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STATES OF JERSEY
JERSEY INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CENTRE: FINANCIAL VIABILITY (INTERIM REPORT) (S.R.7/2015) – RESPONSE OF THE MINISTER FOR TREASURY AND RESOURCES
Presented to the States on 13th January 2016 by the Minister for Treasury and Resources
STATES GREFFE
2015 S.R.7 Res.
JERSEY INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CENTRE: FINANCIAL VIABILITY (INTERIM REPORT) (S.R.7/2015) – RESPONSE OF THE MINISTER FOR TREASURY AND RESOURCES
Ministerial Response to: Ministerial Response required by: Review title:
Scrutiny Panel: INTRODUCTION
S.R.7/2015
11th December 2015
Jersey International Finance Centre: Financial Viability (Interim Report)
Corporate Services
The Minister welcomes the report of the Panel's expert advisers, EY. Their findings confirm the basis on which the Jersey International Finance Centre (JIFC) development has been planned and undertaken to date.
The Minister has difficulty in reconciling the findings and recommendations of the Panel's report with those of their expert adviser. For that reason, he is unable to agree with a number of the Panel's findings, or to accept 2 of their 3 recommendations.
The Minister would welcome further explanation and provision of evidence by the Panel to substantiate the conclusions they have drawn from their adviser's work.
In particular the Minister wishes to make the following points in his response –
- The Panel makes much of comparing the States of Jersey Development Company's (SoJDC's) delivery of the JIFC development with how the private sector would have approached a similar project. To do so displays a fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose of SoJDC. The Company's purpose is to act as the delivery vehicle for property development for the States of Jersey, and in so doing, to deliver socio-economic benefits for the Public of Jersey, where land or existing developments are no longer required for States purposes. P.73/2010 clearly set out that the company would deliver regeneration projects within development plans approved by the Regeneration Steering Group. The purpose of SoJDC is not solely to deliver profit, in the same way as a private developer appraises and delivers projects. It lends consideration to the wider and longer-term economic benefits to the Island of its projects, in a way that a private developer would not be required to do. In order to safeguard the interests of the taxpayer, the company operates a risk mitigation process that requires the costs of construction for each building to be covered by legally binding pre-let agreements – that being the value of the completed building with the level of initial pre-let will exceed the value of the borrowing. This is the case with Building 4, and will continue to be the case for all buildings within the JIFC. The phased approach was recognised in the Minister Planning and Environment's revision to the Masterplan in 2011.
- It is interesting to note that the first item in the Panel's terms of reference for their review is "to consider whether the 2008 Masterplan for the Esplanade Quarter continues to represent the best socio-economic value to the States of Jersey on behalf of the Public of the Island." Paragraph 2(a) of those terms of reference requires an assessment of whether the Minister for Treasury and Resources has undertaken "an up to date assessment of the benefit to the Island of the proposed Jersey International Finance Centre". The Panel would appear to have lost sight of these socio-economic benefits when publishing its interim report. The Minister considers that the wider benefits of the JIFC, whilst difficult to quantify, far outweigh the simple profit calculations relating to Building 4. He considers that more weight could have been given to the evidence from, for example, Jersey Finance, of the need for Jersey to remain an attractive destination for the world's mobile financial services businesses and to invest in infrastructure. Ernst and Young, in the Executive Summary to their report, clearly agree with this view. They state –
- "we also consider that this weak profit performance is not a reason alone to not proceed with the development"; and
- "we believe it is appropriate to embark upon this first step, largely as a catalyst to the commencement of this regeneration project which is so important to Jersey".
- These statements indicate their understanding of the Minister for Treasury and Resources' position that the success of the JIFC development cannot be measured through profit alone. The wider benefits to the future of the Island are incalculable; the potential consequences of not proceeding are unthinkable. It is impossible to say whether a private developer would have proceeded with the development of Building 4 at this time, although other developments in the vicinity are visibly proceeding. Such a debate is of little benefit, given that SoJDC are, in any case, proceeding in accordance with their required risk mitigation measures, which mean that sufficient pre-lets have been secured to fund construction costs. They are also required to proceed with the significant obligation to provide public realm and parking that a private developer would not have to consider. The development sends an important signal of the Government of the Island's commitment to the future of its most important industries, whilst minimising financial risk to Islanders. The Minister is disappointed that the Panel is not able to recognise and support the development as an investment in the future of all Islanders, not just those working within financial services. Scrutiny has a vital role to play in the Island's government and its views, quite rightly, influence the opinions of States Members, interested parties and the Public alike.
