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Yoti Digital ID System: Contract: Termination Contingency Provisions

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WQ.50/2020

WRITTEN QUESTION TO THE CHIEF MINISTER

BY THE CONNÉTABLE OF ST. MARTIN

ANSWER TO BE TABLED ON TUESDAY 4th FEBRUARY 2020

Question

What contingency provisions and plans, if any, have been made for the event of a termination of the contract between the Government of Jersey and Yoti; and do any such provisions include the reclamation of all Jersey IDs registered through the service?

Answer

The procurement process for digital ID considered the need for contingency provisions. It fully assessed the financial strength of the supplier. A strategic decision was taken to work with a single provider to support transition from paper to online services (research suggests multiple options do not generate sufficient critical mass with any provider, particularly an issue in a small jurisdiction like Jersey). Yoti was appointed in March 2018 No plans are in place to add or change providers, but technical architecture has been built to enable this in the future. If the provider failed or this service did not prove successful it would remove the ability to deliver online services that require a digital ID. The Government would need to procure an alternative digital ID solution so the speed to market with a new proposition would depend on the digital identity product and market maturity. The contingency for this is that to date, existing channels remain open and resourced providing a backstop. It was not considered viable to make the significant financial commitment to build and sustain a digital ID solution. This is not an area in which government has expertise and, given the fast-paced development of the global identity market and the small scale of the Jersey population the ongoing capital investment would be prohibitive. The background behind this decision, and many more of the aspects setting out the journey to selection of Yoti as a digital ID, have been extensively covered on the gov.je blog.

Regarding any reclamation of data, any data shared by Jersey citizens with the Government of Jersey via the Yoti identity platform and One.Gov.je service is stored in the Government of Jersey's People Directory. This data includes Yoti verified name, date of birth and email address. This data is in the possession of and owned by the Government of Jersey and can be used (subject to data protection laws) with a new supplier. As such, there is no need for any reclamation of data from Yoti.

The way Yoti is engineered means that Yoti itself does not have the ability to access the personal data Yoti stores because the data is encrypted and each user holds their own private encryption key. In the event that Yoti was shut down, Yoti would delete all user data as part of its winding up.