Camera Surveillance in Jersey - Report - 16 January 2014

Education and Home Affairs Scrutiny Panel

Camera Surveillance in Jersey

Presented to the States on 16th January 2014

SR1/2014

Contents

1. Chairman's Foreword .............................................................................................................. 1
2. Panel Membership ................................................................................................................... 4
3. Panel advisers ......................................................................................................................... 4
4. Terms of Reference ................................................................................................................. 5
5. Key Findings ............................................................................................................................ 6
6. Recommendations ................................................................................................................. 13 7  Introduction............................................................................................................................ 18 8  The Prevalence of Camera Surveillance ................................................................................ 21 9  Public attitudes towards camera surveillance ........................................................................ 40 10   The effectiveness and impacts of camera surveillance .......................................................... 46 11  The governance of cameras surveillance............................................................................... 58 12  Conclusion: Developing the formal regulation of the use of camera surveillance in Jersey ... 81 Appendix One: External Advisers' Final Report ............................................................................ 85 Appendix Two: The prevalence of camera surveillance: States departmental survey ................. 115 Appendix Three: Public survey: summary of results ................................................................... 116 Appendix Four: Key documents relating to the governance and regulation of CCTV .................. 119 Appendix Five: Reflections on the Existing Code of Practice for CCTV ...................................... 123 Appendix Six: Submissions and Public Hearings ........................................................................ 126

1. Chairman's Foreword

This has been an interesting review and deals with a topic which some may question the need for scrutiny. After all, a camera is a camera. However, since cameras were first introduced on the streets of St Helier, in 1995/6, the world has moved on. Whilst the needs and perception of society for protection may remain the same, the requirement for moral accountability has moved on significantly. Transparency and the ability to justify the use of CCTV systems and, of course, expenditure, are far more important now than ever before.

Issues relating to Data Protection must now be taken seriously. Failure to comply with legislation has been shown in the Royal Court to have severe consequences. The pressure will only increase as we head towards the introduction of Freedom of Information legislation. Again, failure to comply will have criminal implications.

Our report reveals, amongst numerous other points, that the Police have not been keeping records which evidence the continued need for public surveillance cameras. Evidence of the value they provide for the public of the Island, the impact they have on the detection and prevention of crime or indeed on the prosecution of offenders tends to be little more than anecdotal. Firm evidence could be gained by continued monitoring and recording by operators and would provide the hugely important evidence needed to support a transparent approach to the needs of today's society. The lack of statistical evidence plays into the hands of opponents of CCTV surveillance and could, in the extreme, provide the grounds for funding to be withheld at some point in the future. Work done as long ago as 2006 cannot provide evidence of today's attitudes. Consent for surveillance is so important to our community and must be safeguarded. Surveillance by consent cannot be supported by conceptual or anecdotal evidence. In today's society, it must be backed by statistics and robust, firm evidence.

There are three important developments in CCTV use in Jersey which are being led by the States of Jersey Police, namely the introduction of body worn cameras for police officers, the proposal for a fixed Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) camera surveillance system around St Helier and the renewal and digitalisation of the Town Centre CCTV network. We examine each of these in detail in our report.

The announcement by the Police, just before we finalised our report, that they planned to extend body worn video cameras to all police officers on the beat was made without any reference to the Scrutiny Panel. Whilst we believe that the processes and procedures around body worn cameras are quite robust it was of some concern to us that the Police should ignore our involvement and interest in this matter. This demonstrates a worrying lack of regard for political accountability on behalf of the Police

The proposal for fixed ANPR around St Helier is another sensitive matter. When Police in the UK attempted to install a similar system in the Hertfordshire town of Royston, it was declared illegal by the Information Commissioner on the grounds that it was excessive and out of proportion to the crime levels in that area. We believe that if such a system is to be proposed in Jersey there must be an informed public debate and political approval by the States before it is implemented.

The third key development, the extension and digitalisation of the Town Centre CCCTV network in St Helier, is not opposed by the Panel. We acknowledge its importance but point out that the new system gives the Police potentially very substantial additional powers of mass surveillance which need to be transparent if they are to be acceptable.

