Code of Practice for Scrutiny Panels and the Public Accounts Committee (P.101-2006)-comments

STATES OF JERSEY

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CODE OF PRACTICE FOR SCRUTINY PANELS AND THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE (P.101/2006): COMMENTS

Presented to the States on 1st September 2006 by H.M. Attorney General

STATES GREFFE

COMMENTS

Report of the Law Officers on the provisions regarding legal advice (paragraphs 9.17 to 9.21) contained in the Proposed Code of Practice for Scrutiny Panels and the Public Accounts Committee

Introduction

1. W  e are takingtheunusualstepoflodging a report on a proposition withoutbeing requested by the States to do so becausewe think the way in which legal advice is treated is offundamental importance to the good administration of the Island. We very much regret that wehave not been able toreachagreement with the Chairmen'sCommittee, and wewould like to reaffirm ourcommitmentto assisting Scrutiny Panels as well as individual members wherever it is reasonably possibleforustodo so. Given that in our view the States Assembly is not the rightplaceto have legal arguments,wewouldhope that, given goodwill andunderstanding,it shouldbepossibleforusto assist intheoverwhelmingmajorityofcases. Indeed that hasbeenour experience sofar.

Executive Summary

2. T h e proposed protocol in relation toaccessby Scrutiny Panels to legal advice atparagraphs9.17to9.21 inclusive would cause serious damagetothe relationship betweentheLawOfficers' Department and the States Assembly,Ministersand Scrutiny Panels.
3. W  i thoutcarryingoutan exhaustive survey,wethink that all jurisdictions accept the need for the executive to haveaccess to confidential legal advice. The public policy underlying this is to ensure that thereisno inhibition on the part ofMinisters or departments both in seeking adviceandin giving all therelevant facts to the lawyerwhether they areembarrassing to the Minister ordepartmentor not; and to ensure that there is no inhibition onthe part of the lawyerin giving full andfrank advice.
4. T h e proposed protocol is likely to drive a wedge between the Minister or the department and the lawyer, affecting adverselythemutual trust between the twowhichisessential to the relationship.
5. T h e proposed protocol is likely to affect adversely the nature of the advice which will probably become more conservative andless positive, and the time which it takes to deliver it.
6. T  h e proposed protocol carries a risk,theextentofwhichwethinkit is undesirableto say in a public document, that legal advice privilege might be lost ifthere were to be litigation betweenthe Minister and a memberof the public.
7. T h e proposed protocol is likely to drag theLawOfficers personally into political disputesor arguments.
8. F u r thermore,at a technical leveltheprotocoldoesnot work even if the principles underlying it were right, whichwethink strongly isnotthecase.

The Chairmen's Committee Report

9. I n t heChairmen'sCommitteeReport, all that is said about the code of practice insofar as legal advice is concerned isthis:

"Unfortunately it has not been possible to introduce the code of practice as early as the Chairmen would have liked, due to the difficulties arising in reaching a consensus with the Council of Ministers and the Law Officers' Department in respect of Scrutiny's access to legal advice.

This access to legal advice covers two distinct areas: First, a Scrutiny Panel's access to advice for its own benefit in pursuit of Scrutiny business, and secondly, access to legal advice that has previously been given to the executive, and upon which advice a particular policy, direction or decision was taken.

The Chairmen's Committee does not consider that any further delay in the establishment of a code of practice is acceptable, and has decided to lodge its draft code of practice "au Greffe", with the inclusion of provisions relating to access to legal advice that it considers are appropriate."

10. T h e only justification for the proposed code of practice in relation to access to legal advice is that agreementhasnotbeenpossible and further delay in the establishment of a code of practice would notbe acceptable. Byanystandards, this is surprising.One might have expectedsome justification for the proposals tobeadvanced. This is especially sobecause,as far as we are aware,the proposal whichhas been made is inconsistent with worldwide practice.
11. B y wayofexampleof that practice, on the Law Officers' website in the UnitedKingdomthere appears the following statement, posted in2004 prior to the leakof the Attorney'sadviceinrelationto Iraq:

"There is a longstanding convention, adhered to by successive governments, that neither the fact that the Law Officers have been consulted in relation to a particular matter, nor the substance of any advice they may have given is disclosed outside government. The purpose of the convention is to enable the government, like everyone else, to obtain full and frank legal advice in confidence. There is a strong public interest in the government seeking legal advice so that it acts in accordance with the law. If there were a risk that Law Officers' advice would be made public, this might inhibit the provision of full and frank legal advice. The rationale for the convention is the same as that which underpins the doctrine of legal professional privilege, which also applies to Law Officers' advice.

