  an  executive  decision  whenever  the Minister is out of the Island or is otherwise indisposed.

Recommendation 18.  One  Junior  Minister  should  by  default  represent  their department at the Council of Ministers whenever the Minister is out of the Island or is otherwise indisposed.

Junior Ministers should as a matter of course be given specific areas of delegated responsibility.  Irrespective  of  whether  these  delegations  concern  areas  of  defined political responsibility or authority to exercise certain legislative powers, we maintain that each delegation should be codified in a Ministerial Decision and be reported to the States. They should also have rights of access to all information available to their Minister.  Without  it,  they  cannot  properly  perform  all  3  of  their  duties  as  per P.122/2001.

Recommendation 19.  Junior  Ministers  should  have  identical  rights  of  access  to information to those of their Minister.

The  above  recommendations  are  intended  to  promote  consistency  and  political resilience at the departmental level.

9. THE PRIVILEGES AND PROCEDURES COMMITTEE

We see a need for the PPC to continue largely as it is, both in terms of its constitution and terms of reference. If there is one element of PPC's terms of reference that might need reviewing, it is Standing Order 128(a), which charges the Committee –

to keep under review the composition, the practices and the procedures of the States as Jersey's legislature and bring forward for approval by the States amendments to the Law and standing orders as considered appropriate'.

During the course of this review, the Sub-Committee has sensed a strong view among some in the executive that the Council of Ministers should take the lead on reforming the States of Jersey Law 2005. We invite PPC and the States as a whole to consider whether –

1. the executive should be required to consult formally with the PPC before lodging any amendments to the States of Jersey Law 2005, or
2. only PPC should be empowered to lodge an amendment to the States of Jersey Law 2005.

10. THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE

The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) has, in our view, been one of the notable successes of ministerial government. We have therefore resisted the temptation to tinker, save in one area. Accepting that existing and previous external members of the PAC have served the committee and the Island well, we think it would be right to safeguard the reputation of the PAC by recommending that the process of recruiting future members of the PAC who are not States Members be overseen by the expert Jersey Appointments Commission.

Recommendation 20. The members of the Public Accounts Committee who are not States  Members  should  be  selected  for  recommendation  to  the  States  Assembly through a recruitment process overseen by the Jersey Appointments Commission.

11. DISMISSAL AND RESHUFFLING OF MINISTERS

Our interim report has already made clear our view that the Chief Minister should be empowered to dismiss a Minister. This remains our position.

In terms of securing a replacement, it would seem appropriate to apply the same process  as  that  which  we  recommend  for  the  primary  election  of  a  Council  of Ministers.  This  would  mean  that  the  Chief  Minister  alone  could  nominate  a replacement Minister – complete with a requirement to summarise in advance and in writing why the nominee is the preferred choice – and that the Chief Minister would be  afforded  3 attempts  to  secure  the  endorsement  of  the  States.  Should  a  third candidate be proposed and fail to be endorsed, the Chief Minister would fall, and the process of electing a new Chief Minister and Council of Ministers would commence. Again, our view is that that at the point of the 3rd election, Members would be required  to  weigh  very  carefully  any  relevant  concerns  regarding  the  nominated Minister  against  the  perceived  benefit  of  maintaining  their  first  choice  of  Chief Minister.

It is perhaps worthy of note that giving the Chief Minister alone the right to nominate a new Minister might seem, at first glance, to take away the dismissed Minister's option of a day in court.' Under the existing arrangements, a dismissed Minister is not prevented  from  standing  again  and  may  choose  to  use  their  nomination  as  an opportunity to challenge publicly the reason for dismissal. Our view, however, is that a States decision to reinstate a dismissed Minister would be tantamount to a vote of no confidence in the Chief Minister. That no confidence motion is still open to the dismissed Minister if he or she feels seriously aggrieved. They need only to persuade 3 of their colleagues to sign a motion in accordance with Standing Order 22.

Recommendation 21. Following a resignation or dismissal, the Chief Minister alone should be able to propose a new Minister. He or she would require the endorsement of the States for that appointment.