Public engagement must be the key, which to date has not been taken seriously enough by the States of Jersey Police in its handling of CCTV. Our report discusses methods available for evidencing public opinion, evidencing that public surveillance in Jersey is by consent. This is a recommendation that the Panel feels strongly about. The response from the Jersey Police at the draft stage of this report has been very positive, leaving me confident that the final recommendations relating to the Police could be implemented.

CCTV in private residences is becoming more prolific and along with that are the complaints about the invasion of privacy. The Panel recognises that this is a difficult nut to crack and one that currently falls between the legislative cracks in Jersey. However, there may be a solution. The Panel recommends that the Planning Minister gives serious consideration to reviewing the classification of CCTV as permitted development'.

I can understand that looking at the recommendations contained in this report could lead the reader to think that the Panel is anti-Big Brother. This review is not about the feelings of the Panel Members. It is about the evidence. The evidence established by the Panel shows that the provision for the control of CCTV, particularly by the States of Jersey Police and the Data Protection Commission is in need of updating to meet modern requirements in areas of transparency, responsibility and accountability.

The intention of this report is to wake States departments up to the need to improve compliance with current Data Protection requirements and to move towards best practice' in the field of CCTV surveillance. The Panel recognises that there is a resources requirement in the rectification of these issues, most particularly in the Data Protection Commission, this is an associated cost that must be met in preparation for the introduction of Freedom of Information legislation in 2015.

Before closing I wish to place on record the Panel's appreciation of the contribution to the review made by our two advisers, Professor William Webster of the University of Stirling and Professor Peter Fussey of the University of Essex. Both provided a broad knowledge of the use and capabilities of modern surveillance systems in the UK and internationally and have helped  to  guide  us  in  the  provision  of  constructive  recommendations  to  bring  local governance arrangements up to date.

Deputy Jeremy Maçon

Chairman, Education and Home Affairs Scrutiny Panel

2. Panel Membership

Deputy Jeremy Maçon, Chairman Connétable Michel Le Troquer Deputy Geoffrey Southern Deputy Montfort Tadier

3. Panel advisers

Professor William Webster, University of Stirling, is one of the founding directors of the Centre for Research into Information, Surveillance and Privacy (Crisp) is also Chair of the Living in Surveillance Societies (LiSS). He is a leading authority on the policies and practices surrounding the provision of closed circuit television/video surveillance cameras and systems in public places.

Professor Peter Fussey is professor of sociology at the University of Essex. He is a criminologist specializing in a number of areas including terrorism and counter-terrorism, major-event security, surveillance and society, organized crime and urban sociology.

4. Terms of Reference

The Education and Home Affairs Scrutiny Panel has agreed to undertake a review relating to the increasing prevalence of camera surveillance in the Island. The review will seek to ensure that the use of camera surveillance is reasonable, justifiable and transparent so that Islanders feel properly informed about and are able to support the security measures that are in place. The Panel will:

• Consider the scale of usage of camera surveillance in Jersey by the States of Jersey, commercial and non-commercial agencies
• Explore the role played by camera surveillance in policing, community safety, transport and in the criminal justice system
• Examine evidence for the effectiveness of camera surveillance in preventing and detecting crime and promoting public safety
• Explore public awareness of camera surveillance in Jersey
• Consider any concerns relating to the extent and purpose of intrusion into people's lives
• Establish the effectiveness of current guidelines/voluntary codes of best practice and their operation
• Establish the rights of access to information and camera footage by citizens and what rights employees have in relation to camera surveillance by their

employers.

• Consider whether there is a need to develop the formal regulation of the use of camera surveillance.

The Panel will consult stakeholders and the public on what information should be available to any individual wishing to know more about overt surveillance cameras and how this information should be made available. The Panel will report its findings to the States

Further explanatory note: The review will be concerned with the overt use of systems such as CCTV and ANPR (Automated Number Plate Recognition) in public and semi-public places where people can generally see a camera, or are informed about its presence. It will not deal with covert surveillance techniques which are legislated for through the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Jersey) Law 2005.