Parliamentary debates as long ago as 1865 refer to a general rule that Law Officers' advice is not disclosed. Erskine May mentions a number of cases in which the views of the Law Officers on a particular matter were disclosed to Parliament. As far as LSLO [Legal Secretary to the Law Officers] are aware, there are in fact only three examples in the past one hundred years of the actual advice of the Law Officers being disclosed publicly. Two of these examples relate to the provision of documents in judicial proceedings, namely the Factortame litigation and the Scott Enquiry. In both of these cases, the advice given by the Law Officers was central to the issues in the proceedings. The third example arose from the Westland Affair when the Solicitor General's letter to Michael Heseltine was disclosed. However, this followed a leak in breach of the convention, gave rise to serious consideration of prosecutions under the Official Secrets Act and led to or contributed to the resignation of two Cabinet Ministers."

12. T h e former Attorney General, the Honourable Darrell Williams,AM,QC,in the early years of the current Australian Governmentsaid this:

"I am not going to speculate about advice that the Government may or may not have received, nor am I going to provide any of that advice. On many occasions, the previous Government declined to say whether it had legal advice on an issue and what that advice was. That is, of course, the traditional response."

W e a re advised that this remains the position in Australia.

13. I n Jersey, priorto the moveto Ministerial Government,and despite the fact that there was no clear distinction in the States of Jersey between the executive and the legislature, the general principle was that legal advice giventoCommittees of the States wasconfidentialunlessotherwise agreed with the Law Officers. Althoughtheremay from time to time have been mistakes made either by politicians orby civil servants as a result of whichlegal advice has been published, theapproach historically adopted in Jersey has been similar to that adopted by jurisdictions elsewhere. Of course, the Law Officers have regularly given advicetotheStatesAssembly in additionto advising Committeesandindividualmembers.
14. W  e willgoontosetout the reasonswhy the LawOfficers' advice should be kept confidential, but in doingsowe would notwantmembers to be undertheimpression that we are advancing a departure from the status quo. The status quo is firmly that both legalprofessional privilege and the confidentiality of the Law Officers' advice doesexistandit is for those who wish to propose a departure from that arrangement to justify theirposition rather than theotherwayround.To date, wehaveseen nothing whichbeginsto

establish such a case. It is in those circumstances all the more surprising that the Chairmen's Committee does not

set out in its report some reasons for the proposals which it makes other than the reason that the Committee does not wish to encounter further delay.

What we do

15. M o stdepartmentsdonothaveemployed lawyers workingwithin them. It follows that the Law Officers are not just theprincipallegal advisers togovernment,but in mostcases are the only legaladvisers providing advice to the civilservantsor the Ministers. Itis therefore very important that as administrative decisions aretakenorchallengedorasnewproposals are workedup and developed,theLaw Officers are actively engaged with the aimofensuring that the policies of the administration are achieved,and that there isproper respect for the rule oflaw,for human rights obligations andfor the Island's international obligations. The process of policy formulation involves civilservants with policymaking responsibilities, Ministers with political responsibilities and the LawOfficers.Of course thecivil servants tend tobe well informed aboutthelegalframeworkwhich is applicable to their particular type ofbusiness,aswellas the policy behind a particular set of proposals.Ofcourse the LawDraftsman,whose duty it is to reduce to a piece of legislation the proposals which are made,also has someexperience of theIsland's international obligations as well as of the law generally. But ultimately it is forthe Law Officers to advise on new proposals, preferably at an early stagesoastoavoid otherwise potentially embarrassing results for the Ministers or for the States as a whole.
16. T h e LawOfficersdo not advise only on policy. Indeed policy advice forms a relatively small part ofthose of ourfunctionswhicharerelevant to this debate. The majority of ouradviceison particular decisions underexisting legislation, decisionswhich are about to betakenor have been taken.
17. T h is type of administrative decision affects one citizen directly or sometimes more than one. Such decisions can usually be challenged in a courtof law, either onappealorby way of judicial review. It seemsunlikelythat,on the whole, Scrutiny Panelswill want to scrutinise individual decisions. But it is essential that, for the reasons which are set out later, the advice on these decisions as well as the request for adviceis kept confidential.
18. In giving advice werecognise that there are three principles whichwe should apply.The first, and byfar the most important, is that our advice should be independent and impartial. The second is that our approachshould if possiblebe constructive. The third is that wherever we give unwelcome advice, we must be preparedto stand firm where that is called for. Similar tothelawyer's duty in the private sector, it is ourfunctionnot to tellthe Minister or civil servant whathewantsto hear – rather it is to tell him what he ought to be told.
19. S o metimesthe best advicewhich can begiven to a Minister or a departmentmaybewhollyunwelcome if not unacceptableto them. Nonetheless,ifwethinkwhathasbeendone,oris proposed to bedone, is open to fatallegal objections, weexpectto say so. However, on the assumption that we analyse the position properly andsetoutourreasons in sufficient detail, it is our belief that even advicewhich the Minister or the departmentwashopingnot to hear will neverthelessbe respected and followed.

