Electoral Commission Final Report January 2013

Electoral Commission Final Report

January 2013

www.electoralcommission.je

Contents

Membership  Page 02 Acknowledgements  Page 03 Terms of reference  Page 04

1. Executive summary  Page 05
2. Introduction  Page 09
3. Current structure and the need for change  Page 13

Part 1: Core recommendations

4. Number of members  Page 18
5. Constituencies and mandates  Page 20
6. Constables  Page 30
7. Term of office Page 33
8. Referendum  Page 34

Part 2: Subsidiary recommendations

9. Voting system  Page 38
10. Strengthening democracy   Page 40
11. Right of Deputies to speak at Parish Assemblies  Page 41

Part 3: Other issues

12. Other issues  Page 42

Bibliography  Page 43 Visits to other jurisdictions   Page 45 Oral submissions  Page 46 Written submissions  Page 47

Membership

Senator Sir Philip Bailhache , Chairman Mr. Colin Storm, Vice Chairman Deputy James Baker

Constable Juliette Gallichan

Dr. Jonathan Renouf

Professor Edward Sallis, OBE

Acknowledgements

The Commission is grateful to the many members of the public who made written submissions, gave evidence at oral hearings

or who attended one of its public meetings. Many of the submissions received, some of which were very lengthy, had been composed with great skill and care.All of them were helpful in enabling the Commission to try to find a sensible balance.

The Commission would also like to acknowledge the considerable assistance that it received from its expert advisers, Dr Alan Renwick, Professor Ron Johnston FBA, and Professor Iain McLean FBA.

The Commission is particularly grateful for the advice that it received throughout its work from the Greffier of the States, Michael de la Haye, and for the cheerful and unstinting administrative support of its Executive Officer,Anna Goodyear.

Terms of reference

On 7th March 2012 the States of Jersey agreed the following terms of reference for the Electoral Commission:

1.  The  Electoral  Commission  shall  consider  all  the  3.  The Electoral Commission shall review existing studies following areas - andresearchandconductfurtherresearchasitseesfit.

• classes of States member;

• constituencies and mandates;

• number of States members;

• terms of office;

and all other issues arising in the course of the work of the Commission which are relevant to the needs stated above.

4.  At  the  conclusion  of  its  investigation,  the Electoral  Commission  shall  present  a  report  with recommendations  to  the  Privileges  and  Procedures Committee  to  enable  the  Committee  to  present the  Commission's  proposals  to  the  States for approval prior to the submission of the proposals to  the  electorate  in  a  referendum  under  the Referendum (Jersey) Law 2002.

2.  The views of the public in Jersey should be sought and all such views taken into consideration. Formal meetings and hearings of the Commission should be held publicly in Jersey unless the Commission believes that there are reasonable grounds for holding a meeting or hearing in camera. The content of all written submissions to the Commission will be made available to the public, unless the  Commission  believes  that  there  are  reasonable grounds  for  non-disclosure  of  a  submission  or  part of a submission, and should be attributed unless the submitter explicitly requests that a submission shall be non-attributed and the Commission accepts the reasons for such a request.

CORE RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1

The number of elected members of the States Assembly should be reduced to 42.

Recommendation 2

The Island should be divided into six large districts, each electing either seven representatives ("Deputies") or, if the Constables remain in the States, five representatives ("Deputies").

Recommendation 3

The Public should decide in the referendum whether the Constables should remain as members of the States Assembly.

Recommendation 4

The decisions of the States to create a general election and to move to a four-year term of office should be affirmed.

Recommendation 5

The above recommendations should be put to the electorate in a referendum in the form of the question set out on page 8.

1. On  22nd  October  2012  the  Electoral  Commission  1.4  Some people thought that we should have explained published its Interim Report on the reform of the States  in more detail the reasoning behind our provisional Assembly. The provisional conclusions set out in that  recommendations. We accept that it is important to report were that - explain that reasoning, and the rationale for our final conclusions is set out in the body of this report, which is  also  available  on  the  Commission's  website:

1. The number of elected members of the

www.electoralcommission.je

StatesAssembly should be reduced to 42;

2. The Island should be divided into six large  1.5  A number of people remained concerned about the loss constituencies or districts; of the Island-wide mandate, and wanted more Senators and fewer Deputies. Some wanted to reduce the number
3. Islanders should be invited to decide in a  

of Deputies but to retain the parish connection for them. Referendum whether the Constables should

We acknowledge that the possible permutations for remain in the States; and

reform are numerous. Some may be disappointed that

4. All States members should be elected at a  thefinalrecommendationsdonotentirelyreflecttheirown general election to serve a 4-year term of office. preferences. It would have been impossible to satisfy all aspirations. We believe that our final recommendations

2. Following  the  publication  of  the  Interim  Report  are a summation that fairly reflects most of the thinking members  of  the  Electoral  Commission  attended  underlying the oral and written submissions that we meetings at each of the parish and public halls in the  received. We believe that they are also consistent with Island  in  order  to  give  members  of  the  public  the  the principles outlined in our Interim Report, viz. -

opportunity  to  hear  an  explanation  of  the  thinking  

behind  the  provisional  recommendations  and  to  • All electors should have the same number give  their  own  views  on  those  recommendations.   of votes

The Commission found this to be a very helpful exercise,

• Constituencies should as far as possible

and many of the ideas expressed at those meetings

  be of equal size

have informed its final recommendations.

• Acandidate should generally require a

3. During  the  consultation  on  our  interim  report  some  significant number of votes in order to be commented  that  the  Commission  should  have   elected to the Assembly

expressed a firm conclusion one way or another in

• The electoral system should be simple,

relation to the position of the Constables. In our opinion

  fair, and easy to understand.

views as to whether the Constables should remain in the

States are so polarized that a provisional conclusion one

way or the other would have diverted attention from the

equally important provisional recommendation that the

other members of the States should be elected in six

large districts formed along parish boundaries. We found

that most people appeared to agree that the question of

the Constables should be decided in the referendum on

the future composition of the States.