5. Key Findings

Paragraph numbers refer to Key Findings and Recommendations Introduction:

The Scrutiny Panel believes that the public in Jersey deserves to have confidence that the use of camera surveillance is in the public interest'. This is especially the case for the Town Centre CCTV system operated by the States of Jersey Police. Public support for CCTV can be enhanced through the introduction of improved governance arrangements, including the introduction of a publicly available Code of Practice for the Town Centre CCTV system, performance audit and public engagement. The overall aim of the recommendations in this Scrutiny review then is to promote public awareness and debate about the capabilities of the various systems in use in the Island.

General principles:

Surveillance by consent: Surveillance by consent' is becoming a key element of CCTV practice in the UK and EU, especially in relation to the provision of public space systems in town and city centres. We have not encountered any initiatives that seek to understand the extent to which surveillance operates on a consensual basis in Jersey. Jersey's Data Protection Code of Practice should contain a statement on the need to seek consent from the people surveilled, including signs for public and private spaces and the need for consultation exercises for public camera installations. The Code should also contain a requirement to make the public aware of the purpose(s) of CCTV cameras and the location of cameras (paragraph 215 and advisers report section 2.1).

Proportionality: As a general principle, public service providers should take an evidence- based approach to the deployment of their camera systems. This should comprise an unambiguous statement of what the surveillance equipment is intended to achieve, a clear and evidenced identification of the type and prevalence of the issue it is intended to address, identification of non-intrusive alternative strategies, and consideration of whether such less intrusive measures could be deployed for those ends (and only discounted if inadequate). New efficacy monitoring processes should also be drawn upon to make an objective and informed evidence-based decision over  whether surveillance cameras provide the most effective response to the particular issue. Experience of practices in the UK and other EU countries could also be drawn on to inform this process. (see advisers' report: section 2.3 and recommendation 3)

Public attitudes:  Public sector CCTV is generally perceived as benign, an anti-crime measure which brings few disadvantages of which people are conscious. CCTV in public spaces is not thought to intrude on personal privacy, a concept associated with the home. However, there is no real evidence that the public have a good understanding of the technological capabilities of CCTV systems or how they are used (paragraph 109).

Public engagement In order to retain public confidence in the appropriate use of CCTV in public spaces it is essential that the States of Jersey Police and other public sector CCTV operators engage with the public in an open and transparent way to explain the capabilities and limitations of their systems. The States of Jersey Police currently provide minimal information to the public on the Town Centre CCTV system, the location of cameras and its operational procedures. Performance reporting which used to be included in States of Jersey Police Annual reports has been discontinued. The introduction of a new Town Centre CCTV system sharpens the focus on the need for the States of Jersey Police to provide the public with a good business case demonstrating value for money for the project (paragraphs 127 & 167).

Evaluating the effectiveness of CCTV: There is an overwhelming view among operators that CCTV provides a vital function in enhancing public safety and reducing crime and disorder in Jersey, but robust evidence, backed by statistical data, for the reduction and prevention of crime is hard to find. Systems which do not achieve their stated purpose should be discontinued; however, we have seen no evidence that any such decisions have been taken in the public sector. The requirement that public sector CCTV operators should undertake a minimum standard of evaluation on an annual basis to ensure that their systems are effective and appropriately sited must be reinforced. This evaluation should be included in the statutory annual returns to the Data Protection Commissioner (paragraphs 141 & 208 and advisers report 2.2).

Governance of camera surveillance:  Since the publication of the Data Protection Commissioner's Code of Practice and Guidance on the Use of CCTV in 2005 there have been a number of important developments in the UK in the governance and regulation of CCTV. It is apparent that some aspects of the current Jersey Code of Practice are outdated and should be brought in line with best practice elsewhere in the UK and Europe. Our advisers have made a number of detailed suggestions (paragraph 218 and advisers report section 2.11).