The Proposed Protocol does not work

20. T h e protocol on legaladviceis to befoundin paragraph 9.21 of the draft code of practice. Althoughwe go on to consider it in more detail below,the effect ofitis that on every occasionwhen the Minister or his Departmentseeklegaladviceor the LawOfficers give it, both sidesmustassume that the request for advice and the advice itself will bemade available to the Scrutiny Panel.Itis rightly said atparagraph
    19. that legal advice covers a broadspectrum.Theadvicemaygotonew legislation, orto policy issues, or to particular issueswhich either are the subjectoforwhich might subsequentlylead to litigation. Adviceonpolicymay equally often be very relevant indeed to matters which will become,or may become,thesubjectof litigation.
21. A t paragraph 9.18, the codeof practice asserts that because both executive and Scrutiny belongto the

same elected assembly, they are not to be considered as separate clients. As a matter of law, this is not correct.

The whole concept of the States of Jersey Law, 2005 and the move to Ministerial Government is based on the premise that the States Assembly is no longer to take executive decisions, because these will instead be taken by Ministers independently. That is why the States of Jersey Law provides that Ministers are corporations sole. They have a separate legal status. As a matter of law, Ministers are separate from the States Assembly and from members.

22. S c rutiny Panels are not corporations sole. They have noneed to be, because they do not take executive decisions in relation to individual cases. Scrutiny is an important parliamentary process forholding the executive to account.Accordingly,onecannot see anyprobability that a Scrutiny Panel will be the subject of legal proceedings.On the otherhand,one can see everyprobability that Ministersmay from time to time be the subject of legalproceedings. It follows that theadvicewhichisgiventoMinisters, whether in the context of a particular caseor in the context of generalpolicywhichmay ultimately be relevant in particular cases, shouldbekept confidential. If it wereanyotherway, then in any litigation between a memberof the publicand the Minister, it would follow that the Minister's advice would be known to the memberof the public, but the private sectorlegal advice would notbeknownto the Minister. Given that the Minister'sdecisionsare,or should be, taken inthepublic interest, itis very hard to see why it shouldbeinthepublicinteresttoputthe Minister at a disadvantage.
23. A t paragraph 9.21.2, the proposal is that thePanelmay ask the executive for a copy ofthelegaladvice received. We do not think this is likely to be practical, atleastin the majority ofcases. This part of the protocol assumes that there isonedocumentwhichcontains the legal advice – but often that isnotthe case. Often advice is given over a protracted period in letters of advice or at meetings or over the telephone. In the latter twocases, the civil servant or Minister mayhavemade his own note of the advice whichhas been given. Whatis meant then by the proposal that the executive will provide a copy of the legal advice received? If it means that the Scrutiny Panel will receive from the executive the civil servant's note ofthelegal advice whichhas been given, that would seem to be a course pitted with danger. Itwould mean that the Scrutiny Panel would be operating noton the basis ofwhatthelegal position was, but on the basis ofwhat the civil servant believed the legalposition was, whichmightbe a completely  different  matter.  So identification  of what the  legal advice actually  is  or was,  is not  a straightforward matter.
24. W  e wish to add that the protocol set out at paragraph 9.21 is riddled with problems even asit stands, and even if one assumed the underlying objective was appropriate, which in our view it is not. This is because:

(i ) O  u r experience is that Committees have frequently presented policy proposals to the States which

have not been formulated with any advice on the legal position whatsoever. This may be either because the Committee has not perceived the need for legal advice or perhaps because legal advice can hardly be considered necessary – for example in assessing what is an appropriate minimum wage. A protocol therefore which requires Ministers to make a statement of the legal position in every case where a policy proposal is made does not reflect the reality of what is likely to take place, nor is it necessarily in the public interest.