Recommendation 22. A Chief Minister should be entitled to 3 attempts to appoint a new Minister.

There is then the question of reshuffling to consider. Our view is that our soon to be implemented 4 year terms are still short enough to make it difficult to derive a net benefit from a Ministerial reshuffle. The value a new Member could bring would inevitably be affected by their need to acclimatise to the new role in the limited time available before the next election. If an existing Minister underperforms, we note that the  Chief  Minister  would  have  the  power  to  dismiss  that  Minister  and  pursue  a reappointment  in  accordance  with  our  recommendations  immediately  above.  If, however, a particular set of circumstances were to warrant the swapping around of existing Ministers with different skill-sets, that could also be achieved by the Chief Minister coming to the Assembly with a reshuffled list of Ministers for endorsement. That is the route we would recommend. In such circumstances, we would not expect the Chief Minister to fall if his or her revised list of Ministers was rejected. Neither would we propose that the Chief Minister be forced into 3 attempts to reconstitute their Council successfully.

Recommendation 23. The Chief Minister should require the prior endorsement of the States for any reshuffling of Ministers between existing portfolios.

12. THE STRATEGIC PLAN

The importance of the Strategic Plan in Jersey's system is difficult to understate given the Island's history of consensus politics, the absence of political parties and the related challenge facing an executive that would like to demonstrate a mandate from the electorate. Our difficulty, however, is that while there is a prevailing view that the existing Strategic Plan development process is far from perfect there is, again, no clearly preferred way forward.

At present, having allowed the Council of Ministers to draft a Strategic Plan for their term of office, the States then review it, amend it as they see fit and then adopt it. Whether this process causes the States to take ownership of the Strategic Plan is a moot  point.  If  they  do,  then  one  might  ask  whether  the  role  of  the  States  is fundamentally  any  different  to  that  which  it  performed  before  the  advent  of  the ministerial  system.  Such  a  state of  affairs  would put  the  States in  an interesting position whenever they sought to hold the Chief Minister or the Council of Ministers to account.

Some consider it counter-intuitive to elect a Chief Minister on the basis of a vision statement made in accordance with Standing Order 115 and the question and answer session that follows, only to require that Chief Minister to adopt a Strategic Plan several months later that takes a fundamentally different path. In the same vein, we would expect any Strategic Plan to broadly replicate and build upon the very same themes  given  priority  in  the  Chief  Minister's  original  pitch  for  election.  As  we acknowledge earlier in our report, the current Strategic Plan can clearly trace its lineage to Senator Gorst 's stated priorities in November 2011.

Others consider that the States must have an opportunity to debate the Strategic Plan in order to afford Members a formal opportunity to let their constituents know that they  disassociate  themselves  with  all  or  a  part  of  the  strategic  direction  being proposed.

We consider that the States should require a detailed strategic policy statement in fairly short order. Given that any Strategic Plan to be followed by a Council of Ministers should reflect the key elements of the statement issued in accordance with Standing Order 115(1)(c) by the successful candidate for Chief Minister, we do not believe that a shortened timescale should present a particular problem. Any public consultation on the draft would nevertheless need to take account of the shortened development period.

Recommendation 24. The period for development of the draft Strategic Plan cited in Article 18(2)(e) of the States of Jersey Law 2005 should be reduced to a maximum of 60 days.

The next question to consider is whether the States should take ownership of a strategy that the executive should be accountable for delivering. There are essentially 3 choices that Members might wish to consider –

1. the States continue to endorse the Strategic Plan and retain the power to amend it;
2. the draft Strategic Plan becomes the subject of an in-committee debate before itis finalised by the Council of Ministers and presented to the States as an R'; or
3. the executive is held accountable for its Strategic Plan, which should be adopted by the Council of Ministers and reported as an R'.

13. GOVERNANCE

If our recommendations are adopted, there will be a further concentration of authority in the hands of the Chief Minister and of the executive members of the Assembly.