6. Some suggested that the reform option which left the Constables in the States was inconsistent with the above principles but we have never disguised the fact that equality of representation (that is, all representatives elected by broadly the same number of voters) cannot be achieved if the Constables remain in the States. The Constable of St. Helier represents some 33,500 parishioners while the Constable of St. Mary represents some 1,750 parishioners. Voter equity can only be achieved without the Constables in the States. Consultation has shown, however, that a significant number of people are more concerned with continuity of parish representation than they are with voter equity. If Deputies are elected in six large districts, the only means of ensuring that continuing direct link with the parish is by adopting the reform option that includes the Constables.
7. We have divided our recommendations into Core Recommendations and Subsidiary Recommendations. The Core Recommendations are those that should be put to the public in the referendum. They are set out below. The Subsidiary Recommendations are for consideration by the Privileges and Procedures Committee or another appropriate States body in due course. They are set out in sections 9, 10 and 11 of this report.

Core recommendations

1. The number of elected members of the States Assembly should be reduced to 42.

8. Nearly all the submissions made to the Commission agreed that there were too many members of the States. Caution is, however, required before accepting this view as conclusive. Asking the public whether they want fewer politicians is rather like asking whether they wish to pay less tax, or work shorter hours. It is nonetheless true that the number of States members is greater than the number of members of many other legislatures of small jurisdictions.
9. Furthermore, the Clothier Panel concluded in 2000 that, if ministerial government were to replace government by committee, fewer members would be needed. The Panel recommended an Assembly of between 42 and 44.
10. In our view, a more effective Assembly would be one composed of 42 members. In a representative democracy it is not sensible to have more members than are necessary. We are satisfied that, whether or not the current machinery of government is reformed, therewouldbeenoughmemberstofulfilallthefunctions of government and scrutiny.

2. The Island should be divided into six large districts, each electing either seven representatives ("Deputies") or, if the Constables remain in the States, five representatives ("Deputies").

11. During the consultation process following the publication of our Interim Report, we explained our position on the Island-wide mandate. Notwithstanding the popularity of the role of Senator, it is inconsistent with the adoption of a single election day. One election day means that the Senators and Deputies are elected for the same term, and have the same functions. The Council of Ministers is composed of equal numbers of Senators and Deputies. It is a distinction without a real difference. Our recommendation is that the "new" Deputies should be elected in large constituencies which will almost certainly ensure a contested election, and where the elections will have many of the characteristics of the Island-wide mandate. We might have chosen a different title to underline the difference between an "old" Deputy and one elected under the new system. None seemed satisfactory, and we think that the "new" Deputies will soon be recognized as a different kind of representative akin to the Senator. They should be concerned much more with "national" rather than parochial issues. They will need a substantial measure of popular support to secure election.
12. Some people expressed concern that the link between Deputies and the parish would be broken. We see no reason why Deputies should not continue to be involved in the parish or parishes they represent as they see fit, but the aim of the reform is to create a larger number of members involved in national or Island-wide affairs. From the viewpoint of constituents, they will have a wider choice of district representatives to approach should they have a problem requiring political assistance. It does not seem to us to matter whether the Deputy lives in the same parish as the constituent. As it is, many Deputies do not live in the parish that they represent. The Constable or another member of the Municipality or a parish volunteer should deal with parish problems.

13. We accordingly recommend that six electoral districts be created along parish boundaries as follows -

3. The Public should decide in the referendum whether the Constables should remain as members of the States Assembly.

14. The public meetings following the issue of the Interim Report confirmed our view that opinion is sharply divided upon the question whether or not the Constables should remain in the States. It is not possible for us to determine where the majority opinion lies. We remain of the view that the public should decide this question in the referendum. We summarised in our Interim Report some of the arguments that have been addressed to us.
15. The principal argument for removing the Constables is that, as mentioned above, their presence makes it  impossible  to  achieve  equality  of  representation. The number of eligible voters in St. Helier exceeds the  number  of  eligible  voters  in  the  eight  smallest parishes1.  Furthermore,  if  the  Constables  were  to remain  in  the  States  alongside  a  system  of  large electoral  districts,  it  would  make  inequality  of representation  even  worse  than  under  the  current system. It is also claimed that the Constables' principal duties lie in the parish, and that they have insufficient time to play a full part as members of the States. Our research has shown that the Constables do tend to take on fewer positions of senior responsibility in the Assembly than their fellow members. It is the case that many elections for Constable are uncontested.

16. The principal contrary argument is that the parishes play a vitally important part in the life of the community, encouraging  honorary  and  other  public  service, providing a focus through the parish hall for local activity, and adding value to the lives of parishioners in countless different ways. The Constable is the head of the parish and is seen by many as an essential link between the parish administration and central government. There is concern that if the role of the Constable is diminished there is a risk that the parish and all that it represents will be diminished and undermined as well. Assuming the introduction of large electoral districts, retaining the Constables in the States would ensure the continuity of  parish  representation.  In  Guernsey,  where  the Constables ceased to be members of the States many years ago, the parish has become a less important institution than it is in Jersey although it may be arguable whether the latter is a consequence of the former.
17. The choice lies between a better balance of electors/ representatives  as  against  a  less  good  balance but direct parish representation in the States. If the Constables remain in the States, it will be necessary for them to continue to combine their two roles - it would not be acceptable for a Constable to restrict himself or herself to parish work.

4. The decisions of the States to create a general election and to move to a four-year term of office should be affirmed.

18. A large majority of those making submissions to the Commission thought that the term of office of members should be increased. Some were in favour of five years, but other people thought that the term should remain at three years. We have taken a mid-point of four years, which is consistent with a previous decision of the Assembly. We also agree that a general election, at which the entire membership of the Assembly is renewed, is important. The opportunity for judgement to be passed upon the performance of a government, or a Chief Minister, outweighs the benefits that some see in returning to the system of staggered elections that took place before 2011.

1 The estimate of eligible voters was calculated by the States Statistics Unit using census data as at 27 March 2011. The first criteria for voter eligibility - adults resident in Jersey for more than 2 years - was calculated by including those aged 16 or over and resident in Jersey from 2008 or earlier at census day, as well as an estimate of those aged 16 or over resident in Jersey and arriving in the first 3 months of 2009. The second criteria for voter eligibility - persons resident for at least 6 months, but who have also been resident previously for 5 years - was estimated from those adults who were resident for less than 2 years on census day, but who held a to h' residential qualifications.

5. The  above  recommendations  should  be  put  to the electorate in a referendum in the form of the question set out below.