(i i ) A t sub-paragraph (3) it is said that only in exceptional circumstances would the legal advice be withheld and that exceptions will be considered within the context of the principles of freedom of

information agreed by the States. However, apart from the Code on Public Access to information, no principles of freedom of information have been agreed by the States. If one did have regard to the Code, the present position is that legal advice is privileged, in which case it would not be disclosed at all. It therefore is hardly appropriate to discuss disclosure in the context of the principles of freedom of information. If the proposition is that this refers to the principles of freedom of information under the new legislation which will be promoted in the States in the future, we have no knowledge at this stage as to the final shape of those proposals; but assuming that they are in the form of the consultation document recently published by the Privileges and Procedures Committee, there is proposed a qualified exemption against disclosure of legal advice, and all the decisions so far in the United Kingdom on a comparable provision appear to have led

to legal advice privilege being upheld and to the information not being disclosed at all. So to discuss the

withholding of legal advice within the context of the principles of freedom of information is conceptually back to front – if such a discussion took place, it would mean that the legal advice would never be disclosed.

( ii i) A  t sub-paragraph 9.21.7, it is proposed that where a dispute arises, a meeting will take place

between the executive, the Law Officers and the Presidents of the Chairmen's Committee. It is to be recognised that the dispute will have arisen because the Scrutiny Panel considers it ought to have access to legal advice and the executive considers it ought not. Often the executive's reasons for not disclosing the legal advice will be inextricably linked to the advice itself, and it will be impossible to have any sensible meeting as to why the advice should not be disclosed other than to say that the nature of the advice means that it should not be disclosed. It is hard to see how this dispute resolution provision will take anyone anywhere.

(i v ) I t is clear that Scrutiny Panels are anxious that the provision of legal advice should take place

within an appropriate timetable. Accordingly at sub-paragraph 9.21.8, the protocol suggests that a Scrutiny Panel may seek legal advice from an external source rather than directly from the Law Officers. However, the proposition that the Attorney General will retain final responsibility for the legal advice given to the Panel in these circumstances is impractical. Are we to tell the external lawyers what their opinion must be? What happens if we disagree? If external lawyers have been appointed, because the Law Officers' Department is so pressed with other matters that it does not have the time to conduct the work for the Scrutiny Panel, is that time suddenly to become available simply because the Attorney General sees a report from an external legal adviser with which he disagrees? Furthermore, to say we retain responsibility for the private sector advice would absolve the private sector lawyer from responsibility for his advice while nonetheless retaining the fee which he charges for it.

(v  ) F in ally, the protocol suggests that the Scrutiny Panel will have access to legal advice given to

Ministers but must keep it confidential. This presumably means that the Scrutiny Panel cannot use the advice in any public way. It does not seem to us that this is in the interests of the Panels nor in the interest of the public. If the Minister has disregarded legal advice, what is the purpose of the Scrutiny Panel being handed the equivalent of a politically loaded gun and not being able to use it?

The Reasons for the Rule

25. W hether in the publicor private sector, legaladvice is treated confidentially. It is qualitatively different from other sorts of advice. This is primarily because a third party – the Court – sits to considerthecaseof the partytowhomthelegal advice is given. Asfarasweareaware,everywhere in the civilised world, private and public sector clients have anentitlementtolegal professional privilege, and lawyers advise them in theknowledge that this is so. That legal professional privilege is an entitlement becauseitis necessary for the protection ofthe client. Therearetwo primary reasons for this. They are:

( i) T  o ensure that there is no inhibition on the part of the client in seeking legal advice, and no

inhibition in ensuring that all relevant facts, whether they tell against him or not, are given to the lawyer to ensure that a balanced view can be taken.

(i i) T o ensure that there is no inhibition on the part of the lawyer in giving full and frank advice on all

the matters which are raised with the lawyer for advice, or which the lawyer considers should reasonably be volunteered to the client for his consideration when he takes his next step.