- The Minister welcomes properly researched and evidenced scrutiny of the exercise of his powers and responsibilities, and is hopeful of further constructive dialogue with the Panel to move towards a shared understanding of what an exciting and pivotal innovation the JIFC represents in the Island's history. Most jurisdictions would embrace and offer enthusiastic support for Government-led intervention, carried out with minimal financial risk, to safeguard future jobs and standards of living for all inhabitants. The Minister will always have regard to the work of the scrutiny function, but he and the Council of Ministers are absolutely committed to the importance of the JIFC.
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FINDINGS
| Findings | Comments |
1 | The JIFC as presently planned is not considered viable. | The Minister is satisfied that the JIFC is viable and the EY report, with its conservative position on rent and yield, suggested that the first building, No. 4 JIFC, will generate a profit of £3 million. The SoJDC viability assessment predicts the building will generate a return of £7.5 million. The EY report also suggests that Building 5 should be progressed on a similar basis of viability. The JIFC development as a whole is being progressed on a prudent, phased basis, which assesses viability at each stage. This is entirely in accordance with the wishes of the States expressed in P.73/2010, and the revised Masterplan. The DTZ/C&W report forecasts a £332 million gross development value (excluding public car park) against JDC gross costs that supports the long- term viability. As an example of the Minister's concerns over how the Panel has arrived at its conclusions, the EY report (page 53) states: "We have severe reservations as to whether there will be sufficient demand to enable full development of the full JIFC proposals totalling 480,000 sq. ft. of office accommodation over the medium term, of say 5–10 years". Based on this, the Panel say the "JIFC as presently planned is not considered viable". The Minister considers this to be an emotive statement which does not recognise the careful, phased approach that is being taken by SoJDC, and does not serve to foster constructive dialogue and evaluation by those reading the Panel's output. |
2 | The JIFC is unlikely to fund the cost of the planned replacement underground car park. | Adopting the figures from the EY report, a 67,000 sq. ft. building will generate a net return of £3 million. If this level of return is extrapolated over the 470,000 sq. ft. of the JIFC, it would generate a return of £21 million. The costs of the underground public car park and the community open space associated with the JIFC are estimated at £27 million. However, the public car park would have a completed value of £10 million. It is therefore entirely appropriate for an income-producing asset to be part-funded by debt finance and, as such, based on the EY figures and the aforementioned assumptions, the Minister is satisfied that the JIFC can fund all public infrastructure associated with Phase 1 of the Esplanade Quarter Masterplan. |
| Findings | Comments |
3 | It is highly improbable that the JIFC will generate the stated return of £50 million (or higher). | SoJDC commissioned BNP Paribas Real Estate to carry out a development appraisal of the JIFC development in March 2014, and this forecast that the JIFC would generate a net profit of £55 million (in today's costs/ values). The Minister has recently commissioned an independent Red Book Valuation from DTZ (now Cushman & Wakefield), which forecast a gross development receipt of £332 million (excluding the public car park). When the total JIFC development costs are deducted, it projected a return in excess of £95 million excluding the value of the public car park. These receipts will be received over the development period, which is expected to conclude at or around the year 2026. Depending on the applied discount rate, the Net Present Value would provide a similar level of return to that identified in the BNP appraisal. The Minister is entirely satisfied that the expected return is forecast to be as stated by 2 pieces of work from industry experts. |
4 | The valuations undertaken by both DTZ (April 2015) and BNP Paribas Real Estate (March 2014) do not examine viability and development risk. | The valuation undertaken by DTZ for HSBC was to satisfy the bank's requirements prior to an offer of provision of funding. The C&W/DTZ report recently commissioned by the Minister is a Red Book Valuation carried out in accordance with the RICS Valuation Professional Standards. As with all valuations, this used market evidence. Furthermore, as it was projected some time into the future, certain assumptions also needed to be applied. The BNP Paribas Real Estate development appraisal did assess viability, and performed various sensitivity analyses on the major inputs to the financial model. |