19. The  questions  to  be  put  to  the  electorate  in  the referendum  have  been  the  subject  of  extensive consideration  by  the  Commission.  The  best referendum question is a simple yes/no: do you support the  Commission's  recommendations?  However, an inevitable consequence of our conclusion that the people should decide the question of the Constables has been that the framing of the referendum question is more complex.
20. A number of options have been examined. It is clear that many people would find it difficult to answer the question  about  the  reform  options  without  knowing whether  or  not  the  Constables  were  to  remain  in the  States.  Some  have  said  that  they  would  vote against any reform if the Constables were to remain in the States, because that would make inequality of representation worse than it is now. Others have said that the parish is so important that if there were to be no parochial representation in the States, they would vote against reform. We therefore considered whether we  should  recommend  two  separate  referendums, dealing first with the Constables and later with the other reforms, or vice versa. But these solutions create other problems, including that of sustaining voter interest, as  well  as  being  contrary  to  advice  received  from the experts.

21. We have concluded that the question set out below gives voters the clearest choice. Voters will choose between three options, and will rank their choices in order of preference. Voters will need to write 1 next to their first choice and 2 next to their second choice (although there will be no requirement to indicate a second choice). In the event that none of the options obtains an absolute majority at the first count, the votes cast for the least popular option will be re-distributed amongst the other two in accordance with the second preference expressed by those voters. One option will then have an absolute majority.
22. We recommend that the referendum should put the following questions to the electorate. The questions have been assessed as fair and clear by our expert adviser, by the UK Electoral Reform Society and by the Plain English Campaign.

1. The Electoral Commission was established against a  2.3  Not all of these problems can be overcome simply by background of numerous failures to agree upon reforms  changing the electoral system, but reform can make a of  the  electoral  system  following  the  introduction  of  majorcontribution.IftheIslandistodevelopaconfident ministerial government. We think that the implementation  political voice that is respected both in the Island and on of our recommendations would lead to a revival of  the world stage, its government needs to be founded on Jersey'selectoralsystemsoastomakeitfitforpurpose the bedrock of popular consent, and a greater number in the 21st century. Our task has been carried out  of able men and women need to be attracted to stand against a backdrop of relatively low levels of political  for election. To achieve this, its politics should aim for engagement from the public. There is a sense in Jersey  thriving  debate,  mass  participation,  and  a  sense  of that politics is often irrelevant, that the level of debate  inclusiveness.

falls below that of our competitors, and that the majority

of the population is disinterested.  2.4  The Electoral Commission believes that Jersey needs to aim for "best practice" in all that it does. Jersey should

2. We consider that there are a number of problems at the  aim to be a model democracy. This requires transforming present time which need to be addressed as part of any  the electoral system so that it is simple, fair and based package of reform - on some clear principles. Reform should be mindful of, but not bound by our heritage and traditions. It is with these objects in mind that we set out our proposals

• Jersey's political structure is unnecessarily

for reform.

complex with 3 categories of elected members;

• voter turnout is low;

• it is not unusual for elections to be uncontested; and

• the position of Senator has been rendered untenable by the introduction of the

single election day.

Background

5. Thelast significant reforms to the composition of the States Assembly took place in 1948 when the Jurats and the Rectors were removed and replaced by Senators and an increased number of Deputies. Although the structure and scope of public administration in Jersey has changed beyond recognition since 1948 the composition of the Assembly has not evolved at all.
6. There have been calls for reform to the machinery of  government  in  Jersey  and  to  the  composition and election of the States for many years. The most recent  culminated  in  the  Report  of  the  Review Panel  on  the  Machinery  of  Government  in  Jersey,' or the Clothier Report', that was published in 2000. This eventually resulted in the abolition of government by committee and a move to Ministerial Government. It had no impact, however, upon the composition of the States Chamber.
7. The  Clothier  Report  had  proposed  the  abolition  of the role of Senators and had also recommended that Constables should cease to be members of the States byvirtueoftheiroffice.ItadvocatedaStatesAssemblyof between 42 and 44 members elected on a parish basis, the introduction of one general election for all Members of the States, and a number of other changes too.
8. Rather than adopt the complete package of reform recommended by the Clothier Report, the Assembly agreed  to  introduce  Ministerial  Government, but rejected the proposed changes to the composition of the States Assembly. The Island thus retained its three classes of States member, continuing to allocate its elected representatives to the role of Senator, Deputy or Constable; and elections continued in the same manner as they had in previous years. The 12 Senators held  an   Island-wide  mandate  and  were  elected  for a six-year term, with half being appointed every three years; the Deputies continued to be elected for three years in districts allocated according to parish; and the Constables continued to be elected by their parishioners to serve a three-year term.
9. The decision of the States not to adopt the Clothier recommendations in full led to the calls for change that have been made repeatedly ever since.
10. Thefirst proposal came with the establishment of the Special Committee on the Composition and Election of the States Assembly which was set up in March 2002 to consider matters including the constituencies and termsofofficeofelectedmembers.On14thSeptember 2004 it lodged a proposition asking the States to agree in principle that -

1. all members of the States should be elected on a singlegeneral election day and for a fixed term of office of 4 years;
2. the  general  election  should  be  held  in  the Spring  with  effect  from  next  set  of  elections after 2005;
3. the  12  Parish  Constables  should  no  longer

be members of the States by virtue of their office;

4. the  present  positions  of  Senator  and Deputy should be abolished and replaced with a new  category  of  States  member  elected  in  6 new constituencies with a total of 47 members as follows -

11. The Special Committee also asked that the States agree to put the proposals to the electorate in a referendum with a view to their being implemented no later than 20082. The States rejected the proposition in its entirety on 24th November 2004.
12. On 5th June 2007, two years after the introduction of Ministerial  Government  in  2005,  the  Privileges  and Procedures Committee ("the PPC") lodged a further proposition to revise the composition of the States3. The Committee proposed that, from 2011, the elected membership of the States Assembly should consist of the 12 parish Constables and 36 Deputies elected in six large electoral districts. It proposed the introduction of a singlegeneralelectiondayandacommontermofoffice of four years for all 48 members. The proposition also invited the States to submit the proposals to the electorate in a referendum and to pursue their introduction if they were supported by a majority of those voting. The States rejected the proposition by 26 votes to 21.
13. In  May  2009  the  PPC  proposed  a  similar  revised structure  as  that  suggested  two  years  previously. The proposition included the introduction of a single election day and a States Assembly comprising the 12 parish Constables and 37 other members to be elected in six large electoral districts4. The proposition was rejected by 38 votes to ten.

2 Special Committee on the Composition and Election of the States. Machinery of government reform: composition and election of the States Assembly. P.151/2004. 14th September 2004 3 Privileges and Procedures Committee. Composition of the States: revised structure and referendum. P.75/2007. 5th June 2007.