To counter this, Clothier made various recommendations, including the introduction of an Ombudsman, and also mentioned Freedom of Information ("FOI"). FOI will only be implemented in 2015, some 14 years after the Clothier report. Other recommended checks and balances remain outstanding. It is crucial that if key proposals are adopted, robust governance must be implemented.

This cuts across a number of core principles such as accountability, transparency, sound corporate governance, etc. Public expectations surrounding ethical standards are more demanding now than ever before. The tone from the top' must support and encourage ethical standards and behaviour.

Ethics  is  about  principles,  values  and  beliefs  which  influence  judgement  and behaviour. It goes beyond obeying Laws, Rules and Regulations – it is about doing the right  thing  in  the  circumstances.  Ethics  is  fundamental  to  establishing  trust.  The existence of trust is essential to business and society. It enhances the dependability of relationships, facilitates transactions and promotes the efficient allocation of resources.

Improving public trust must surely be an aim of every States Member.

Deciding what is the right thing to do can be challenging. We all face numerous personal,  social  and  organisational  pressures  which  influence  our  decisions  and actions. Sometimes it is easy to assume that compliance with legislation, regulations and policies and procedures equates to doing the right thing. Unfortunately that will not always be the case.

By its nature, a compliance approach to decision-making cannot cover all types of situations and eventualities. Even when a specific circumstance is addressed by a rule, compliance is often with the letter of the rule, not its spirit.

Various organisations have identified certain threats' that could impact upon the decision-making  process  and  need  to  be  guarded  against.  These  are  all  readily transposable to the world of the politician and civil servant and can fall into one or more of the following categories –

Self-interest  threat –  the  threat  that  a  financial  or  other  interest  will inappropriately influence judgment or behaviour;

Self-review threat – the threat that someone may not appropriately evaluate the results of a previous judgment made or service performed, particularly by colleagues close to them;

Advocacy threat – the threat of promoting the interest of a particular company, constituent,  or  other  individual  to  the  extent  that  overall  objectivity  is compromised;

Familiarity  threat –  the  threat  (for  example)  that  due  to  a  long  or  close relationship with someone, a politician or civil servant will be too sympathetic to their interests rather than the wider public interest; and,

Intimidation threat – the threat that a politician or civil servant is deterred from acting objectively because of actual or perceived pressures, including attempts to exercise undue influence over the person making a decision.

It seems clear to us that to mitigate some of the threats, there is a requirement for greater transparency and better oversight than is presently the case. As an example, we do not believe that it is appropriate that decisions could be made that are known solely to  the  executive.  However,  one  also  has  to  ensure  that  the  counter-arguments regarding confidentiality are addressed.

We therefore consider that there is a need for further checks and balances, and are recommending in the following chapters – (a) increasing the oversight ability of non- executive States members; (b) improving the flexibility and resources available to Scrutiny, and (c) improving the appeal options available to members of the public, and indeed other stakeholders.

We  believe  that  our  proposals  as  a  whole  preserve  the  integrity  of  Ministerial executive government, but significantly improve overall governance and oversight. It will therefore mitigate the risks we run of dysfunctional government through error, mistake and potentially (in the future) even worse.

14. NON-EXECUTIVE MEMBERS

In our first chapter Defining the Problem,' we discussed Ministers' relative isolation from other States Members and the relative lack of sources of political advice that Ministers can rely on to work through a problem. In the absence of party structures, specialist advisers and the like, one rather obvious source of political advice that the executive  can  draw  upon  is  the  non-executive.  Tapping  that  source  requires  a mechanism to bridge the gap between the executive and non-executive, and one with sufficient controls in place at each end to guard against cross-contamination of roles.

To fix this difficulty, we propose the creation of the Non-Executive Member (NEM) role. The role of the NEM would be as follows –

1. to provide preliminary advice and constructive challenge throughout the  development  of  ministerial  policy  and  the  formulation  of departmental initiatives;
2. to act generally as a political sounding board or source of informal political advice on general matters pertaining tothe department,
3. to safeguard the public interest by providing real time oversight of matters arising within departments, including ministerial decisions; and,
4. to carry  out  early  monitoring  of  the  performance  of  departmental management in meeting goals and objectives of the Minister.