5 | The development of B4 by the States of Jersey Development Company (SoJDC'') is without doubt speculative in nature, contrary to undertakings previously given regarding minimal' risk to the Public. | The Minister is satisfied that the construction of Building 4 is not "speculative". That term, in itself, is considered by the Minister to be emotive and not helpful in achieving a balanced and reasoned perspective on the JIFC. EY do not appear to use this description, and the Minister would welcome further justification by the Panel of their choice of words. The Panel's view is difficult to reconcile with that of their advisers. The development is being progressed on a building-by- building basis only when a significant legally binding pre-let has been entered into. The total value of the first building, when completed with the current level of pre- let, will be greater than the total borrowings that SoJDC is taking out to fund this phase of the development, and therefore even if no other tenant signed up, the building could be sold on completion and the debt cleared. This is |
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| Findings | Comments |
|
| not, however, SoJDC's intention. SoJDC intend to fully tenant the building and hold until first rent review, 3 years after practical completion. This is a standard industry approach in Jersey. |
6 | There are severe reservations as to whether there will be sufficient demand to enable development of the full JIFC proposals over the medium term (5–10 years). | Forecasts of demand for office accommodation will vary according to the differing perspectives and level of optimism of those commenting. The Minister is satisfied that sufficient evidence exists, obtained from Jersey Finance and the level of interest from prospective tenants, to progress Buildings 4 and 5 and to plan for delivery of the remainder of the JIFC. Masterplans are living documents that need to be flexible and adjust to market requirements. SoJDC is carrying out the JIFC development on a phased, building-by-building basis: this will allow for flexibility in delivery if necessary. |
7 | It is considered highly unlikely that a private developer would undertake the development of B4, as the profit margins and risk factors are not at a level at which such a development would normally be undertaken. | This finding appears to be based on the conservative rents and yields applied by EY. SoJDC is of the view, supported by independent red book valuations, known out-turn costs and its disposal strategy, that B4 will generate a return of £7.5 million. The opinions of valuers will differ. HSBC have clearly taken a view that the project risks are outweighed by anticipated returns, to the extent that they are prepared to make development finance available to SoJDC. The amount that a developer would pay for the site and the level of public realm requirements beyond the normal' Planning conditions and obligations imposed, would also be a key factor in any developer's decision. The conclusion of the Panel's advisers is that Buildings 4 and 5 should be actively progressed. The Minister supports this position. |
8 | The likely profit' of B4 (i.e. completed development value assuming fully let less development costs but with no allowance for land value) produces an estimate of £3,040,000, before costs of contamination. | This finding appears to be based on the conservative rents and yields applied by EY. SoJDC is of the view, supported by independent red book valuations, known out-turn costs and its disposal strategy, that B4 will generate a return of £7.5 million. |
| Findings | Comments |
9 | This profit' of £3,040,000 is significantly lower than previously, publicly reported returns for B4. | This finding appears to be based on the conservative rents and yields applied by EY. SoJDC is of the view, supported by independent red book valuations, known out-turn costs and its disposal strategy, that B4 will generate a return of £7.5 million. |
10 | The Panel notes that the £3,040,000 does not include the following items:
£2.6 million and £2.9 million in respect of B1, B2, B3, B6, the public realm and possibly B5 if the scheme does not proceed as envisaged;
(e.g. management |
On pages 24 and 25, EY list the rent-free element of the incentives provided on 37 Esplanade that ranged from 9 to 15 months. On page 47, EY details that Rent-Free of 18 –24 months has been allowed for within its valuation of No. 4 JIFC. [On page 48 it states under the sub-heading other tenant incentives, "These can take the form of either or both capital contribution to enhance fit-out, stepped rental and take backs' of the tenant's existing leases. Our analysis assumes no further tenant incentives other than the rent frees referred to above."] On page 14 of the EY report it states: "Whilst our analysis is informed by the information provided by SoJDC, we have not specifically referred to it in the body of this report in order to comply with the agreed NDA". On page 6 of the EY report it states: "We assess the gross development value of Building 4, net of purchaser costs (i.e. reflecting the anticipated sale price), assuming a stabilised rental profile (i.e. all rent-frees washed' through) of £32.65 million. In other words, this is our view of the potential price at which the building could be sold once complete and fully income-producing." SoJDC has publicly disclosed that it will hold these office buildings for 3 years after the completion of the build. This will ensure that all rent-free periods are wound out and that SoJDC benefits from any uplifts at first review. There is nothing uncommon about this strategy – Dandara has now held 37 Esplanade for at least 24 months since first occupation. SoJDC will have to bear the interest costs of holding the building for 3 years. However, the rental-stream that will flow on expiry of the rent- free periods will exceed the cumulative hold cost |
