Code of Practice for Scrutiny Panels and the Public Accounts Committee (P.77-2007) - comments

STATES OF JERSEY

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CODE OF PRACTICE FOR SCRUTINY PANELS AND THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE (P.77/2007): COMMENTS

Presented to the States on 3rd July 2007 by H.M. Attorney General

STATES GREFFE

COMMENTS

Introduction

1. F o l lowingthepracticeadoptedin relation to P.101/2006,we are presenting a report on this proposition without being requested by the States todo so becausewe think thewayinwhichlegaladvice is treated is of fundamentalimportance to the good administration ofthe Island. We very much regret that wehave not been able to reachagreement with the Chairmen'sCommittee,andwe would like to reaffirm our commitment in principle to assisting Scrutiny Panels as well as individual members wherever it is reasonably possible for ustodoso.Given that in our view the States Assembly is not the rightplaceto have legalarguments,we would hope that, givengoodwill and understanding, it shouldbepossibleforus to assist intheoverwhelming majority of cases. Indeed that has been our experience sofar.
2. W  e have noted a hardeningof the approachof the Chairmen'sCommitteecompared with the approach taken in P.101/2006.Weregretthat.Thishardeningofapproachisshownbythesesubstantive changes –

(i ) T h e re is no provision requiring a Panel to afford the Law Officers an opportunity to review the

draft Scrutiny Report in order to ensure the confidentiality of their advice is maintained.

(i i) T h ere is no provision that where an approach to an external Legal Adviser is made, it will be so

made through the Law Officers' Department such that the Attorney General is aware of the legal advice given to the Panel, and can be properly prepared to advise the States Assembly should that be necessary.

Executive Summary

3. T h e proposed protocol in relation toaccessby Scrutiny Panels to legal advice atparagraphs9.25to9.29 inclusive would cause serious damagetothe relationship betweentheLawOfficers' Department and the States Assembly,Ministersand Scrutiny Panels.
4. W  i thoutcarryingoutan exhaustive survey,wethink that all jurisdictions accept the need for the executive to haveaccess to confidential legal advice. The public policy underlying this is to ensure that thereisno inhibition on the part ofMinisters or departments both in seeking adviceandin giving all therelevant facts to the lawyerwhether they areembarrassing to the Minister ordepartmentor not; and to ensure that there is no inhibition onthe part of the lawyerin giving full andfrank advice.
5. T h e proposed protocol is likely to drive a wedge between the Minister or the department and the lawyer, affecting adverselythemutual trust between the twowhichisessential to the relationship.
6. T h e proposed protocol is likely to affect adversely the nature of the advice which will probably become more conservative andless positive, and the time which it takes to deliver it.
7. T  h e proposed protocol carries a risk,theextentofwhichwethinkit is undesirableto say in a public document, that legal advice privilege might be lost ifthere were to be litigation betweenthe Minister and a memberof the public.
8. T h e proposed protocol is likely to drag theLawOfficers personally into political disputesor arguments.
9. F u r thermore,at a technical leveltheprotocoldoesnot work even if the principles underlying it were right, whichwethink strongly isnotthecase.

The Chairmen's Committee Report

10. In the Chairmen'sCommittee Report, all that is saidabout the code of practice insofar aslegal advice is concerned is this –

" U n f o r tu n a t ely it has not been possible to introduce the code of practice as early as the Chairmen would have liked, due to the difficulties arising in reaching a consensus with the Council of Ministers and the Law Officers' Department in respect of Scrutiny's access to legal advice.

T h is a c ce s s t o legal advice covers two distinct areas: First, a Scrutiny Panel's access to advice for

its own benefit in pursuit of Scrutiny business, and secondly, access to legal advice that has previously been given to the executive, and upon which advice a particular policy, direction or decision was taken.

T h e C  h a ir m e n's Committee does not consider that any further delay in the establishment of a code

of practice is acceptable, and has decided to lodge its draft code of practice "au Greffe", with the inclusion of provisions relating to access to legal advice that it considers are appropriate

T h i s C  o d e o f Practice was originally lodged on 15th August 2006, but because of continuing

difficulties in reaching agreement with relevant parties on the legal advice issue, it was withdrawn. Despite extensive negotiations it has not been possible to resolve the legal advice issue to the satisfaction of all parties. The Committee therefore considers it appropriate to bring the matter to the Assembly for resolution.".