Recommendation 25.  NEMs  should  be  appointed  to  provide  advice  and  other assistance to each Minister.

An NEM would perform an entirely separate role from that of a Junior Minister. The latter would remain part of the executive and would be expected to fulfil each of the 3 roles as cited in P.122/2001. Whereas it would be possible for a Minister to delegate to his or her Junior Minister specific authority, a NEM would not be permitted to exercise any delegated authority at all.

NEMs would be appointed from the non-executive side of the States. Although our preference would be for all NEMs to be nominated by Chief Minister (following consultation with relevant Ministers) and appointed by the States, we acknowledge that a case could be made for appointments by the Chief Minister, by the States directly or, perhaps, by Scrutiny. If the Chief Minister is to make the nominations and if  the  States  declines  to  accept  3  separate  nominations,  we  would  propose  that nominations  be  permitted  from  the  floor  of  the  Assembly.  In  making  such  a recommendation, we again seek the views of the Assembly as to the preferred method of appointment. We anticipate that some Members would prefer to have the States nominate their own candidates from the floor of the Assembly.

Recommendation 26.  NEMs  should  be  appointed  by  the  States  on  the recommendation of the Chief Minister.

On the question of how many NEMs there should be, we envisage a need for 2 per ministerial portfolio. If, for example, the States are to be comprised of 46 Members in future, there would be an executive of 20 and a non-executive of 26. Assuming that we retain 10 ministerial portfolios, there would be a need to fill 20 NEM positions. This is achievable, assuming that every Member with a role as an NEM also contributes to the Scrutiny function. Ensuring that the Scrutiny function continues to have access to sufficient resources whilst avoiding material conflicts of interest would require each NEM to undertake scrutiny work, and to do so in respect of a different ministerial portfolio. It is not inconceivable that PPC might need to devise a mechanism to ensure that Members do not prioritise NEM work over their scrutiny duties.

An Assembly of less than 46 Members would raise the question of whether some Ministers should be supported by only one NEM. If the size of the Assembly remains at 49, then there is greater flexibility in the numbers available for allocation.

Recommendation 27. NEMs should only be selected from members of the Assembly who are actively available to participate in scrutiny reviews.

Recommendation 28.  PPC  should  consider  establishing  procedures  to  define  and ensure that NEMs are actively' available to participate in scrutiny reviews (such procedures to be implemented at the same time as NEMs are created).

Any scenario in which Members carry out a dual role gives rise to the risk of conflicts of interest. To mitigate risk in this regard, we see a need to revise the Code of Practice for Scrutiny and the PAC to make it clear that NEMs could not serve on a scrutiny review covering a topic area within that of the Minister for whom they have oversight responsibility.

Recommendation 29. NEMs should be permitted to serve on scrutiny committees but not the SMC, and not in respect of any ministerial portfolio for which they act as a NEM.

The day-to-day duties of an NEM would involve frequent direct contact with the Minister, the Junior Minister and the States department/s that fall within the Minister's portfolio.  NEMs  would  necessarily  be  given  full  and  real-time  access  to  all  the information relating to policy and operations that the relevant States departments hold, albeit that some of that information will be available on a confidential basis only. That information access would extend to include advance notice of every formal Ministerial Decision before it is made. Proportionate engagement with officers would also be permitted. We envisage the same level of access as received by the Minister and Junior Minister of the department.

Recommendation 30. NEMs should have full and unfettered access to information held by, and the officers working within, the States departments falling within the relevant Minister's portfolio.

Although  a  significant  proportion  of  the  work  undertaken  by  NEMs  would  be undertaken informally, NEMs would meet with the Minister and Junior Minister on at

least a monthly basis. A written summary of such meetings and of action points arising would need to be created by the relevant executive department, and these would be approved  at  subsequent  meetings.  In  addition,  NEMs  should  be  able  to  request separate meetings with the Minister on any particular item of interest.