26. T h ese principles are fundamentally important both to the client and to the lawyer.It is essential that Ministers and/or Departments do take legal advice, and that when they take it, they provide all the relevant facts, whether those facts tell against them or not. Anything which inhibits Ministers or Departments from takinglegal advice or from giving the full facts to the lawyersat the time they doso, would be very bad for the integrity of the administration.

27. It isalso essential that the lawyers are not inhibited in giving advice. We both accept that theremaybe occasions when our advice is disregarded. TheCommitteeor Minister may take a view, as paragraph 9.19 of the protocol suggests, that the LawOfficers' advice is only an expression of opinion, and might or might not be right. If a Minister or Committee takes that view, then the Minister or Committee accepts the risks which go with that decision.

The Consequences of the Proposed Change

28. If the draft Code were accepted, one hasto contemplate what the result, in political terms, would be if a Minister decides not to actinaccordance with thelegaladvice received. That legal advice has been shared with the Scrutiny Panel,whichmight naturally wish to scrutinise the Minister upon it. Is the Minister to trust to luck that the Scrutiny Panel will overlook this particular piece of advice, and if luck goes against him and it isscrutinised, is it to be assumed that he will concedehewaswrong not to act consistently with that advice? That seemsunlikely.Far more likely is that the Minister would assert to the Scrutiny Panel that heor she thought theadvicereceived from theLaw Officers or from lawyers within the Departmentwasbad advice, orwaswrong,orwas unrealistic. In otherwords,thetendency would be for the Minister to justify the decision taken, belittling the legal advicereceived.What is then thepositionof the Law Officer or the lawyerin the Department? Is it to be expected that the lawyer will sayto the Scrutiny Panel that maybe the advicegivenwasnotcorrect? That seems unlikely. Heis likely to justify it. Theproposalwhich has beenput forward bytheChairmen'sCommittee in effect will therefore drive a wedge between the Minister and the lawyer who advises him or her, and over a period of time, relationships between the Minister and the lawyerstand the riskofbecomingevermore fractured. This presumably would only not arise if the Minister always followed to the letter the advice givenbythe Law Officers' Department, whether strictly legaladviceor not. Such a possibility is neither reasonable nor desirable. Itis the Minister whoisaccountablefor the decisions taken.
29. W e think that there are other, and even moredamaging,consequencesof the proposal that legaladvice given toMinistersshouldbeshared with Scrutiny Panels. First ofall,it is likely that the advice givento Ministers will be more conservative andless positive. It is not that we, or the lawyers in our Department, have atthemomentcarte blanche to give risky advice. It is simply a reflection that at present, the lawyer and the client are broadly speakingon the same side. This issowhetherweadviseMinistersor Scrutiny Panels. Butwherethe legal advice is goingtobemade available to someonewhomaybe a political opponent,whether that bethe Minister or the Scrutiny Panel, it seemstous to be inevitable that the advice will contain moredoubtsandmorereservations and will focusmuch more on all the potential drawbacksinrelationtothecoursewhich the Minister orDepartmentmay have sought advice about. There is a realrisktherefore that the written advice will becomelesspositiveand will take even longerto produce.
30. T h ere is certainly a substantial risk that if somethingbecame the subjectof litigation between a Minister and a member of the public, the privilege overlegaladvicecouldnotbeclaimedin the proceedings because the Minister has disclosed the information voluntarilyto a third party, namely the Scrutiny Panel. Arguments couldbe run both wayson that point, and it is unclear touswhy this risk should be taken.
31. It i s very likely that the adviceto Ministers will no longer include what we might call strategic or tactical advice on the next steps forward. Somemembersmaythink that this is not part of a lawyer'sadvice anyway.Forour part, westronglydisagree with that. Lawyersin both the publicand the private sectors have long since tried to give addedvalue to clients by expressing a lawyer's view on the next steps forward or a lawyer's analysis of the problemswhichhave to betackled.It is part of his professional function. Wedoubt very muchwhether it would be desirable or indeed always possible to redactadvice so that one could take out the strategic or tactical advice from the legal advice whichhad been given.The likely result would be that strategic or tactical advice would notbe offered at all, andwe have no doubt that the quality of the Ministerial decision would beworseas a result. We say that not because the lawyer'sadvice is alwaysfollowed, but because itis a contribution in the overall process throughwhich the Minister goes to reach a decision.