4 Privileges and Procedures Committee. Composition and election of the States: revised structure. P.72/2009. 19th May 2009.

14. Asa result, no significant changes to the composition of the Assembly have been made and the reforms that have been agreed have been, almost without exception, related  to  measures  designed  to  facilitate  a  single election day.
15. The States agreed in principle to introduce a single election  day  for  all  States  members  in  September 2009[5] and to move to a four-year term of office for all members in October 2010[6]. This arrangement included an agreement to reduce the number of Senators from 12 to eight in 2014 as it was considered that it would be impractical to elect 12 Senators on the same general election day as all other members.
16. The changes were controversial but were implemented following the adoption, as amended, of the States of Jersey  (Miscellaneous  Provisions)  Law  2011  which established the following arrangements, which remain in place to date -

Electoral Commission

17. The  continuing  debate  about  the  structure  and composition of the States culminated on 15th March 2011 with the decision of the States to establish an Electoral  Commission  to  consider  the  classes  of States member; their constituencies and mandates; the number of States members; their terms of office; the functions of the electoral process; voting systems; voter registration and all other issues arising in the course of its work relevant to those areas[7]. Its recommendations should then be put to the electorate in a referendum.
18. On 13th May 2011 the PPC presented a report to the States which invited comments from stakeholders in respect of the proposed composition, cost and funding of the Electoral Commission[8]. Only two consultation responses were received and on 7th September 2011 the Committee presented the proposed structure of the Commission to the States[9]. This identified a timetable for its work and established a budget of £200,000 which was agreed by the States as part of the Annual Business Plan 2012 and was made available as part of the budget of the States Assembly for 2012.
19. While the States had agreed in early 2011 to establish and fund an Electoral Commission, the appointment of a newly elected Chamber in the autumn of 2011 resulted in changes to the scope of the Commission's work. On 7th March 2012 the States adopted a proposition by the PPC to enable States members to be appointed to serve on the Commission, as well as to amend its terms of reference to delete the functions of the voting process'; voting systems'; and voter registration' from the list of areas for consideration[10].
20. On 7th March 2012 Senator Sir Philip Bailhache was appointed as Chairman of the Electoral Commission and Constable Juliette Gallichan of St. Mary and Deputy James Baker of St. Helier were appointed as members. Following  an  open  recruitment  process  undertaken with  the  involvement  of  the  Jersey  Appointments Commission, Dr. Jonathan Renouf ; Professor Edward Sallis, OBE and Mr. Colin Storm were appointed by the States as external members of the Commission on 16th May 2012[11].

21. At the end of May 2012 the Commission launched  a  three-month  public  consultation  on  its  terms  of reference. A leaflet was distributed to every household  in  the  Island  and  the  Commission's  website,  www.electoralcommission.je,  was  launched.  The Commission invited Islanders to give their views  on  its  terms  of  reference,  asking  them  to  write  in  with their opinions on -  

• the classes of States member;

• their constituencies and mandates;

• the number of States members; and

• their terms of office.

22. The  Commission  received  more  than  340  written  submissions[5] and  heard  from  35  people  at  public  hearings13.  The  consultation  closed  on  31st August 2012.
23. The Commission appointed Dr. Alan Renwick of the  University of Reading; Professor Ron Johnston of the University of Bristol and Professor Iain McLean of the  University of Oxford as advisers and is grateful for their  assistance. Their reports are available to view online  at: www.electoralcommission.je/about-the-commission/ research. The Commission also carried out research  into the structure and workings of the States Assembly  and parliaments in other small jurisdictions around the  world, undertaking visits to the parliaments of Guernsey,  the Isle of Man, Barbados and Ireland.  
24. On  22nd  October  2012  the  Commission  published  its Interim Report and provisional recommendations.  The report was sent to every household in the Island  and written comments were invited by a deadline of  23rd November 2012. The Commission held meetings  at each of the Island's 12 parish or public halls in order  to give members of the public the opportunity to hear  an explanation of the thinking behind the provisional  recommendations, and to give their own views to the  Commission. The Commission found this to be a very  helpful exercise. Following these meetings it received  97 further written submissions from members of the  public, all of which has contributed to the formation of  the Commission's Final Report.

12 http://www.electoralcommission.je/current-submissions/

13 http://www.electoralcommission.je/current-submissions/hearings/

1. At present the States Assembly is composed of 51  3.4  At present, Jersey's electoral system, which is based members as follows - upon the 12 parish boundaries, makes it impossible to achieve equal representation. The populations of the 12 parishes are very different. St. Mary has the smallest

• 10 Senators elected on an Island-wide basis;

population and is over 19 times smaller than St. Helier ;

• 12 Parish Constables, each elected by the  while the combined population of the eight smallest relevant parish; and parishes, at 30,966, is 2,556 less than the population of

• 29 Deputies elected on a constituency basis,   St. Helier .Table 1 shows the population figures for each

  with the constituencies being either a whole  parish as at the 2011 census.

  parish or a district within a parish (there

  are currently 17 such constituencies).  Table 1

2. When it comes to sitting in the States Chamber there is, however, no difference between the functions of a Senator, Deputy or Constable. All three have exactly the same voting power; all three can stand for any of the ministerial, Scrutiny and Committee roles available; and all three have equal right to speak during debates. Despite  this,  the  basis  on  which  each  member  is elected  is  diverse,  with  Senators  being  elected  by the  popular  vote  of  the  entire  electorate,  and  the Deputies'  and  Constables'  constituencies  ranging  in size considerably from 1,752 to 33,522 residents at either extreme.
3. Equality and fairness are key elements of any truly democratic electoral system. The ideal would be a system  that  allows  every  voter  to  have  the  same number of votes, with every elected member being appointed to represent the same number of people. While  that  might  be  the  Utopian  ideal,  there  are other  considerations  of  which  the  Commission  has had to take account.

5. The different ways of electing each class of States member adds another level of complexity to the ideal of achieving equal representation for each voter. Table 2 shows the current number of Deputies elected by each parish and the number of eligible voters per Deputy in each parish, which ranges from 4,010 in St. Peter to 1,340 in St. Mary .
6. If Constables are included in the calculation, St. Helier is shown to have the highest number of eligible voters per representative, at 2,444, with St. Mary the lowest, at 670, the inequality of representation is considerable.
7. Another consequence of small constituencies based upon the parishes, or parts of parishes, is that voters do not always have a choice in the selection of their representatives. If a Deputy in a small constituency, or  a  Constable,  is  well  regarded,  this  may  act  as a  deterrent  to  a  challenge  by  another  contender. From  a  voter's  perspective,  and  indeed  from  a democratic perspective, it is desirable always to have a choice.