11. T h e only justification for the proposed code of practice in relation to access to legal advice is that agreementhasnotbeenpossible and further delay in the establishment of a code of practice would notbe acceptable. Byanystandards, this is surprising.One might have expectedsome justification for the proposals tobeadvanced. This is especially sobecause,as far as we are aware,the proposal whichhas been made is inconsistent with worldwide practice, and because onemighthaveexpectedsomestatement of the Committee'spositionbywayofresponse to ourcommentslodgedin relation toP.101/2006.
12. B y wayof example of that worldwide practice, on the LawOfficers' website in the United Kingdomthere appeared thefollowing statement, postedin 2004 priorto the leakof the Attorney'sadvicein relation to Iraq –

" T h e r e i s a longstanding convention, adhered to by successive governments, that neither the fact that the Law Officers have been consulted in relation to a particular matter, nor the substance of any advice they may have given is disclosed outside government. The purpose of the convention is to enable the government, like everyone else, to obtain full and frank legal advice in confidence. There is a strong public interest in the government seeking legal advice so that it acts in accordance with the law. If there were a risk that Law Officers' advice would be made public, this might inhibit the provision of full and frank legal advice. The rationale for the convention is the same as that which underpins the doctrine of legal professional privilege, which also applies to Law Officers' advice.

P a r li a m e n t a ry debates as long ago as 1865 refer to a general rule that Law Officers' advice is not

disclosed. Erskine May mentions a number of cases in which the views of the Law Officers on a particular matter were disclosed to Parliament. As far as LSLO [Legal Secretary to the Law Officers] are aware, there are in fact only three examples in the past one hundred years of the actual advice of the Law Officers being disclosed publicly. Two of these examples relate to the provision of documents in judicial proceedings, namely the Factortame litigation and the Scott Enquiry. In both of these cases, the advice given by the Law Officers was central to the issues in the proceedings. The third example arose from the Westland Affair when the Solicitor General's letter to Michael Heseltine was disclosed. However, this followed a leak in breach of the convention, gave rise to serious consideration of prosecutions under the Official Secrets Act and led to or contributed to the resignation of two Cabinet Ministers."

13. T h e former Attorney General, the Honourable Darrell Williams,AM,QC,in the early years of the current Australian Governmentsaid this –

" I a m n o t g o ing to speculate about advice that the Government may or may not have received, nor

am I going to provide any of that advice. On many occasions, the previous Government declined to say whether it

had legal advice on an issue and what that advice was. That is, of course, the traditional response."

W e a re advised that this remains the position in Australia.

14. T h ere is an implication from the Report that there have been extensive negotiations sinceP.101/2006was withdrawn.For the avoidance ofdoubt, the only contact betweentheLawOfficersandtheChairmen's Committee on this subject hasbeen –

(i ) A  m  eeting between the Attorney General, the President of the Chairmen's Committee and Deputy

Le Hérissier held on 4th May 2007, the upshot of which was that the Attorney General was asked to draft a more user-friendly version than that proposed on the last occasion by the Council of Ministers, but which, it was understood, would adhere to the same principles as Ministers had put forward.

( ii ) A n e-mail dated 17th May 2006, from the Attorney General to the President attaching such a

revised version and offering to meet either the Chairmen's Committee or all members of Scrutiny together.

(i ii ) A  n e-mail dated 31st May 2006, from the President to the Attorney General expressing regret that

the proposed Code of Conduct was unacceptable and indicating that the Chairmen's Committee would bring forward its own provisions for consideration by the States. The President offered a meeting on the subject, if we so desired, but given that P.77/2007 was lodged a few days later, such a meeting seemed to us to be without merit.

W  e r egret there have in reality been no negotiations at all, let alone extensive negotiations, between the

Chairmen's Committee and ourselves. We particularly regret that neither the Committee nor Scrutiny members generally were prepared to meet us before P.77/2007 was lodged.