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| Findings | Comments |
| costs) that relate to the JIFC project. | and any other incentives that JDC may have given. (c) EY was provided with figures up to the date of concluding its report, and furthermore the EY figures included a 2.5% contingency figure which would take into account such unforeseen costs. The most recent SoJDC cost assessment, including contamination costs, confirms that the estimated cost of building No. 4 is within the overall cost position stated in the EY report;
|
11 | SoJDC must demonstrate to the States Assembly that the scheme for B4 will deliver no loss to the public purse, taking account of the effect upon profit of any rent free or equivalent tenant incentives (both agreed and proposed), together with due allowance for all known and planned costs of delivery. | There is no requirement for SoJDC to demonstrate this to the States Assembly. SoJDC's relationship is with the Minister for Treasury and Resources as shareholder. In accordance with P.73/2010, SoJDC reports to its Shareholder on a quarterly basis with regard to progress and viability. The Minister Treasury and Resources, in turn, updates the States Assembly via briefings, statements and answers to States questions. Regardless of this point, the Minister has on numerous occasions demonstrated and justified to the Assembly that the development of Building 4 will not result in a loss to the Public. |
12 | In the event that B4 were only to break even', it would not deliver sufficient profit' to fund its proportion of the proposed public realm (including the underground car park). | The Minister is satisfied that evidence exists to forecast that Building 4 will generate a profit. |
13 | The Masterplan for the Esplanade Quarter is not viable. | The Minister is not clear on the evidential basis for this statement. The Masterplan is a flexible, living document and will develop and change over time. The DTZ/C&W Red Book Valuation, combined with the costs forecasts provided by SoJDC, suggest that the JIFC would provide the financial wherewithal to complete the current masterplan proposals to lower La Route de la Libération |
| Findings | Comments |
|
| and carry out all of the public infrastructure associated with Phase 1 (the JIFC), should this continue to be the States Assembly's desired outcome. |
14 | Burying the road (La Route de la Libération) is not viable. | The Minister is not clear on the evidential basis for this statement. The Masterplan is a flexible, living document and will develop and change over time. The DTZ/C&W Red Book Valuation, combined with the costs forecasts provided by SoJDC, suggests that the JIFC would provide the financial wherewithal to complete the current masterplan proposals to lower La Route de la Libération and carry out all of the public infrastructure associated with Phase 1 (the JIFC), should this continue to be the States Assembly's desired outcome. |
15 | The Masterplan for the Esplanade Quarter will need to be re-appraised, and then presented to the States Assembly for debate. | EY advise that a review of the Masterplan be undertaken. This is a matter for the Minister for Environment to consider in conjunction with the Council of Ministers. |
16 | The key issue of having seamless connectivity between the Esplanade Quarter scheme (in particular to the South of La Route de la Libération) and the town will need to be resolved in a different manner. | EY advise that "an updated review on the Masterplan with more economically deliverable objectives should achieve most of the original aims whilst retaining the prospect for the generation of surpluses". The Masterplan set out 6 main objectives, one of which was the connectivity between the town and the Waterfront. There may well be alternative approaches that can deliver connectivity in a more economic manner. This would need to be assessed as part of any review of the Masterplan that the Minister for Environment may choose to undertake following the publication of the EY report. |
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RECOMMENDATIONS
| Recommendations | To | Accept/ Reject | Comments | Target date of action/ completion |
1 | An updated viability assessment of B4 must be immediately undertaken by the Minister for Treasury and Resources, taking account of the effect upon profit of any rent free or other tenant incentives both agreed and proposed together with due allowance for all known and planned costs of delivery. | T&R | Accept | This recommendation has already been complied with in a number of ways. SoJDC already provide quarterly updates on viability and progress to the Shareholder in accordance with its MoU and P.73/2010. HSBC have made financing available to SoJDC, based on its own commissioned appraisal of financial viability. The Minister for Treasury and Resources has also commissioned a Red Book Valuation of the entire JIFC development, and Jersey Property Holdings has deducted the total development costs to reach an assessment of the financial viability of each building and the JIFC as a whole, taking into account SoJDC's disposal strategy. | Complete |