It is evident that a number of CCTV operators are not compliant with all aspects of Data Protection legislation in Jersey or the Data Protection Commissioner's CCTV Code of Practice. We recommend that the Data Protection Commissioner establish processes and mechanisms to ensure compliance takes place. The creation of a CCTV register (see below) may assist in this process. CCTV operators should be reminded about the importance of compliance and the penalties arising from non-compliance. Individual CCTV operators should ensure compliance with their own CCTV Code of Practice, and thereby compliance with the Data Protection Commissioner's Code of Practice, by identifying a named employee with the responsibility for ensuring compliance and the creation of processes to monitor compliance.(advisers report section 2.12)

Specific developments and issues:

Town Centre CCTV network: The States of Jersey Police are at an advanced stage in their project to replace, upgrade and extend the current Town Centre network of CCTV cameras. This project should have involved the preparation of a detailed business case, available to the public, demonstrating the cost effectiveness of CCTV as a crime prevention measure. The Police, however, have assumed that the benefits of CCTV are well known and accepted. The Police must urgently revise their Code of Practice, improve their evaluation mechanisms which have been neglected in recent years and must provide the public with a clear statement about the functions and capabilities of their proposed new system as well as a privacy impact assessment for any proposed new locations (paragraph 34 and advisers report section 2.5).

Automatic Number Plate Recognition: The proposed new fixed ANPR system would provide the States of Jersey Police with a capability to monitor virtually all traffic movements in and out of St Helier. The system is capable of being linked to an extensive database holding significant information on Islanders. This development potentially represents a major enhancement of the surveillance powers of the Police over citizens in Jersey. It is essential for purposes of transparency, particularly for new CCTV systems being introduced, including the States of Jersey Police ANPR system, that the principles of data connectivity are established in the Data Protection Code of Practice and Guidance on the Use of CCTV. The Jersey Data Protection Code of Practice and Guidance on the Use of CCTV should include a requirement to specify where the matching of personal data takes place, with whom and for what purposes. This is a requirement of European Data Protection law. In this respect, data should only be matched with named databases (i.e. ANPR images with the official vehicle licensing database) and not be matched with other unnamed databases. There needs to be a mechanism to regulate this (paragraphs 51-53).

Body Worn Video Cameras: The States of Jersey Police are trialing six body worn video (BWV) cameras. These cameras can protect both suspects and police officers as they are designed to provide an impartial, accurate record of incidents attended by officers. Experience elsewhere shows the introduction of these cameras has led to a sharp fall in allegations against officers. There is a robust policy in place to ensure the integrity of video evidence. A publicly available code of practice should be developed by the Police. (paragraphs 66-67).

Data matching: Data matching is a process that is relatively hidden' from public view. Whilst we do not want to obstruct the appropriate proportionate use of data matching it is important that the public are made aware of such processes, that they are captured by existing governance arrangements, and that safeguards are established to ensure unnecessary data matching does not take place. We recommend that any camera system that incorporates data matching as part of its purpose clearly specify this in the system's Code of Practice and on appropriate signage. This should also be specified in the Data Protection Commissioner's CCTV Register of surveillance cameras and systems. (Advisers report section 2.10 and recommendation 10)

Creating a Register of CCTV cameras: A register or census of cameras and their purposes is currently absent. Creating a register could make it easier to ensure compliance to regulations and codes of practice and place Jersey at the forefront of European best practice in this area. It would also enhance public awareness and confidence and enable political oversight. This register could be achieved through a short extension to the Data Controllers' statutory annual submission to the Data Protection Commissioner. This could comprise of a supplementary sheet, preferably one sheet of paper, capturing additional information, such as: the number of cameras in a system, their location, the existence of a Code of Practice, primary and secondary purposes, links to other databases and perhaps some aspects of their technical capability (the latter to differentiate between different types of CCTV) (paragraph 80 and advisers report 2.7).

CCTV in Schools and Colleges: The primary purpose of CCTV systems in schools and colleges in Jersey is for the security of the premises and to deter intruders or petty vandalism out of school hours, although not all schools have identified a need to install cameras. CCTV cameras are not used for the purposes of monitor pupil behaviour or quality of teaching. One school, however, does use CCTV in a much more extensive way and has found CCTV to be an effective means of safeguarding pupils when they are unsupervised. In this school cameras have been installed in all classrooms. This development has been made in accordance with Data Protection advice and has not given rise to any objections from parents, students or staff (paragraphs 87).