We envisage that, from time to time, NEMs will identify matters of political concern. These might include –

1. a decision due to be made or policy advanced which does not seem to be in the public interest;
2. operational matters arising which are deemed problematic; and,
3. policy/operational issues that are not being addressed.

In the first instance, the NEM will be expected to raise any concerns with the Minister and Chief Officer directly. Should the concern be raised at a formal meeting and not be addressed to the satisfaction of the NEM, there will be options open to the NEM, including approaching the Comptroller and Auditor General, as appropriate.

Given that the NEM decides where public interest issues/problematic operational or policy matters arise, there might conceivably be a need for a proportionate mechanism to dismiss an NEM that might abuse their position. Although we consider that such mechanisms would be for the PPC to propose, we envisage that the relevant Minister would seek to raise any concerns with the Chief Minister and PPC in the first instance. Indeed, there may well be a need to amend the existing Code of Conduct for Elected Members to take account of this new role.

Recommendation 31. PPC should consider bringing an amendment to the Code of Conduct for Elected Members to take account of the creation of NEMs.

It is worthwhile just noting how the relationship between NEMs and Scrutiny will work. Whilst there may be a perceived potential for overlap between the work of NEMs and Scrutiny; in practice, however, each will have a materially different role. Whereas NEMs will work directly with Ministers and Junior Ministers to provide a broader  political  perspective  and,  critically,  real-time  oversight  of  all  Ministerial Decisions prior to them being made, Scrutiny and the PAC will continue to carry out at arm's length the 3 primary activities of formal scrutiny as originally defined in P.122/2001,  namely  participation  in  the  development  of  policy,  the  review  of legislation, and the overall examination of the performance of government.

15. SCRUTINY

Feedback obtained during our programme of stakeholder interviews has led us to conclude that the output of the 5 Scrutiny Panels since the elections in 2011 has improved in both quantitative and qualitative terms. There are nevertheless 3 issues concerning the scrutiny function that are of principal concern to the Sub-Committee. These are –

1. the flexibility of the scrutiny function,
2. the resources available for scrutiny panels (by which we mean both States Members and the executive support they receive), and
3. the ability of the scrutiny function to operate in real-time.

Taking  flexibility  first,  the  recommendations  we  have  made  so  far  will,  if implemented, deliver an executive that can get up to speed more quickly, and with greater  clarity  of  focus, than  is the  case at  present.  If  the  Chief  Minister  or  his successor pursues the re-alignment of certain ministerial portfolios – and there are signs this might happen – then Scrutiny will be under pressure to keep pace.

We begin by recommending a more flexible oversight and management structure. Five States Members should be elected to what will become the Scrutiny Management Committee (SMC), with the Chairman of the PAC becoming the sixth member. These SMC members will have remits broadly identical to the existing Scrutiny Panels. Members of the executive will not be eligible to serve on the SMC and neither will anyone formally appointed to a NEM position. We further propose that only the non- executive States Members be permitted to cast votes during the election of the SMC. This may prove controversial, and there is not a unanimous opinion on the Sub- Committee regarding this matter. Accordingly, we again do wish to hear the views of States members on this matter during the in-committee debate.

Recommendation 32. There should be a Scrutiny Management Committee (SMC) consisting of 5 non-executive States Members elected by the States, together with the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee.

Recommendation 33. Only non-executive States Members should be permitted to cast votes during the election of the SMC or for a replacement member of the SMC.

For the avoidance of doubt, the above 5 persons will be the only persons elected by the States to a particular roles within Scrutiny – albeit that the States will continue to appoint a PAC Chairman and PAC members, with the majority coming from among its number. The process by which other non-executive States Members will join topic- based reviews is explained below.

Recommendation 34. Dismissal and replacement of individual members of the SMC should be a matter determined by the States following debate on a no confidence proposition, to be lodged by a member of the non-executive only.

It stands to reason that if the States appoints the members of the SMC, it needs to be able to hold them to account. We therefore recommend that it be possible for any member of the non-executive to lodge a proposition calling for the dismissal of a member of the SMC, save that such a proposition would need to be counter-signed by another 3 States Members in the same way as a no confidence motion would be lodged in accordance with Standing Order 22.