The current system in Jersey can result in uncontested elections, sometimes for Deputies' and more frequently for Constables' seats. Uncontested elections also tend to dampen the enthusiasm and hence the engagement of the electorate. Only 63 per cent of Islanders were registered to vote in the 2011 elections.

8. Furthermore, of that registered electorate, an average of less than half actually turned out to vote. In 2011 the  average  voter  turn-out  (which  many  regard  as an important measure of the health of a democracy), was  50.58%  in  the  Senators'  elections,  47.55%  in the contested Deputies' elections, and 45.30% in the contested Constables' elections.
9. The Commission has set out to develop a package of reforms that should result in increased levels of voter interest  and  participation.  Evidence  suggests  that turnout is usually higher at elections in countries with more equal representation than in those without such representation16 and it can be surmised that Jersey's current  voting  system  has  a  detrimental  impact  on voter turnout17.

Table 2

15 Estimated using 2011 census data

16 Simon Hix, Ron Johnston FBA and Iain McLean FBA, Choosing an electoral system, page 16. 17 Dr. A. Renwick, The Jersey States Assembly in Comparative Perspective, page 19.

Key principles

10. One  of  the  most  important  deterrents  to  active participation  by  the  registered  electorate  in  the democratic process seems to us to lie in the complexity of the current system.. The Commission has therefore been keen to establish a package of reforms that will result in greater simplicity and a more democratically elected States Assembly.
11. While the 2011 decision to introduce a single election day for all 49 members of the States in October 2014 may be considered laudable in its intention to provide Islanders with a general election, the complexities for the electorate remain. As it stands, voters in St. Helier , for example, will have not only to select eight Senators from what is likely to be a lengthy list of Island-wide candidates, but will also have to be aware of their district in St. Helier in order to make an informed decision regarding the three or four Deputies representing that district,  as  well  as,  perhaps,  choosing  a  Constable from another list of candidates. According to our expert advisers, when voters are asked to vote in two or more simultaneous elections using different electoral systems, the number of spoiled ballot papers increases[5].
12. In formulating our recommendations we have taken a number of overarching principles into account. While it may not have been possible for us to meet each one of these principles in full, each one has been vital in helping us to develop our final recommendations.

13. Our key principles are as follows -

• Constituencies should be of a broadly equal size;

• All electors should have the same number of votes;

• The system should be designed to ensure

  that no candidate is elected unless he or

she can gain a reasonably significant number of votes;

• All members of the States should recognise

  that their main role in the Chamber is as a

  member of the Island's national' parliament

  and that their task is to consider draft

  legislation and policies that affect the

whole Island;

• The system should be designed so that

  more people are encouraged to vote and

feel engaged in politics in Jersey;

• There should be a general election for all

  States members so that the electorate is

  able to effect change of the entire membership

of the States at one time if it sees fit; and

• The electoral system should be simple,

  fair, and easy to understand.

14. In applying these principles to its task, the Commission has also been aware of the importance to the electorate

of  the  Island's  heritage.  While  we  have  taken  into account the provisions of the Code of Good Practice

in Electoral Matters issued by The Council of Europe's European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission)[6] during the development of our recommendations on constituency boundaries, we did not conclude that absolute voter equity was essential.

A purely mathematical approach to the allocation of districts  would  have  involved  cutting  across  parish boundaries, and we did not consider that was desirable. We think that our recommendations are necessarily radical, but they are not revolutionary. Throughout our work we have been conscious of the need for progress through evolutionary change as well as the need to respect the stabilising influence of Jersey's traditions.

PART ONE - CORE RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission makes five core recommendations -

Recommendation 1

The number of elected members of the States Assembly should be reduced to 42.

Recommendation 2

The Island should be divided into six large districts, each electing either seven representatives ("Deputies") or, if the Constables remain in the States, five representatives ("Deputies").

Recommendation 3

The Public should decide in the referendum whether the Constables should remain as members of the States Assembly.

Recommendation 4

The decisions of the States to create a general election and to move to a four-year term of office should be affirmed.

Recommendation 5

The above recommendations should be put to the electorate in a referendum in the form of the question set out in Section 8 of this report.

Recommendation 1

The number of elected members of the States Assembly should be reduced to 42.

1. It is often said that there are too many States members, but asking the public whether they want fewer politicians is rather like asking whether they want to pay less tax or work shorter hours. It is quite possible that if the current  size  of  the Assembly  were  lower,  Islanders would still seek a reduction in that number. Nearly all the submissions made to the Assembly agreed that there were too many members of the States, but caution is required before accepting this view as conclusive.
2. While the size of the States Assembly at present is not notably large in international comparison it is somewhat greater than that of legislatures of other democracies with  similar  populations.  According  to  one  of  our expert  advisers  a  reduction  in  size  to  somewhere between 30 and 50 members would not make it unusually small20. If the hypothesis that the membership of the lower chamber of a country's national legislature tends to be roughly equal to the cube root of its population is accepted, in Jersey's case, this would imply a legislature of 46 members21.
3. The decision on the appropriate number of members of the Assembly is related in part to the machinery of government, as changes to the structure of government can affect the number of members required. The Clothier Panel concluded in 2000 that, if ministerial government were  to  replace  government  by  committee,  fewer members would be needed. The Panel recommended an  Assembly  of  between  42  and  44  members. In considering the appropriate number of members, the Commission took into account the current machinery of government, which has evolved since the Clothier Report  and  which  enables  members  to  serve  in  a number of different capacities, as follows -

• the Council of Ministers comprising the Chief Minister and 9 Ministers;

• 12 positions ofAssistant Minister (although

  under current proposals this will reduce

  to 11 from 2014 when the reduction in

membership to 49 takes effect);

• 1 Chairman and a variable number of members of the PublicAccounts Committee;

• 5 scrutiny panels, each comprising a

  Chairman and up to 4 other members.

  Members are allowed to serve on up to

2 panels;

• the Privileges and Procedures Committee

  comprising a Chairman and 6 other members,

  all of whom can serve in other capacities,  

  although for the purposes of this assessment

  the assumption has been made that the  

  Chairman may want to serve on PPC only.