32. It i s likely also that the mechanism for giving advice would change. We anticipate there is a risk that there would be conservative written advice, and at least the possibility that morepositiveadvice might be given orally. Wedo not think this particularly helps Scrutiny Panels, especially so if they were in danger of thinking they had received all the advicewhen they had not. We do not think that itassiststheexecutive because therewouldbeanaddedrisk of misunderstandingastowhatadvicehadactually been given,and no wayofidentifying later what that advicewas, with the probability then of a subsequentmutual loss of confidence between the executiveand the Law Officers' Department; and finally, the result would notbe helpful for us, because it would create the riskof quality control problems within our Department.We cannot possibly give all advice personally andanimportant quality control mechanism is the review of outgoing correspondence containing written advice.
33. P e rhapsworstof all from our perspective is the increased likelihood that theLawOfficers would be dragged into political disputes orarguments.It is wrong that theLaw Officers shouldbedrawn into any public support for or criticism of the executive.If Scrutiny Panels were to see the Law Officers' advice, the riskofourbeingdragged into political debates would be very high.Indeedwe think it wouldbe inevitable.

Conclusion

34. W e are very sorry that the Chairmen's Committee has decided topromote this protocol regarding access to legal advice which,as that Committee is aware,theLawOfficers have advised against stronglyand which the majority of theCouncil of Ministersis thought to regard as unacceptable. Thefactofourdoing so means that we have already been driven into taking up a position which is more critical of the Chairmen'sCommittee than we would have liked. In our view,however difficult it ison occasions, we think that generallyspeaking the Law Officers ought to be able to advise Scrutiny Panels aswellas Ministers, and in doing so the advice givenwouldbe confidential to the Panelor Minister requesting it. With a little goodwill andcommonsense,we believe this to be manageable. Ofcourse one can anticipate that from time to time therewillbe difficulties, perhaps because the matter is of such sensitivity that for any numberof possible reasons we will be obliged to indicate to the Scrutiny Panel that it would be embarrassing for usto continue to advise, or to advise atall.On those occasions the Scrutiny Panels would berequiredtogetadvice from outside the Law Officers' Department. While that hasoccurredon one occasionsofar,wethink that, with goodwill, these occasions will be few and far between.
35. W e fully recognise that Scrutiny Panels may from time to time needto have legal advice in orderto evaluate what the Minister hasdone.What is critical however is that the Paneldoesnotneedto see the advice which was given to the Minister to scrutinise his decision taking process. That confuses the scrutiny of decisions, whichisanimportantpublic objective, with the process oftakingdecisions,which is private. A Minister mayreach a brilliant decisionongoodorbadorno advice, andfor any numberof reasons which are very goodorverypoor. Alternatively, hemayreach a very poordecisionon the basis of misreading some very good advice, or perhaps on the basis ofsome very bad advice. In eachcase the critical thing is the decisionwhich the Minister makes. Where wethinkwe can usually help is to give legal advice which will enable the Scrutiny Panel to understand the parameters within which the Ministerial decision has been taken or policy adopted.
36. A n approachwhichmeans that Scrutiny Panels will assess the quality of all legal advice put to the Minister all the time could notbeadoptedwithout affecting thetrustwhich must exist between the Minister andthelawyer and the natureof the legal advice and the pace with and extenttowhichthelegal advice is provided.In any event, Panelsarenotequippedtoassessthe quality of legal advice. Norwould it beeasyforus to find lawyers prepared to work in such a system whereby judgment calls continually have tobedefendedagainstthosewho question them for political reasons rather than from anyinformed legal basis. It is the decision orthepolicywhichisto be scrutinised.
37. T h ereisinour view no justification for departing from the general rule that the LawOfficers' advice is to be treated confidentially. Accordingly Scrutiny Panels should not see the legal advice given to the executive. Weare firmly opposedtothe proposal that Scrutiny and the executive will each have accessto legal advicegiven to the other,andweconsider that such a proposal will, if implemented,be bad for

Ministers, bad for Scrutiny Panels and bad for the Law Officers. As a result, implementation would be bad for the

States and bad for the Island.

31st August, 2006.

H.M. Attorney General H.M. Solicitor General