While the Council of Ministers is busy preparing the Strategic Plan, the SMC will be preparing the ground for scrutiny to function effectively. It may commission briefings from  all  executive  States  departments  on  their  functions,  priorities  and  on  the legislation and policies to which those departments adhere. These briefings should be open  to  all  non-executive  Members  and  should,  we  think,  be  supplemented  with scheduled opportunities for new Members to visit States departments and meet senior management teams. Additional sessions will need to be arranged to educate new Members on scrutiny techniques and, perhaps to provide refresher training for those who have been re-elected. Our expectation is that Members will want to take full advantage of these sessions.

Recommendation 35. There should be scheduled opportunities for new Members to visit States departments and meet senior management teams early in the life of a new States.

Accepting that the Council of Ministers might consider it appropriate to consult non- executive  Members  independently  and  in  detail  regarding  the  content  of  its forthcoming  Strategic  Plan,  we  envisage  that  the  role  Scrutiny  performs  can  be determined once a decision is taken on the matters we raise in chapter 12.

Once the Strategic Plan is presented to the States by the Council of Ministers, together with a supplementary outline work programme for at least the coming 12 months, the SMC would utilise both to inform development of its own scrutiny work programme. Where review topics do not fall solely and directly within the remit of one SMC member, the SMC will allocate responsibility for oversight of the topic review. The work programme will be presented to the States, will synchronise with that of the Council and will be kept under monthly review by the SMC. It will be necessary for the SMC to leave scope for a number of reviews to be launched unilaterally or for matters to be referred by the States Assembly from time to time.

Recommendation 36.  Any  questions  regarding  the  responsibility  for  cross-cutting review topics should be resolved by the Scrutiny Management Committee.

On top of its overarching responsibility for the work programme and responsibility for allocating  cross-cutting  reviews,  the  SMC  will  oversee  financial  management  of scrutiny activity and be the upholder of a suitably redrafted Code of Practice for Scrutiny and the PAC.

Recommendation 37. The Code of Practice for Scrutiny and the PAC would need to be reviewed to take account of the changes we recommend.

SMC members will not be conducting reviews in isolation. The part of the scrutiny work  programme  for  which  they  are  responsible  will  have  been  developed  in consultation with other non-executive members, as well as with due regard to any views expressed by the public. During that process, SMC members will doubtless have developed a clear idea as to which non-executive Members are interested in particular fields. We anticipate that they will be mindful of this knowledge when selecting members to join a scrutiny committee formed to look at a particular issue. As is generally the case now, we believe each scrutiny committee should have between 3 and 5 Members, so as to provide appropriate resource and a balance of political without becoming unwieldy. In this regard, we recommend that the SMC be given an additional oversight role regarding the membership of scrutiny committees formed to review a particular topic, and that this role be defined in the revised Code of Practice for Scrutiny and the PAC. The SMC should ensure that a broad range of non-executive States Members are being employed at any one time.

If the members of the SMC were to be tempted to define the scrutiny work programme unilaterally, we suspect that they might find themselves short of the Members they would need to form the necessary committees.

Recommendation 38. Any non-executive States Member not already serving on the SMC should be able to volunteer to serve on a scrutiny committee established by the SMC to conduct a topic review.

Recommendation 39. Scrutiny committees formed to conduct a review of a particular issue should be comprised of between 3 and 5 non-executive members.

Recommendation 40. Membership of scrutiny committees should be approved by the SMC.

SMC members may wish to appoint themselves as Chair of the scrutiny committees formed to carry out reviews within their remit. We envisage, however, that they should have the flexibility to appoint another non-executive States Member to chair certain reviews.

Initial outline planning of many scrutiny reviews will have been conducted in advance as part of the SMC's forward planning process. With these matters already addressed, it seems right to us that the detailed terms of reference for a scrutiny committee's review be approved by the SMC member with oversight responsibility. The decision to approve and present the final report of a scrutiny committee will, however, be taken by unanimous or majority decision of that scrutiny committee.