Advanced digital capabilities: Modern digital systems, such as the system to be installed in the St Helier Town Centre, will offer the potential for advanced Video Content Analysis features, such as facial recognition, in the future. They will certainly make their introduction easy: the proposed new system could be seen as a stepping stone for more sophisticated mass surveillance. Such advances should be treated with caution. Privacy impact assessments and public consultation must take place before any such capabilities are introduced by the public sector (paragraph 100).

Privacy concerns: In general the presence of CCTV cameras in public spaces is not seen as an intrusion into privacy. However, new technologies have increased the scope and processing capabilities of camera surveillance and are often assembled in a piecemeal way without citizens being aware of their implications. Too much surveillance can fundamentally alter the relationship between the individual and the State (paragraph 116).

By the nature of the location of cameras in the Town Centre CCTV system, there is a possibility for some cameras to pan and tilt so that they can look through windows into private accommodation. We observed this possibility during our visit to the Police Control Centre. Police CCTV operators are trained to block out such views; nevertheless we believe that it is essential that property owners or tenants are made aware of the possibility of their being overlooked. The Police told us that property owners in this situation were fully aware of the cameras as there was no attempt to hide them. It is conceivable however that as tenancy change new residents may not be alerted to the cameras. (Paragraph 20)

Codes of Practice: Every CCTV operator should have their own publicly available code of practice compliant with the Data Commissioner's Code of Practice setting out the purpose of the system, their data management procedures and security policies and their training processes for CCTV operators. This Code of Practice should be reviewed on a regular basis to ensure that the CCTV system is operating effectively against stated purposes. There is inconsistency across States departments in relation to compliance with the requirement for all CCTV operators to have their own Code of Practice – some refer simply to the Data Protection Code of Practice and Guidance in the Use of CCTV as their model whereas it should be standard practice for all public sector CCTV operators to have a specific code of practice for their operation setting out their purpose, data management procedures and security policies and information to the public on how they can contact the organisation in case of queries about their operation of CCTV (paragraphs 178 &184; Advisers report 2.11).

States of Jersey Police Force Policy: Training related to data processing and privacy principles is an essential element in the training programme for States of Jersey Police Force CCTV operators. However, the current Police Code of Practice falls short of what is seen elsewhere in the UK and Europe. The Police have acknowledged the requirement to update their policies and procedures and have assured the Panel that the documents would be reviewed as part of their project to renew and extend the current Town Centre system. Appropriate governance arrangements, an updated Code of Practice, and the introduction of auditable process must be introduced as a matter of urgency to ensure the delivery of a service in the public interest and to ensure compliance with UK and European standards and norms in the provision of CCTV. This is a necessary perquisite of the upgrade to the current Town Centre system (paragraph 193).

Retention periods: Personal data captured by CCTV is stored for varying lengths of time across different organisations using CCTV in Jersey. In almost all cases, the length of time exceeds that governing data retention in the UK and elsewhere in Europe. Given the significantly lower levels of crime and disorder in Jersey it is hard to justify why the Police and other operators require much longer periods of data retention (sometimes triple) than, say, London's Metropolitan Police, (paragraph 201).

Domestic CCTV issues: The Data Protection Office receives a significant number of enquiries relating to the potential invasion of privacy from CCTV security cameras installed in neighbouring properties with a potential overlooking into properties. Disputes over CCTV may be part of a broader conflict between neighbours. Serious cases of misuse of CCTV may constitute harassment and could be dealt with by the Police. This is a complex problem to solve, not covered currently by data protection or other legislation. One partial solution would be the introduction of planning applications for installing visually prominent cameras with a potential for overlooking. This would allow neighbours the opportunity to challenge the location of cameras. (paragraph 235 and advisers report 2.8)

We also believe that it would be helpful to neighbours if all domestic CCTV operators were obliged to register their systems with Data Protection. We acknowledge that this obligation is currently extra-statutory but we request the Data Protection Commissioner to consider and explain the implications of this suggestion. (paragraph 237)

In addition, the Data Protection Commissioner should prepare a comprehensive guidance note for those wanting to install a CCTV system at home for security purposes or to tackle anti-social behaviour (paragraph 239)

Rights of access to CCTV footage: Individuals whose images are recorded have a right to view those images and to be provided with a copy of the images. Operators' codes of practice should detail how members of the public make access requests. In practice, such requests by individuals are not common and this right is not widely known. Individuals face obstacles as it may be necessary to block out images of third parties and may be required to provide heavy justification for their request (paragraph 246).