2 | Such a viability assessment must be presented to both the Corporate Services Scrutiny Panel and the States Assembly. | T&R | Reject | The Panel's advisers were supplied with all of the information they requested for the purpose of carrying out their work. They have prepared their report in such a way that the confidentiality of this information has been respected. Their finding is clear that Building 4 should be completed, and that Building 5 should be progressed, assuming a similar level of viability to Building 4. The Minister is prepared to supply the Panel with the report commissioned by him from DTZ/C&W. The detailed findings cannot be presented publicly to the Assembly. The Panel is fully aware of the reasons for this, and the Minister is disappointed that they choose to make a recommendation that is not capable of being implemented. | N/A |
| Recommendations | To | Accept/ Reject | Comments | Target date of action/ completion |
3 | Regardless of the outcome of the fully- disclosed viability assessment for B4, appropriate processes for the re-appraisal of both the full JIFC proposals and the wider Esplanade Quarter Masterplan, as recommended by EY, should be implemented. Such re- appraisal should also take into account development proposed by the private sector along the Esplanade immediately adjoining the JIFC site. | T&R | Reject | The Esplanade Quarter is a 20 year project. SoJDC is developing out the project in a logical, phased manner in response to demand, and in accordance with the directions of the States Assembly. Each element of the phased delivery will naturally take into account a number of factors, including other developments in the locality, as part of the ongoing viability assessment. A full re-appraisal of the viability of the JIFC development and the Masterplan as a whole is not considered to serve any purpose at this stage, and this is not the EY recommendation. EY advise the following – "An updated review on the Masterplan with more economically deliverable objectives should achieve most of the original aims whilst retaining the prospect for the generation of surpluses which SoJ could apply to capital projects elsewhere on the Island". EY's main concern appears to concern the "proposals to sink the road beneath the development which we consider to be commercially unrealistic and arguably a burden upon the whole project". This is undoubtedly an expensive element of the Masterplan, which would result in the States, as shareholder, not receiving any capital receipts from the development until around 2035. A review of the Masterplan could assess the alternative approaches to achieving the connectivity which may be deliverable in a more cost- effective manner, thereby enabling States' access to the development receipts as early as 2020, which | N/A |
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| Recommendations | To | Accept/ Reject | Comments | Target date of action/ completion |
|
|
|
| could then be put towards alternative uses, such as the regeneration of St. Helier . Re-appraisal of the JIFC development as a whole is not considered necessary or useful by the Minister at this time due to the prudent, staged approach being adopted. A review of the Masterplan is a matter for the Minister for Environment in conjunction with the Council of Ministers. |
|
CONCLUSION
The Minister is fully supportive of the Scrutiny function. It is therefore uncomfortable for him to be unable to agree with the majority of the Panel's findings and recommendations. This response should be contrasted with the appended response to the findings of the Panel's expert advisers, EY. Their findings are clearly evidenced and are accepted. It is the conclusions drawn by the Panel from that work that the Minister is unable to clearly understand.
The JIFC development has been subject to an unprecedented level of public scrutiny. The Minister would welcome the opportunity to work collaboratively with the Panel on an approach which would alleviate the concerns expressed by a section of States Members and the Public in general. The Minister is entirely satisfied that he has sufficient evidence that the JIFC development is of direct financial benefit to the taxpayer and the Public. The wider economic benefits to the Island are incalculable, and the risks to the Island's most productive industries of not proceeding are unthinkable. If the Panel's remaining work on this subject serve to better inform the Assembly and the Public that the development is not only desirable but essential, then the Minister is pleased to contribute to that process.
APPENDIX
EY REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Findings Comments
1 The masterplan for the Agreed; however, it should be noted that
Esplanade Quarter was Jersey's economy is improving, and having adopted in 2008 at a time cumulatively lost 19% on its GVA levels since when the commercial outlook 2007, last year (2014) saw a 5% increase.
and market expectations in There is significant pent-up demand for new Jersey were very different Grade A office accommodation in St. Helier , than they are today. having had very little new space delivered
during the recession. There is currently c. 300,000 sq. ft. Net Internal Area (NIA) of new build office under construction. The level of pre-lets and construction which has occurred since April 2014 exceeds pre-recession activity.