Recommendation 41. Terms of reference for individual scrutiny committees should be approved by the member of the SMC with oversight responsibility for that topic area.

Recommendation 42. A scrutiny committee constituted to conduct a particular topic review will be authorised to approve its own final report for presentation to the States.

In our interim report, we recommended that the Chairmen's Committee consider the Electoral Commission's subsidiary recommendation on legislative scrutiny and report its views to the PPC. The Chairmen's Committee has gone further and considered the substantive question asked by the Electoral Commission. It concludes that a second chamber  would  be  disproportionately  expensive  and  that  a  dedicated  legislative scrutiny committee is unnecessary. Better policy planning on the part of the executive and, in particular, adherence to the Green and White Paper consultation process, will, in the opinion of the Chairmen's Committee, allow the Scrutiny function to build into its forward work programme adequate time to conduct legislative scrutiny. We accept that view.

Recommendation 43.  Responsibility  for  conducting  legislative  scrutiny  should remain with the established Scrutiny function.

On a related matter, we were reminded during the course of our interview process that, under the old committee system, a member of the Law Draftsman's Office would go through,  with  a  committee,  on  a  line-by-line  basis,  any  significant  draft  Law  or Regulations that the Committee was considering lodging. This process ensured that the politicians were fully briefed on the implications of the Law being drafted and were able to consider whether it met their policy objectives. Committee members were also able to question any particular aspects of the draft legislation at that time. It has been suggested to us that an equivalent process happens rather less frequently under the Ministerial system. If these briefings are now tending to occur at officer-to-officer level,  then  the  Minister  is  being  briefed  at  third-hand,  and  the  system  could conceivably be more heavily dependent on Scrutiny than is perhaps appropriate. We invite  the  Council  of  Ministers  to  review  the  position  and  satisfy  itself  that  all Ministers are applying a consistent and thorough approach to draft legislation.

Recommendation 44. The Council of Ministers should ensure that all Ministers are obtaining appropriate input from the Law Draftsman's Office on significant pieces of draft legislation prior to lodging.

We are mindful that the following recommendation may appear somewhat curious given that it seeks only to maintain the status quo. We nevertheless feel that this is matter is too important to leave buried in the main body of our report. To allow Assistant Ministers to serve on Scrutiny would be to contravene the finding at the very heart of the Clothier report of December 2000 –

good government calls for an assembly in which there is a division between those who exercise executive power and those who are in government but not in the executive.'

Quite  apart  from  the  extensive  scope  for  conflicts  of  interest  to  occur,  the  Sub- Committee concludes from Members' own feedback that Members with executive responsibilities  would  always  be  tempted  to  prioritise  their  executive  work  over scrutiny duties. The risk that Scrutiny would suffer as a result is, therefore, very real.

Recommendation 45.  Assistant  Ministers  should  not  be  permitted  to  serve  on Scrutiny.

The output of the scrutiny function will be affected by the availability of States Members and of financial and officer resource. Assuming that the States does not become markedly smaller, and that the available non-executive Members all commit themselves to scrutiny duties, we believe that Scrutiny could further improve its output in  qualitative  and  quantitative  terms  with  some  refinements  to  its  support arrangements.

We envisage that each of the Scrutiny Management Committee members will need a permanent  Scrutiny  Officer  to  deal  with  the  day-to-day  management  of  scrutiny reviews. Scrutiny Officers' work will include preparation of agendas and minutes for the  scrutiny  committees  carrying  out  individual  reviews,  securing  of/liaison  with specialist advisors, preparation of media releases, website management and so on. A supplementary  internal  research  function  may  also  be  needed  to  assist  with background  preparation  for  scrutiny  reviews,  perhaps  with  more  complex  issues internal  to  the  States  that  arise  during  the  course  of  an  individual  review.  We anticipate that the researchers will have a role to play in producing the briefs that will need to be given to the Retained External Specialist Advisor (RESA) service that we are convinced Scrutiny needs. The RESA service will provide specialist economic and legal advice to scrutiny committees on request, together with a financial analysis capacity. This latter capacity may in practice be of particular benefit to the PAC, but could conceivably be of significant use to scrutiny committees also. The establishment of a RESA service would be broadly consistent with the resource provision for UK Select Committees.