CCTV in the workplace: There are legitimate uses of CCTV in the workplace; for example in monitoring till transactions in bars and supermarket or movements of stock in warehouses. We have received no evidence that CCTV is used in office environments in Jersey to monitor staff performance. Where employers make staff aware of the purposes and scope of this surveillance and make clear policies available on procedures for the security, processing and retention of images employees generally find no reason for concern about the overt use of CCTV. However, employees find that continuous monitoring, where this occurs, is overbearing. Complaints occur when employers use CCTV for monitoring purposes outside their stated policies and procedures (paragraph 258).

6. Recommendations

Town Centre CCTV: States of Jersey Police

1. Recommendation: Before any extension to the current Town centre CCTV system the States of Jersey Police must:

• provide the public with a clear statement about the functions, capabilities and purpose of their new CCTV system;
• re-evaluate the justification for each of their current sites; and
• publish a privacy impact assessment statement for any proposed new locations. (paragraph 35)

2. Recommendation: A commitment should be made by the Minister for Home Affairs and the States of Jersey Police that no development of CCTV which includes advanced Video Content Analysis features, such as facial recognition, should proceed in the future without instigating an informed public debate and seeking approval by the States. (paragraph 101)
3. Recommendation: The States of Jersey Police should follow the example of local authorities in the UK and provide extensive information on their website on the Town Centre CCTV system including a map indicating the location of cameras. (paragraph 128)
4. Recommendation: Appropriate signage should be erected in the town centre indicating that CCTV surveillance is taking place with a contact point for members of the public with queries. (paragraph 129)
5. Recommendation: Appropriate governance arrangements, an updated Code of Practice, and the introduction of auditable process should be introduced as a matter of urgency to ensure the delivery of a service in the public interest and to ensure compliance with UK and European standards and norms in the provision of CCTV. (paragraph 194)
6. Recommendation: As part of updating their code of practice and procedures on CCTV, the States of Jersey Police should review their policy on retention periods to ensure that they are in line with current best practice. (paragraph 203)
7. Recommendation: The States of Jersey Police should issue regular notification to any property owners where Town Centre CCTV cameras are capable of looking through windows reminding them of procedures to preserve privacy. (paragraph 21)

Automatic Number Plate Recognition: States of Jersey Police

8. Recommendation: Before implementing their proposal for a fixed ANPR system around St Helier, the States of Jersey Police must consult the public and publish a privacy impact statement. (paragraph 54)
9. Recommendation: The Data Protection Code of Practice and Guidance on the Use of CCTV should include a requirement to specify where the matching of personal data takes place, with whom and for what purposes. (paragraph 55)
10. Recommendation: In accordance with the above recommendation, the States of Jersey Police should state clearly what databases their ANPR system will access and their purpose. Connections to any new databases should not be made without providing clear justification and seeking approval from the Data Protection Commissioner. (paragraph 56)

Body worn cameras: States of Jersey Police

11. Recommendation: The States of Jersey Police should provide a publically available code of practice on the purpose and use of body worn video cameras, including how personal data is processed. (paragraph 68)

Regulating CCTV: Data Protection Commissioner

12. Recommendation The statutory annual submission by Data Controllers to the Data Protection Office should be supplemented by additional information (as specified in the report). This should be collated into a CCTV register' which should be publically available. (paragraph 81)
13. Recommendation: An annual review of the number and types of CCTV should be presented to the Minister for Home Affairs by the Data Protection Commissioner (based on the CCTV register). This would allow some political debate and oversight. (paragraph 82)
14. Recommendation: A review and updating of the current Data Protection Code of Practice and Guidance on the use of CCTV to take account of best practice elsewhere in the UK and beyond. Improvements we would point to include:

• A requirement for operators to include signage,

• To integrate the principle of surveillance by consent',

• A requirement for operators to engage in public awareness activities,

• A requirement for operators to periodically evaluate the performance of systems,

• A requirement for operators to establish a log or register of access to CCTV control rooms and footage,