Furthermore, the residential property market is also showing marked improvement, with the number of property transactions back to pre- recession levels, and the average value of property exceeding the 2008 high for the first time (reported in Q3 2015 House Price Index).
2 SoJDC are about to embark Agreed.
upon a phased' development The Esplanade Quarter Masterplan provides for of Phase 1 of the Quarter, a mixed-use development of 1.1 million sq. ft. namely by the construction of of NIA. The primary uses include office Building 4 providing (620,000 sq. ft.), residential (290,000 sq. ft.), 68,173 sq. ft. of Grade A and visitor accommodation (130,000 sq. ft.). office accommodation. Phase 1 will deliver up to 470,000 sq. ft. of
office accommodation in 6 standalone buildings on the site of the existing Esplanade Surface Car Park (in accordance with the revised Masterplan).
SoJDC is carrying out the development on a building-by-building basis in response to known demand, and is only commencing the construction of a building once a significant level of pre-let is achieved.
3 We are instructed by the Noted.
Scrutiny Panel to provide [Please note my reading of EY's Statement of advice upon the viability of Work (Appendix A of its report) did not limit Building 4 and to comment the instruction to the viability of No. 4 JIFC and upon the implications which this may have evolved during their our conclusions may have for appointment.]
the remainder of JIFC and
also for the Esplanade
Quarter proposals as a whole.
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4 As part of our work, we have Agreed.
received information from
SoJDC which is
commercially sensitive and
necessarily confidential. The
Scrutiny Panel has agreed
that, in order that we may
receive this important
information, we may enter a Non-Disclosure Agreement
with SoJDC. This was
exchanged on 15 July 2015.
5 Consequently our analysis Noted.
contained in this report,
whilst informed by this
confidential data, does not
disclose any of this
confidential information. It is important to note that this
confidential data alone has
not driven our conclusions
which are also based upon our
findings in relation to the
office market in Jersey.
6 For example, we refer in our Noted.
analysis to tenant incentives [We note that the report sets out, on pages 24 which could be agreed to and 25, that the rent-free element of the secure tenants. In reality our incentives provided on 37 Esplanade ranged analysis only allows for rent from 9 to 15 months. On page 47, EY details free periods which in our that Rent-Free of 18 to 24 months has been view would be representative allowed for within its valuation of No. 4 JIFC.] of the market.
SoJDC has publicly disclosed that it will hold Therefore, should it be these office buildings for 3 years after the
necessary to correlate our completion of the build. This will ensure that all analysis with the actual rent-free periods are wound out, and that situation, it will be necessary SoJDC benefits from any uplifts at first review. to obtain this direct from There is nothing uncommon about this SoJDC. strategy – Dandara has now held 37 Esplanade
for at least 24 months since first occupation.
SoJDC will have to bear the interest costs of
holding the building for 3 years; however, the
rental stream that will flow on expiry of the
rent-free periods will exceed the cumulative
hold cost and any other incentives that JDC
may have given.
7 For the avoidance of doubt, Noted. However, EY has reflected its position
our analysis of viability does in the full knowledge of this information which not represent the actual out- it received having signed a suitably enforceable turn as will be experienced by Non-Disclosure Agreement.
SoJDC in terms of actual
profit. This can only be
achieved by a direct
correlation with the data held
by SoJDC which is
necessarily confidential from
the public domain.
8 We detail below and in the Noted (statement of fact – no further
body of our report the comments).
outcome of our analysis
together with our
observations and conclusions.
It is important to appreciate
that we have not carried out
an audit of the actual costs,
both incurred and proposed,
for the scheme.
9 Given that there remain costs Noted. In accordance with SoJDC's
which are material to the Memorandum of Understanding with its viability of the scheme which Shareholder, the Minister for Treasury and are either unresolved or Resources, and P.73/2010, SoJDC provides confidential in nature, we quarterly updates to the Minister, and covers would expect that SoJ, as sole both progress and viability of the Company's shareholder of SoJDC, ensure projects.
that they are fully briefed
upon the potential impact of
these matters through their
normal channels of
communication.