15. I n Jersey, priorto the moveto Ministerial Government,and despite the fact that there was no clear distinction in the States of Jersey between the executive and the legislature, the general principle was that legal advice giventoCommittees of the States wasconfidentialunlessotherwise agreed with the Law Officers. Althoughtheremay from time to time have been mistakes made either by politicians orby civil servants as a result of whichlegal advice has been published, theapproach historically adopted in Jersey has been similar to that adopted by jurisdictions elsewhere. Of course, the Law Officers have regularly given advicetotheStatesAssembly in additionto advising Committeesandindividualmembers.
16. W  e willgoontosetout the reasonswhy the LawOfficers' advice should be kept confidential, but in doingsowe would notwantmembers to be undertheimpression that we are advancing a departure from the status quo. The status quo is firmly that both legalprofessional privilege and the confidentiality of the Law Officers' advice doesexistandit is for those who wish to propose a departure from that arrangement to justify theirposition rather than theotherwayround.To date, wehaveseen nothing whichbeginsto establish such a case. It is in those circumstances all the more surprising that the Chairmen'sCommittee does not setout in its report some reasons for the proposalswhichitmakesother than thereason that the Committee does not wish to encounter further delay.

What we do

17. M o stdepartmentsdonothaveemployed lawyers workingwithin them. It follows that the Law Officers are not just theprincipallegal advisers togovernment,but in mostcases are the only legaladvisers providing advice to the civilservantsor the Ministers. Itis therefore very important that as administrative decisions aretakenorchallengedorasnewproposals are workedup and developed,theLaw Officers are actively engaged with the aimofensuring that the policies of the administration are achieved,and that there isproper respect for the rule oflaw,for human rights obligations andfor the Island's international obligations. The process of policy formulation involves civilservants with policymaking responsibilities,

Ministers with political responsibilities and the Law Officers. Of course the civil servants tend to be well-

informed about the legal framework which is applicable to their particular type of business, as well as the policy behind a particular set of proposals. Of course the Law Draftsman, whose duty it is to reduce to a piece of legislation the proposals which are made, also has some experience of the Island's international obligations as well as of the law generally. But ultimately it is for the Law Officers to advise on new proposals, preferably at an early stage so as to avoid otherwise potentially embarrassing results for the Ministers or for the States as a whole.

18. T h e Law Officers do not advise only on policy. Indeed, policy advice forms a relatively small part of those of our functions whicharerelevant to this debate. The majority ofouradviceison particular decisions underexisting legislation, decisionswhich are about to betakenorhave been taken.
19. T h is type of administrative decision affects one citizen directly or sometimes more than one. Such decisions can usually be challenged in a courtof law, either onappealorby way of judicial review. It seemsunlikelythat,on the whole, Scrutiny Panelswill want to scrutinise individual decisions. But it is essential that, for the reasons which are set out later, the advice on these decisions as well as the request for adviceis kept confidential.
20. In giving advice werecognise that there are three principles whichwe should apply.The first, and byfar the most important, is that our advice should be independent and impartial. The second is that our approachshould if possiblebe constructive. The third is that wherever we give unwelcome advice, we must be preparedto stand firm where that is called for. Similar tothelawyer's duty in the private sector, it is our function not totell the Minister or civil servant what hewants to hear – rather it is to tell him what he ought to be told.
21. S o metimesthe best advicewhich can begiven to a Minister or a departmentmaybewhollyunwelcome if not unacceptableto them. Nonetheless,ifwethinkwhathasbeendone,oris proposed to bedone, is open to fatallegal objections, weexpectto say so. However, on the assumption that we analyse the position properly andsetoutourreasons in sufficient detail, it is our belief that even advicewhich the Minister or the departmentwashopingnot to hear will neverthelessbe respected and followed.

The proposed Protocol does not work

22. T h e protocol on legaladviceis to befoundin paragraph 9.25of the draft code of practice. Althoughwe go on to consider it in more detail below,the effect ofitis that on every occasionwhen the Minister or his Departmentseeklegaladviceor the LawOfficers give it, both sidesmustassume that the request for advice and the advice itself willbe the subject of a request by a Scrutiny Panelto see it. Itis rightly said at paragraph9.27 that legal advicecovers a broadspectrum.Theadvicemaygo to new legislation, orto policy issues, or to particular issues which either are the subject oforwhichmightsubsequentlyleadto litigation. Adviceon policy may equally oftenbe very relevantindeed to matters which will become,or may become, the subject of litigation. The proposed Protocol is silent on whether theExecutive are expected to acquiesce to the Scrutiny Panel'srequestto see the advice. If adopted, theProtocolwould leave this point in the air, unresolved.
23. A t paragraph 9.26, the code ofpracticeasserts that because both executive and Scrutiny are both branches of government, they are not to beconsidered as separate clients. As a matter of law,wethink this is not correct. The whole concept of the States of Jersey Law 2005andthemove to Ministerial Governmentis based on the premise that the States Assembly is no longer to take executive decisions through its Committees, because,by and large, these will instead be taken by Ministers independently. That is why the States of Jersey Law provides that Ministersarecorporations sole. They have a separate legal status. As a matteroflaw,Ministers are separate bodies from the StatesAssembly, Scrutiny Panels and from members.
24. S c rutiny Panels are not corporations sole. They have noneed to be, because they do not take executive decisions in relation to individual cases. Scrutiny is an important parliamentary process forholding the executive to account.Accordingly,onecannot see anyprobability that a Scrutiny Panel will be the