• A requirement for operators to establish training in relation to appropriate levels of individual surveillance and live targeting,

• A requirement for operators to make the public aware of surveillance systems which incorporate data matching processes,

• To establish a register of cameras and systems,

• To provide more detailed guidance on the use of surveillance cameras in domestic residential settings, and

• To incorporate a definition of public space. (paragraph 218 and advisers report 2.11)

15. Recommendation: The Data Protection Code of Practice and Guidance on the Use of CCTV should specify standardised retention periods based on the operational purposes of the CCTV systems. (paragraph 202)
16. Recommendation: The Data Protection Code of Practice and Guidance on the use of CCTV should incorporate a legal requirement to comply with the principles of surveillance by consent, including a requirement for signage, consultation and public awareness mechanisms. (paragraph 216)
17. Recommendation: The Code of Practice should also contain a requirement for all CCTV operators to make the public aware of the location of cameras, the purpose of systems and any data matching that may take place. (paragraph 217)
18. Recommendation: Safeguards should be introduced to ensure only appropriate and necessary data matching takes place. Any camera system that incorporates data matching as part of its purpose clearly specify this in the system's Code of Practice and on appropriate signage. This should also be specified in the Data Protection Commissioner's CCTV Register of surveillance cameras and systems. (Advisers' report section 2.10 and recommendation 10)

States Departments

19. Recommendation: All States departments operating public' CCTV systems should undertake an annual review/audit, which sets out the scope of the system, its stated purpose(s) and a range of performance indicators which can be utilised to judge the effectiveness of the system. (paragraph 168)
20. Recommendation: We also recommend including some comparison of the crime rates in areas observed by CCTV against those without coverage in order to assist understandings of crime displacement and to provide and evidence base to inform future camera deployment decisions. This process should be followed by a review of the appropriateness of existing camera positioning. (paragraph 169)
21. Recommendation:  All States departments using CCTV should have their own dedicated and publicly available code of practice setting out their purpose, data management procedures, security policies and training procedures as well as information to the public on how they can contact the organisation in case of queries about their operation of CCTV. (Paragraph 185)
22. Recommendation: All public sector CCTV operators should be required to have a log of who has had training and when. This training should include knowledge and skills associated with the processing of personal data, the requirement to collect performance related information and the actual process of undertaking surveillance. Training should explicitly cover ethical obligations, regulatory responsibilities, privacy, issues of data handling and protection, responsible subject monitoring and access requests. Training requirements should be set out in individual Code of Practice and should be reported on in annual system reviews. (paragraph 185 and advisers report 2.13).
23. Recommendation: The requirement that public sector CCTV operators should undertake a minimum standard of evaluation on an annual basis to ensure that their systems are effective and appropriately sited should be reinforced. This evaluation should be included in annual returns to the Data Protection Commissioner. (paragraph 209)
24. Recommendation: To meet appropriate security standards a log of access to each control room should be established. This log should include details such as the name of the visitor, time of visit, purpose and name an employee responsible for escorting

the visitor. Visitors should be required to present a recognised form of identification before being granted access to a surveillance camera operations centre. (Advisers' report section 2.4)

25. Recommendation: All requests to view footage are recorded in a log, not just those incidences where footage is legally obtained for investigations. This log should apply to anyone not working, at that time, in the CCTV control room. The log should include details of the name of the person requesting footage, reason, time of request, and name of the person granting the request. (Advisers' report section 2.4)
26. Recommendation: We recommend that image retention periods are limited to a maximum 31 days across public surveillance camera operations. This is common practice elsewhere in the UK and the EU. This maximum data retention period should be specified in the Data protection Commissioner's CCTV Code of Practice. (advisers' report)

Domestic CCTV issues

27. Recommendation: The Panel recommends that the Planning Minister gives serious consideration to reviewing the classification of CCTV as permitted development and follows the example of Scott ish legislation on this matter. (paragraph 236)
28. Recommendation: The Data Protection Commissioner should prepare a comprehensive guidance note for those wanting to install a CCTV system at home for security purposes or to tackle anti-social behaviour. (paragraph 240)