10 We assess the gross Noted (statement of fact – no further
development value of comments).
Building 4, net of purchaser
costs (i.e. reflecting the
anticipated sale price),
assuming a stabilised rental
profile (i.e. all rent frees
washed' through) of
£32.65m. In other words this
is our view of the potential
price at which the building
could be sold once complete
and fully income producing.
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S.R.7/2015 Res.
11 This assumes full rent Noted. SoJDC's position is that the value of the
received of £2.428m per building should be based on an investment yield annum, i.e. £34 per sq. ft., of 6.5%. This yield is supported by BNP and an investment yield of Paribas Real Estate and DTZ.
7%.
12 Assuming the fourth and fifth Noted. SoJDC's position is that there will be no
floors are pre-let with the letting void on Practical Completion.
equivalent of 24 months rent Based on SoJDC's projected figures for rent free with the remaining floors and yield, it considers that No. 4 JIFC will leasing up between generate a net return (profit and land value 6 to 18 months post practical combined) of £7.5 million.
completion, all with 18 month
rent free agreements, we
calculate that the
development will return a
profit of £3.04m. This
represents a return of 12.04%
on costs incurred, and
specifically assumes that the
site is contributed at zero
cost.
13 Our analysis provides Noted.
sensitivities to this outcome
varying the investment yield
and the leasing voids.
14 You will note that we have Noted. These views on yield are not only those
also provided an analysis of of SoJDC; BNP Paribas Real Estate (SoJDC's the potential profit based letting agent) and DTZ (on behalf of HSBC) upon the views which have also conclude that a yield of 6.5% should be been expressed by SoJDC, achieved.
namely a lower yield of 6.5%
and assuming the building is
fully let on completion.
15 Although we do not agree Noted. The most significant variable in the
with these assumptions, they valuation of an office building is yield.
do demonstrate that if the SoJDC and its letting agent, BNP Paribas Real building was fully let prior to Estate, conclude that the standard of design and completion (with tenant specification coupled with blue chip' tenants, incentives of 18 – 24 months) these buildings should deliver a yield of 6.5%. and the investment is then
saleable at a yield of 6.5%, an A yield of 6.5% has also been concluded by acceptable profit including DTZ in its independent Red Book Valuation for site contribution would be the Funder of No. 4 JIFC, HSBC.
delivered. A half a percent shift in yield would have the
effect of adding around £3 million to the value of No. 4 JIFC.
16 This demonstrates the upside It is the view of SoJDC and its letting agent
potential as suggested by BNP Paribas Real Estate that this high-quality SoJDC although in our view and unique development will be an attractive it does not fully reflect the investment proposition and that the Jersey likely outcome based upon market is improving, with more inquiries from the evidence of current investors.
market conditions. The same level of yield was also adopted
completely independently by DTZ in its valuation for HSBC.
17 That said, we also consider Noted and supported.
that this weak profit
performance is not a reason
alone to not proceed with the
development.
18 We believe it appropriate to Noted and supported.
embark upon this first step,
largely as a catalyst to the
commencement of this
regeneration project which is
so important to Jersey.
19 This presupposes that SoJDC Noted. SoJDC has publicly disclosed that it will can demonstrate that the hold these office buildings for 3 years after the scheme will deliver at least a completion of the build. This will ensure that all profit or no cost to SoJ. rent-free periods are wound out and that SoJDC This will require their benefits from any uplifts at first review. There disclosure to their shareholder is nothing uncommon about this strategy –
of an updated viability review Dandara has now held 37 Esplanade for at least focused on Phase 1A – 24 months since first occupation. SoJDC will have to bear the interest costs of holding the
Building 4 above, taking building for 3 years; however, the rental stream account of the effect upon that will flow on expiry of the rent-free periods profit of any rent free or will exceed the cumulative hold cost and any equivalent tenant incentives, other incentives that JDC may have given. The both agreed and proposed SoJDC projected £7.5 million return, therefore
together with due allowance includes for all tenant incentives.
for all known and planned
costs of delivery.