subject of legal proceedings. On the other hand, one can see every probability that Ministers may from time to

time be the subject of legal proceedings. It follows that the advice which is given to Ministers, whether in the context of a particular case or in the context of general policy which may ultimately be relevant in particular cases, should be kept confidential. If it were any other way, then in any litigation between a member of the public and the Minister, it would follow that the Minister's advice would be known to the member of the public, but the private sector legal advice would not be known to the Minister. Given that the Minister's decisions are, or should be, taken in the public interest, it is very hard to see why it should be in the public interest to put the Minister at a disadvantage.

25. A t paragraph 9.29.2, the proposal is that thePanelmay ask the executive for a copy ofthelegaladvice received. We do not think this is likely to be practical, atleastin the majority ofcases. This part of the protocol assumes that there isonedocumentwhichcontainsthe legal advice – but often that is not the case. Often advice is given over a protracted period in letters of advice or at meetings or over the telephone. In the latter twocases, the civil servant or Minister mayhavemade his own note of the advice whichhas been given. Whatis meant then by the proposal that the executive will provide a copy of the legal advice received? If it means that the Scrutiny Panel will receive from the executive the civil servant's note ofthelegal advice whichhas been given, that would seem to be a course pitted with danger. Itwould mean that the Scrutiny Panel would be operating noton the basis ofwhatthelegal position was, but on the basis ofwhat the civil servant believed the legalposition was, whichmightbe a completely  different  matter.  So identification  of what the  legal advice actually  is  or was,  is not  a straightforward matter.
26. W  e wish to add that the protocol setoutatparagraph 9.29posessome problems even as it stands, and even if one assumed the underlying objective was appropriate, which in our view it is not. This is because –

( i) A  t sub-paragraph 9.29.6, it is proposed that where a dispute arises, a meeting will take place

between the executive, the Law Officers and the Presidents of the Chairmen's Committee. It is to be recognised that the dispute will have arisen because the Scrutiny Panel considers it ought to have access to legal advice and the executive considers it ought not. Often the executive's reasons for not disclosing the legal advice will be inextricably linked to the advice itself, and it will be impossible to have any sensible meeting as to why the advice should not be disclosed other than to say that the nature of the advice means that it should not be disclosed. It is hard to see how this dispute resolution provision will take anyone anywhere.

(i i) T h e protocol suggests that the Scrutiny Panel will have access to legal advice given to Ministers

but must keep it confidential. This presumably means that the Scrutiny Panel cannot use the advice in any public way. It does not seem to us that this is in the Panels' interests, nor in the interest of the public. If the Minister has disregarded legal advice, what is the purpose of the Scrutiny Panel being handed the equivalent of a politically loaded gun and not being able to use it?

The reasons for the Rule

27. W  hether in the publicor private sector, legaladvice is treated confidentially. It is qualitatively different from othersortsof advice. This is primarily because a third party – the Court – sits to considerthecaseof the partytowhomthelegal advice is given. Asfarasweareaware,everywhere in the civilised world, private and public sector clients have anentitlementtolegal professional privilege, and lawyers advise them in theknowledge that this is so. That legal professional privilege is an entitlement becauseitis necessary for the protection ofthe client. Therearetwo primary reasons for this. They are –

( i) T  o ensure that there is no inhibition on the part of the client in seeking legal advice, and no

inhibition in ensuring that all relevant facts, whether they tell against him or not, are given to the lawyer to ensure that a balanced view can be taken.