4. Members  also  serve  on  the  Planning  Applications Panel (PAP); the States Employment Board (SEB); the Legislation Advisory Panel and the Jersey Overseas Aid  Commission  but  membership  of  these  does not  prevent  a  member  serving  in  another  capacity. These bodies do not therefore need to be considered as part of the assessment of the required minimum number of members. There are also the inter-parliamentary bodies, (e.g. the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and the  Assemblée  Parlementaire  de  la  Francophonie), but these do not meet frequently and have not been counted in this assessment. In addition the Comité des Connétable s and the Chairmen's Committee are bodies that bring together respectively the 12 Constables and the PACandscrutinypanelchairmeninanexofficiocapacity and these are not therefore considered relevant for this assessment.
5. The  relevant  number  of  States  members  required under the current machinery of government is therefore estimated to be 42, as shown in Table 3 -

Table 3

20 The Jersey States Assembly in Comparative Perspective - Dr. A. Renwick, page 1 21 The Jersey States Assembly in Comparative Perspective - Dr. A. Renwick, page 4

6. In the present Assembly, 39 members are involved in the bodies shown in the table above. Of the 12 members who are not included -

• 1 is a member of the LegislationAdvisory

Panel;

• 2 are members of the Privileges and Procedures Committee;

• 2 are members of the States Employment Board;

• 2 are members of the Planning Applications Panel;

• 5 have no official responsibilities.

7. Thiscalculation excludes ex officio membership of the Comité des Connétable s and membership of the two inter-parliamentary bodies. It would be difficult to argue that the workload of the Legislation Advisory Panel or of the Jersey Overseas Aid Commission is such that a  member  could  not  take  on  other  responsibilities. At present four of the seven members of the Planning Applications Panel combine this with work that is counted inthetotalof39above,asdothreeofthefivemembers of the States Employment Board and five of the seven members of the Privileges and Procedures Committee.

10. None of this, however, falls within the terms of reference of the Commission. It would be for the States to consider in due course, if our recommendations were accepted, whether the " Troy " rule should be adapted or abolished having regard to the smaller number of members of the States Assembly. If the " Troy " rule were retained, it would be necessary to reduce the number of Ministers and Assistant Ministers to 18 so that the differential with the 24 non-executive members could be maintained. We record that we have seen the draft interim proposals of the sub-committee appointed by the PPC to consider the machinery of government. There is nothing in those draft proposals that has caused us to revise our interim recommendation as to the number of members of the States Assembly.

Conclusion

11. The Commission has concluded that an Assembly of 42 members would be able to perform all the functions of government and of scrutiny more effectively and efficiently than a larger number. In a representative democracy it is not sensible to have more members of a legislative assembly than are necessary.
12. The Commission therefore recommends that the number of elected members of the States Assembly should be reduced to 42.

8. When considering the appropriate number of States members the Commission was also aware of the so- called Troy ' rule which currently affects the size of the  executive (i.e. the combined total of members serving  as Ministers or Assistant Ministers). The name came  about as the result of an amendment to the original  Clothier proposals brought by then Deputy Peter Troy .  The amendment adapted the Clothier recommendation  for a minority' executive by specifying that this minority  should always be smaller than the size of the executive  by a factor of at least 10% of the total membership  of the Assembly. That rule is now embodied in article  25(3) of the States of Jersey Law 2005 as follows -

"The number of Assistant Ministers appointed shall not  cause the aggregate of the Chief Minister, Ministers and  Assistant Ministers to exceed 22 individuals."

[The number is due to reduce to 21 in 2014 as a result of  the States of Jersey (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Jersey)  Law 2011.]

9. The rule evolved from the assumption of the Clothier  Panel that Ministers and Assistant Ministers would act  as a government and, although this was not expressed,  be  bound  by  some  form  of  collective  responsibility.  In  practice  experience  has  shown  that  Assistant  Ministers  do  not  always  vote  with  the  government.  Some Assistant Ministers ask questions of Ministers  and  speak  and  vote  against  propositions  brought  by them.  

Recommendation 2

The Island should be divided into six large districts, each electing either seven representatives ("Deputies") or,  if  the  Constables  remain  in  the  States,  five representatives ("Deputies").

Senators

1. During the consultation process following the publication of our Interim Report, we explained our position on the Island-wide mandate. Notwithstanding its popularity, the role of Senator seems to us inconsistent with the adoption of a single election day. One election day means that the Senators and Deputies are elected for the same term and have the same functions. The Council of Ministers is composed of equal numbers of Senators and Deputies. It is a distinction without a real difference. There seems to be a conflict between the public perception of the role of Senator and the functions of the actual role itself. On the one hand, we accept that at present the public strongly supports  the  concept  of  the   Island-wide  mandate. Senators are perceived as being the "senior" members of the States and, perhaps, as taking a broader view of issues. On the other hand, the reality is that Senators have no greater rights or privileges in the Assembly than any other States member, and play no greater part in the government of Jersey than the Deputies. Given that the term of office is now the same as that of a Deputy or a Constable, we think that fewer and fewer candidates of substance would in future put themselves forward for election as a Senator. Only one Deputy was a candidate in the 2011 senatorial election.
2. Of  the  submissions  received  by  the  Commission, 42% thought that the Island-wide mandate should be abolished; 32% wanted to retain the status quo or return to a system of 12 Senators; 22% were keen for the number of Senators to be increased beyond 12, including a small number who suggested that all members should be elected on this basis; and 4% wanted to retain an Island-wide mandate for less than ten members.

3. The reasons put forward by those in favour of maintaining the Island-wide mandate included -

• that the Senators have the most democratic'  mandate of any States member, being  elected by the largest number of voters;

• that the senatorial election provides a way  of measuring public opinion across the  whole Island;

• that only the senatorial candidates

  consistently address Island-wide issues in  their manifestoes and during hustings; and

• in view of the above, that ministerial posts  should be reserved for Senators.

4. Many of the submissions received by the Commission made  a  link  between  the   Island-wide  vote  and ministerial positions. Several respondents commented that only members with an Island-wide mandate had the  authority  to  speak  on   Island-wide  issues  and several suggested that only members elected on an Island-wide  basis  should  be  able  to  be  appointed as  Chief  Minister  or  Ministers.  The  perception  was that Senators are the more senior' members of the Assembly and should therefore occupy the most senior positions of responsibility.
5. The reality is, however, that for some years Senators have enjoyed no particular ascendancy in terms of ministerial  posts.  There  have  been  three  Councils of  Ministers  since  the  introduction  of  ministerial government in December 2005. Table 4 shows the make-up of each Council at the start and the end of its term -

Table 4

At the end of the last Council of Ministers, only four out of ten Council members were Senators. The present Council of Ministers contains an equal number of Senators and Deputies.