20 In particular at the time of The EY report included a contingency of 2.5%
this report being finalised on construction costs. The EY report also SoJDC had begun site included a greater finance cost and greater excavation works. It has marketing costs than incurred by SoJDC. become clear that additional Following cost confirmation to date on the and unbudgeted costs are excavation works and decontamination being incurred to processes, SoJDC's cost projections are that the decontaminate the site. Our additional costs associated with dealing with the analysis makes no allowance legacy site contamination will be contained for environmental issues. It within the EY total cost allowances with no follows that, once established, further impact on the EY profit level.
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this will further reduce the profit from the scheme below that which we have indicated above and detailed in our analysis which follows.
21 A contingency allowance of SoJDC has entered into a lump sum JCT Design
2.5% is included in our and Build construction contract on a fully appraisal but we believe that designed and specified scheme with <1% this should not be absorbed in provisional sums.
its entirety for the purposes of Any call on the residual contingency is likely to allowing for the cost of be very minimal, and it is therefore absolutely decontamination given that appropriate to allocate this contingency to the these costs, whilst unknown costs of dealing with the legacy unbudgeted, are now partially contamination.
known.
22 We also believe that it is Noted and supported.
reasonable to plan for the
development of Building 5 to
follow as this will complete
the frontage to Castle Street.
23 However we would strongly The JIFC is being undertaken on a building-by- advise that a review of both building basis in response to known demand.
the JIFC proposals and the This significantly reduces delivery risk and wider Esplanade Quarter ensures the construction work is only
masterplan be undertaken. progressed if a particular building is viable. This must not be at the cost of There is significant pent-up demand for new the current phase but rather to Grade A office accommodation in St. Helier , achieve a balanced and having had very little new space delivered commercially based review of during the recession. JDC is in contact with the wider scheme. 20 prospective tenants with a total space
requirement of 325,000 sq. ft. Indeed, since
starting construction, JDC has received direct
enquiries from 6 new prospective tenants.
The Minister for Treasury and Resources would not wish for a review of the Masterplan to impact the delivery of Phase 1 of the Esplanade Quarter (namely the JIFC), and should a third or indeed a fourth office building be proven to be financially viable, the Minister would support SoJDC in its progression.
Whilst the Minister for Treasury and Resources does not disagree with the recommendation, any review of the Esplanade Quarter Masterplan is a matter for the Minister for Environment in conjunction with the Council of Ministers.
24 In addition, if the cost of site The costs of remediating the site and dealing
decontamination proves to be with the legacy contamination issue will be a disproportionate cost to known shortly, and SoJDC has confirmed that developing the wider scheme, based on known and projected figures to date, then the alternative of these costs will be contained with the total cost capping the site and figures used by EY in assessing the viability of developing ground and above No. 4 JIFC.
should be explored as a more
realistic and cost effective
solution.
25 There are currently proposals Masterplans are flexible, living documents and
to sink the road beneath the will no doubt develop and change over time development which we (particularly as it is predicated that the consider to be commercially Esplanade Quarter will take around 20 years to unrealistic and arguably a deliver). The DTZ/C&W Red Book Valuation, burden upon the whole combined with the costs forecasts provided by project. The associated public SoJDC, suggests that the JIFC would provide realm, including the creation the financial wherewithal to complete the of landscaped amenity areas, current masterplan proposals to lower La Route should also be considered in de la Libération and carry out all of the public the context of a revised infrastructure associated with Phase 1 (the masterplan of the wider JIFC), should this continue to be the States scheme. Assembly's desired outcome.
That is not to say that alternatives could not be assessed; however, this would be a matter for the Minister for Environment in conjunction with the Council of Ministers.
26 An updated review of the [Agreed/Noted]. A review of the Masterplan
masterplan with more could assess the alternative approaches to economically deliverable achieving the linkage/connectivity which could objectives should achieve be delivered in a more cost-effective manner, most of the original aims thereby enabling States' access to the whilst retaining the prospect development receipts as early as 2020. These for the generation of receipts could then be put towards other surpluses which the SoJ could regeneration projects in St. Helier and other apply to capital projects States capital projects.
elsewhere on the Island. A A review of the Masterplan is a matter for the key to this will be releasing Minister for Environment in conjunction with land for residential the Council of Ministers.
development, probably to the
south side of La Route de la
Liberation, much earlier than
will be currently possible and
to achieve the linkage of this
to the JIFC/car park site by
other means than the very
costly lowering of the road.
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