(i i) T o ensure that there is no inhibition on the part of the lawyer in giving full and frank advice on all

the matters which are raised with the lawyer for advice, or which the lawyer considers should reasonably be

volunteered to the client for his consideration when he takes his next step.

28. T h ese principles are fundamentally important both to the client and to the lawyer.It is essential that Ministers and/or Departments do take legal advice, and that when they take it, they provide all the relevant  facts,  whether those  facts tell against  them  or not. Anything  which inhibits Ministers  or Departments from takinglegal advice or from giving the full facts to the lawyersat the time they doso, would be very bad for the integrity of the administration.
29. It isalso essential that the lawyers are not inhibited in giving advice. We both accept that theremaybe occasions when our advice is disregarded. TheCommitteeor Minister may take a view, as paragraph 9.27 of the protocol suggests, that the LawOfficers' advice is only an expression of opinion, and might or might not be right. If a Minister or Committee takes that view, then the Minister or Committee accepts the risks which go with that decision.

The consequences of the proposed change

30. If the draft Code were accepted, one hasto contemplate what the result, in political terms, would be if a Minister decides not to actinaccordance with thelegaladvice received. That legal advice has been shared with the Scrutiny Panel,whichmight naturally wish to scrutinise the Minister upon it. Is the Minister to trust to luck that the Scrutiny Panel will overlook this particular piece of advice, and if luck goes against him and it isscrutinised, is it to be assumed that he will concedehewaswrong not to act consistently with that advice? That seemsunlikely.Far more likely is that the Minister would assert to the Scrutiny Panel that heor she thought theadvicereceived from theLaw Officers or from lawyers within the Departmentwasbad advice, orwaswrong,orwas unrealistic. In otherwords,thetendency would be for the Minister to justify the decision taken, belittling the legal advicereceived.What is then thepositionof the Law Officer or the lawyerin the Department? Is it to be expected that the lawyer will sayto the Scrutiny Panel that maybe the advicegivenwasnotcorrect? That seems unlikely. Heis likely to justify it. Theproposalwhich has beenput forward bytheChairmen'sCommittee in effect will therefore drive a wedge  between the  Minister  and  the lawyer  who advises him or her,  and over  a  period  of time, relationships between the Minister and the lawyerstand the riskofbecomingevermore fractured. This presumably would only not arise if the Minister always followed to the letter the advice givenbythe Law Officers' Department, whether strictly legaladviceor not. Such a possibility is neither reasonable nor desirable. Itis the Minister whoisaccountablefor the decisions taken.
31. W  e think that there are other, and even moredamaging,consequencesof the proposal that legaladvice given toMinistersshouldbeshared with Scrutiny Panels. First ofall,it is likely that the advice givento Ministers will be more conservative andless positive. It is not that we, or the lawyers in our Department, have atthemomentcarte blanche to give risky advice. It is simply a reflection that at present, the lawyer and the client are broadly speakingon the same side. This issowhetherweadviseMinistersor Scrutiny Panels. Butwherethe legal advice is goingtobemade available to someonewhomaybe a political opponent,whether that bethe Minister or the Scrutiny Panel, it seemstous to be inevitable that the advice will contain moredoubtsandmorereservations and will focusmuch more on all the potential drawbacksinrelationtothecoursewhich the Minister orDepartmentmay have sought advice about. There is a realrisktherefore that the written advice will becomelesspositiveand will take even longerto produce.
32. T h ere is certainly a substantial risk that if somethingbecame the subjectof litigation between a Minister and a member of the public, the privilege overlegaladvicecouldnotbeclaimedin the proceedings because the Minister has disclosed the information voluntarilyto a third party, namely the Scrutiny Panel. Arguments couldbe run both wayson that point, and it is unclear touswhy this risk should be taken.
33. It i s very likely that the adviceto Ministers will no longer include what we might call strategic or tactical advice on the next steps forward. Somemembersmaythink that this is not part of a lawyer'sadvice anyway.Forour part, westronglydisagree with that. Lawyersin both the publicand the private sectors have long since tried to give addedvalue to clients by expressing a lawyer's view on the next steps

forward or a lawyer's analysis of the problems which have to be tackled. It is part of his professional function. We

doubt very much whether it would be desirable or indeed always possible to redact advice so that one could take out the strategic or tactical advice from the legal advice which had been given. The likely result would be that strategic or tactical advice would not be offered at all, and we have no doubt that the quality of the Ministerial decision would be worse as a result. We say that not because the lawyer's advice is always followed, but because it is a contribution in the overall process through which the Minister goes to reach a decision.