There will continue to be a senior manager for this modified scrutiny office, who will be the executive officer to the Scrutiny Management Committee.

Recommendation 46. The structure and resourcing of the Scrutiny Office should be reviewed with a view to enhancing internal research capacity and enabling easier access to specialist external advice.

16. AN OMBUDSMAN

As noted in a number of places in this report, greater authority is being proposed to be vested in the executive arm of the States, be it in the hands of the Chief Minister, or in the  hands  of  the  Chief  Executive.  However,  as  also  stated,  we  consider  this  is acceptable provided the appropriate checks and balances exist or are put in place.

Parts of our deliberations have included some consideration of matters raised in the original Clothier report. One whole chapter of that report was devoted to the call to create an Ombudsman. Extracts of that chapter are as follows –

"The argument in favour of an Ombudsman for Jersey is strengthened by the proposal to shift more of the administrative decision-making in the system to the Civil Service

 in  any  civilised  state  the  citizen's  complaint  must  be  listened  to, adjudicated upon and a remedy supplied if the complaint is well founded. It should be understood that an Ombudsman is concerned only with dilatory, incompetent or discourteous dealings with the citizens' affairs.

We recommend the institution of a proper Ombudsman to hear complaints of maladministration by Government Departments. This would be a matter of little  difficulty  and  no  great  expense.  The  Ombudsman  should  be  an independent person and endowed with powers to order the production of papers and files and to command the attendance of witnesses. If a finding is made  in  favour  of  the  citizen,  and  the  responsible  Department  does  not volunteer to remedy the grievance, the power of compulsion should lie in the States, to whom the Ombudsman reports and whose officer he is"

Whilst we acknowledge that our existing administrative appeals system was improved in  2006,  we  consider  that  the  case  for  implementing  the  original  Clothier recommendation remains compelling. It would, in our view, be in the public interest to establish  the  office  of  ombudsman  either  before  or  at  the  same  time  that  the recommended structural changes are made regarding the Executive.

Recommendation 47. An Ombudsman should be appointed to hear and determine complaints of maladministration by Departments. This recommendation should be implemented  either  in  advance  of,  or  at  the  same  time  as  the  recommendations concerning greater authority for the Executive.

17. THE PRIVATE MEMBER'S ROLE

It seems to be a source of frustration to some non-executive Members that they stand for election on the basis of a published manifesto and that, within a matter of weeks, their election pledges run the risk of being diluted or pushed entirely to one side by the strategic planning and medium term financial planning processes, both of which are heavily resourced. We consider it slightly perverse that the States guard so jealously the right of a Member to bring a private proposition, whilst restricting the resource available to backbenchers to give them a sporting chance of developing the election pledges they made as an independent candidate. Neither would we wish to do anything to encourage Members outside of the executive to make use of the resources available to Scrutiny for such purposes. Paragraph 5.8 of the Clothier report was clear that Members needed better facilities and, notwithstanding the improvements secured by the PPC since its inception and the very welcome research assistance provided by the States Greffe on an ad-hoc basis, we believe that backbenchers would benefit from more formal research assistance than they currently receive.

Recommendation 48. An additional research resource should be made available to non-executive States Members to assist them with the development of draft policy proposals.

18. THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE

PAC's first report of 2012 highlights the double fracture' in reporting lines created when the States approved what became the States of Jersey Law 2005. Chief Officers were made accountable to the Minister of the relevant department. The Chief Minister was not able to direct or to dismiss Ministers, and indeed also lost control over the ability to nominate his/her own team. To quote P.A.C.1/2012, the fractured lines of responsibility  allowed  the  Chief  Minister  of  the  day  to  do  nothing  in  respect  of problems identified in their report. The problem, which continues to exist, is perhaps best summarised in paragraph 7.6 of that same report –