6. The  three  Chief  Ministers  to  date  have  all  been Senators  but  the  2011  selection  for  Chief  Minister appears to have been the first occasion when there was  any link  between  recent  electoral  success  in a senatorial election and election as Chief Minister, with the two candidates for Chief Minister being the top two candidates in the senatorial election. States members appear to take less account of the category of  membership  when  selecting  other  Ministers. For  example  two  of  the  current  Ministers  with responsibility for some of the largest States budgets, Health and Social Services and Education, Sport and Culture, are both Deputies.
7. Another factor that has been borne in mind by the Commission  is  the  fact  that  many  members  have served in another capacity before being elected as a Senator. Of the current ten Senators in the States, eight had previously been Deputies, either immediately before  their  election  as  Senator  or  in  a  previous States.  Only  two  of  the  ten  were  elected  straight into  a  senatorial  role.  Senators  consistently  have  a longer average length of service than the two other categories of member and this would appear to be another factor in explaining why Senators may occupy a  greater  percentage  of  positions  of  responsibility. As at January 2013 the average length of service of the current 10 Senators is 9.1 years as opposed to an average of 5.9 years for Deputies.
8. Although  some  argue  that  the  senatorial  election provides the only real Island-wide debate on major policy issues, this could be seen, under the current system,  to  lead  to  a  situation  whereby  Deputies' and Constables' elections focus much more on very local issues with little debate on Island-wide matters. In addition, media reporting is concentrated to a large extent upon the senatorial election. In 2011, reporting of the elections focused disproportionately upon the election for 4 Senators rather than the elections for the remaining 41 Deputies and Constables and this must be a matter of concern as Senators make up only 19.6% of the current Assembly and would make up only 16.3% of the Assembly after the 2014 elections if no reforms were agreed.
9. The  Commission  was  advised  during  its  visit  to Guernsey that the issues debated in the elections for their large constituencies were 80% Island-wide issues and that the hustings were not dominated by purely parochial or local issues. This would seem to indicate that the creation of large constituencies moves the focus of debate, and the attention of election candidates, away from local issues towards Island-wide considerations. A States member's key role is as a member of the national parliament. His or her task is to debate legislation and major policies that impact upon the whole Island. A move away from parochial and localised debate during the election campaign would in our view be a positive development.

10. Prior to 2011, candidates who were unsuccessful in the senatorial elections could then stand for election as a Deputy . A considerable number of the unsuccessful senatorial candidates in 2008 then stood in the Deputies' elections  and  six  of  these  were  elected.  Since  the reforms of 2011, which instituted a common term of office and a single election day, it has not been possible for candidates to adopt this approach. This too has had a significant adverse impact upon the attraction of the senatorial role.
11. There is no second chance' election and candidates can no longer stand to be elected in the Deputies' elections  if  they  are  unsuccessful  in  the  Senatorial elections.  Furthermore,  the  cost  of  an   Island-wide election campaign is significant. Only one Deputy risked standing for the role of Senator in the 2011 elections and it is difficult to see why any sitting Deputy would wish to risk his or her Deputy 's seat in future given that there is no particular advantage in being elected a Senator. The Commission believes that it would be unfortunate if only new candidates with no experience in the States stood for election as Senator in the future.
12. Some of those who wrote to the Commission stated that all States members should be elected on an Island-wide mandate in the same way that Senators are now elected. It would, however, be unrealistic to ask the electorate to vote for up to 42 members from a possible list of over 100 candidates on one ballot paper. The January 2007 report by the UK Electoral Reform Society for the States of Guernsey States Assembly and Constitution Committee examined the feasibility of all Island-wide voting and concluded -

"(g)  In short therefore, a nationwide

constituency system could only feasibly operate in Guernsey if one of the following conditions were met -

• Candidates coalesced into political parties, or (at the very least) electoral blocs;

• There were fewer seats to be filled (however any more than twenty seats would make any of the above systems problematic, and a twenty- member assembly would not seem appropriate)." 22

22 First Report on Island-wide voting by the States Assembly and Constitution Committee, October 2008, Appendix 1.

13. The only realistic way that all members could be elected on an Island-wide basis would be if the Island were to move away from the proposed introduction of a general election and to re-introduce staggered elections. However, Islanders have shown a preference for the introduction of a general election and that preference has been endorsed by the States with its decision to introduce a general election in 2014.
14. It would be possible to continue to have a limited number of members elected on an Island-wide basis, as is the case at present with the Senators. This approach would, however, add complexity and would be inconsistent with the proposed 6 large districts which are intended to replicate many of the characteristics of the Island-wide mandate. It would also be illogical, and would likely result in the only debate on major Island-wide issues being during the senatorial elections while the elections for the remaining 77% of States members were dominated by local issues. It is important to emphasize, in our view, the fact that the primary role of a States member is now as a member of the Island's national legislature.
15. We have considered other ways in which the Island- wide mandate might be retained. These include -

The golden' vote

Under this system, suggested by two Islanders during the Commission's public hearings and considered by Guernsey in its review of the available options, voters are given a number of votes in their own constituency, equal to the number of candidates that must be elected, plus a number of golden' votes to distribute amongst candidates in other constituencies. Such a system would not be consistent with one of the Commission's guiding principles, viz. to establish a simple electoral system.

Rolling elections

This system would allow Senators to be elected on a rolling basis every one or two years or would return to the former six-year Senatorial term with half of the Senators being elected every three years. This would be preferable for those who would retain the Senators rather than have a general election day. The Commission considers that the democratic will of the electorate to be able to change their representatives in a general election is more important, and has not, therefore, pursued this option.

Turning the senatorial election into a ministerial election

Several people suggested versions of a system whereby Ministers would be selected by Island-wide mandate. In one version anyone wishing to be a Minister would have to be a Senator. In another version, following the election of States members on the general election day, those who were successful and wished to go on to be Ministers would put themselves forward for election on an Island-wide basis. The Commission does not believe that reserving ministerial roles for those who are elected as Senators would provide a sustainable government for the Island. The States should be able to select the best person for the job for the role of Minister, regardless of their class. In addition, the Chief Minister and Ministers must have the confidence of a majority of members or they will not be able to obtain support for their policies. Government could not operate if the Chief Minister and/or Ministers elected through a public election did not have the support of a majority of their colleagues. The Commission does not believe that a two-stage electoral process with Ministers being appointed in a further election shortly after the previous election would result in an efficient or popular system.