34. It i s likely also that the mechanism for giving advice would change. We anticipate there is a risk that there would be a conservative advice note, and atleast the possibility that morepositiveadvice might begiven orally. Wedo not think this particularly helps Scrutiny Panels, especially so if they were in danger of thinking they had received all the advicewhen they had not. We do not think that itassiststheexecutive because therewouldbeanaddedrisk of misunderstandingastowhatadvicehadactually been given,and no wayofidentifying later what that advicewas, with the probability then of a subsequentmutual loss of confidence between the executiveand the Law Officers' Department; and finally, the result would notbe helpful for us, because it would create the riskof quality control problems within our Department.We cannot possibly give all advice personally andanimportant quality control mechanism is the review of outgoing correspondence containing written advice.
35. P e rhapsworstof all from our perspective is the increased likelihood that theLawOfficers would be dragged into political disputes orarguments.It is wrong that theLaw Officers shouldbedrawn into any public support for or criticism of the executive.If Scrutiny Panels were to see the Law Officers' advice, the riskofourbeingdragged into political debates would be very high.Indeedwe think it wouldbe inevitable.

Conclusion

36. W e are very sorry that the Chairmen's Committee has decided topromote this protocol regarding access to legal advice which,as that Committee is aware,theLawOfficers have advised against stronglyand whichthe majority oftheCouncilofMinistersisthought to regard as unacceptable. Thefactofsodoing means that wehave already been driven into taking up a position which is more critical of the Chairmen's Committee than wewouldhaveliked.In our view,however difficult itison occasions, we think that generally speaking the Law Officersought to be able toadvise Scrutiny Panels as well asMinisters,and in doingso the advicegiven would beconfidential to the Panelor Minister requesting it. With a little goodwill andcommonsense,we believe this to be manageable. Of course one can anticipate that from time to time there will be difficulties, perhaps because the matter is of such sensitivity that for any number of possible reasons we will be obliged to indicate to the Scrutiny Panel that it would be embarrassing for usto continue to advise, or to advise atall.On those occasions the Scrutiny Panels would berequiredtogetadvice from outside the Law Officers' Department. While that hasoccurredon one occasionsofar,wethink that, with goodwill, these occasions will be few and far between.
37. W e fully recognise that Scrutiny Panels may from time to time needto have legal advice in orderto evaluate what the Minister has done.What is critical, however, is that the Panel does not need to see the advice which was given to the Minister to scrutinise his decision taking process. That confuses the scrutiny of decisions, whichisanimportantpublic objective, with the process oftakingdecisions,which is private. A Minister mayreach a brilliant decisionongoodorbadorno advice, andfor any numberof reasons which are very goodorverypoor. Alternatively, hemayreach a very poordecisionon the basis of misreading some very good advice, or perhaps on the basis ofsome very bad advice. In eachcase the critical thing is the decisionwhich the Minister makes. Where wethinkwe can usually help is to give legal advice which will enable the Scrutiny Panel to understand the parameters within which the Ministerial decision has been taken or policy adopted.
38. A n approachwhichmeans that Scrutiny Panels will assess the quality of all legal advice put to the Minister all the time could notbeadoptedwithout affecting thetrustwhich must exist between the Minister andthelawyer and the natureof the legal advice and the pace with and extenttowhichthelegal advice is provided.In any event, Panelsarenotequippedtoassessthe quality of legal advice. Norwould

it be easy for us to find lawyers prepared to work in such a system whereby judgment calls continually have to be

defended against those who question them for political reasons rather than from any informed legal basis. It is the decision or the policy which is to be scrutinised.

39. T h ereisinour view no justification for departing from the general rule that the LawOfficers' advice is to be treated confidentially. Accordingly Scrutiny Panels should not see the legal advice given to the executive. Weare firmly opposedtothe proposal that Scrutiny and the executive will each have accessto legal advicegiven to the other,andweconsider that such a proposal will, if implemented,be bad for Ministers, bad for Scrutiny Panels and bad for theLawOfficers.As a result, implementation would be bad for the States and bad for the Island.

July 2007 H.M. Attorney General H.M. Solicitor General