16. We conclude that it is not feasible to elect all members of the States Assembly on an Island-wide basis. Furthermore, the Commission does not believe that it would be appropriate to move back to staggered elections in order to facilitate the retention of the position of Senator at the expense of the introduction of a general election.
17. The removal of the role of Senator and the equalisation of Senators and Deputies in one class of States member in accordance with our recommendations would encourage all of those standing for election as members of the States to have a broad knowledge of Island-wide issues as well as of matters relating to the parishes in their district. This would accord with our view that members of the States of Jersey should recognise their role as being that of members of the Island's national legislature and that their focus should be upon legislation and major policies that affect the whole Island.

Deputies 5.19  It seems to us that a Deputy 's role is a mixture of all these functions with different Deputies allocating more

18. The Commission accepts that for many Islanders the  or less time to one or other of them depending on the link between parishes or districts and their Deputies  nature of the position(s) of responsibility they hold. It is is important. The main role of a parish Deputy is not,  likely that Deputies who undertake the role of Minister however, entirely clear and gives rise to two questions in  will spend the vast majority of their time on ministerial particular - business. Deputies also, however, need to take and to be seen to be taking a close interest in their parish or

• Is a Deputy in the States to represent the  districtiftheyaretoretaintheconfidenceofvotersatthe interests of his or her parish/district; or as  next election.

  a member of Jersey's national legislature  5.20  There are two separate forms of imbalance in the current   to consider Island-wide issues?  allocation of Deputies. The first is that some parishes/

• Is there a distinction between the role of  districts elect only one Deputy whereas others elect

  the Constable and the Deputy in dealing  two, three or four Deputies. This form of imbalance is   with matters raised by constituents in  not unknown in other jurisdictions (the Isle of Man, for   the parish?  example) but it does run contrary to the principle that

every elector should, if possible, have the same number of votes. The second form of imbalance is demonstrated inTable5.Therearesignificantdifferencesbetweenthe numbers of residents represented by each Deputy at the present time, with no changes having taken place since 1974 when an additional Deputy was allocated to St. Brelade .

Table 5

21. It has been suggested that the position of parish Deputy should be retained. However, if there is at least one Deputy per parish, it becomes impossible to obtain fair and reasonably equal representation. The rounding needed to achieve a whole number of Deputies in each parish results in very significant deviations from the average across the Island. This can be illustrated by considering two possible allocations of Deputies within existing parish boundaries.
22. Table 6 takes the number of eligible voters of the smallest parish, St. Mary , (1,340) as the basis for the calculation.
23. Thisdemonstrates that the deviations from the average are greater in some cases than the five to ten per cent recommended  by  the  Venice  Commission  guidelines.  More  importantly,  the  overall  number  of  Deputies,  at  57, is far higher than we consider to be necessary.

Table 6

24. Table 7 treats St. Mary as a special case that will be over- 5.26  In  order  to  overcome  the  problems  of  unequal represented under any parish based model of this type  representation we examined the options for moving and instead uses the second largest parish, St. John ,  away from the current system of electing Deputies on a as the basis for calculation, with 2,280 eligible voters. parish basis and introducing a system of larger districts.
25. Although this model results in fewer Deputies overall, there are once again vast deviations that are even greater than in the first model. It would not therefore be  possible  to  reduce  the  number  of  Deputies  as suggested  by  some  respondents  and  re-allocate  a smaller  number  by  using  the  existing  parish-based system.  A  reduced  number  of  Deputies  would, in many cases, require the amalgamation of one or more parishes into one district unless it was decided that some parishes should have no Deputy at all and be represented only by their Constable.

Table 7

Electoral districts

27. The introduction of large electoral districts in Jersey would allow each voter to have the same number of votes and (subject of course to the question of the Constables) to have more or less equal weight in terms of voting power. In coming to our recommendations, we have taken into account the Venice Commission guidelines, which state -
28. "Equality  in  voting  power,  where  the  elections  are not  being  held  in  one  single  constituency,  requires constituency boundaries to be drawn in such a way that seats in the lower chambers representing the people are  distributed  equally  among  the  constituencies, in accordance with a specific apportionment criterion, e.g.  the  number  of  residents  in  the  constituency, the number of resident nationals (including minors), the  number  of  registered  electors,  or  possibly  the number of people actually voting."

29. The Code goes on to say that, while "the maximum admissible  departure  from  the  distribution  criterion adopted depends on the individual situation, it should seldom exceed ten per cent and never 15%, except in really  exceptional  circumstances  (a  demographically weak administrative unit of the same importance as others with at least one lower-chamber representative, or concentration of a specific national minority)." 24
30. In order to establish the appropriate district model for the Island we considered a range of possible divisions on a purely mathematical basis. The resultant number of eligible voters per district is set out in Table 8.

24 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, guidelines and explanatory report, paragraph 15.

Table 8

31. Dividing  the  Island  into  districts  on  a  mathematical  5.33  The Commission believes that the correct approach basis without having any regard for parish boundaries  is to establish a system of districts based upon parish would enable an equal distribution of seats in relation  boundaries whilst still achieving as great a level of voter to population. It would avoid malapportionment as the  equity as possible.

constituency boundaries could be drawn wherever they

needed to be drawn in order to share the population out

equally. It would also enable district boundaries to be  easily amended in future in order to reflect any shifts in population. However, the establishment of constituency  boundaries which were unrelated to the Island's familiar  parish boundaries for the purposes of voter equity would  not in our view create a system designed to encourage  Islanders to vote and to feel more engaged in politics,  but would instead be likely to result in confusion and  detachment.  

32. One of the main advantages of a parish-based system is  its simplicity. For example -

• all residents of a parish, with the exception  

  of St. Helier , will be part of the same  

electoral district;

• if Islanders were to favour the retention

  of the Constables in the States, then the  

  constituency of each Constable would,  

  again with the exception of St. Helier ,  

not be divided amongst different districts;

• if elected members were to be given the  

  right to attend Parish Assemblies in any of  

  the parishes in their district and to participate