7 Introduction

1. CCTV surveillance cameras are deployed extensively throughout the UK and in Jersey. We are used to seeing them monitoring movements in all public areas, in streets, banks, shops, airports, bus stations. They are unremarkable. Used appropriately they can be a valuable tool contributing to public safety and security and in protecting people and property.
2. However, there is also an increased risk of interference with a citizen's right to privacy. The UK first Surveillance Camera Commissioner recently warned: CCTV systems capable of identifying and tracking a person's face from half a mile away are turning Britain into a Big Brother society. New high-definition cameras are being rolled out across UK cities without public consultation into the intrusion they pose', Andrew Rennison told the Independent. The increasing sophistication of surveillance technology is becoming so serious that Britain may be in breach of its own human rights laws,' he said.
3. The Scrutiny Panel believes that the public in Jersey deserves to have confidence that the use of camera surveillance is in the public interest'. This is especially the case for the Town Centre CCTV system operated by the States of Jersey Police. Public support for CCTV can be enhanced through the introduction of improved governance arrangements, including the introduction of a publicly available Code of Practice for the Town Centre CCTV system, performance audit and public engagement. The overall aim of the recommendations in this Scrutiny review then is to promote public awareness and debate about the capabilities of the various systems in use in the Island.
4. In the first part of this report we look at the scale of usage of CCTV by the States of Jersey and by commercial and non-commercial agencies. In the next section of the report we look at public attitudes to CCTV. In general, CCTV is seen as benign, an anti- crime measure which brings few disadvantages of which people are conscious. The presence of CCTV cameras in public spaces is not seen as an intrusion into privacy, a concept associated with the home. However, as new technologies develop the capabilities of camera surveillance we believe that, for the public to retain this confidence in the appropriate use of CCTV surveillance, it is essential that CCTV operators engage with the public in an open and transparent way to explain the capabilities and limitations of their systems.

5. There is considerable debate across Europe about how the effectiveness of CCTV cameras might be measured. In part three of our report we have looked at some of the research in this area and taken account of the views of those who believe that the expectations for CCTV are unrealistic. Reviewers in the UK have noted that CCTV is the single most heavily funded crime prevention measure operating outside the criminal justice system, accounting for more than three quarters of the total spending on crime prevention by the British Home Office. Here in Jersey we have found that methods of demonstrating the effectiveness of cameras installed by both the States of Jersey Police and other States departments have been neglected. We believe that a regular analysis and evaluation of the efficacy of States CCTV systems must be provided to the public.
6. In part four of our report we look at the governance of CCTV in Jersey and in particular at the Data Protection Code of Practice and Guidance on the Use of CCTV (2005). CCTV creates data in the form of images which can be stored and retained for extended periods of time for subsequent review and can be used to identify individuals for a variety of purposes. The protection of privacy and rules for the appropriate processing of data and the basis for Data Protection legislation and for these reasons Data Protection is the relevant body to regulate CCTV. We make a number of recommendations in this report for the Data Protection Commissioner. In doing so we acknowledge the independence and autonomy of the Office of Data Protection. However, we believe that it is important that the regulation of CCTV, as with other data protection issues, is kept up to date with recent developments.
7. The Code of Practice applies principally to the public sector and there are limited controls over commercial systems although the Code sets out guidance for the following of good practice. The UK has recently seen the establishment of a Camera Surveillance Commissioner and the publication by the Home Office of a Surveillance Camera Code of Practice (June 2013). The concept of surveillance by consent' is fundamental to this new Code and we believe that the local Jersey Code of Practice needs to be updated in a number of ways to keep up to date with developments in the UK. This task will undoubtedly have resource implications for the Data protection office which is already dealing with the implications of the introduction of Freedom of Information legislation in Jersey.

8. Finally, an increasingly common problem with CCTV was drawn to our attention, namely the potential intrusion into privacy by the installation of cameras on neighbouring residential properties. There is no simple solution to this issue as existing legislation does not cover this issue. We looked for a legal remedy which we believe could be provided through an amendment to the planning development controls. This would provide homeowners with the opportunity to challenge the validity of cameras which clearly have the potential for overlooking without compromising the cameras effectiveness for security purposes.

8 The Prevalence of Camera Surveillance

The scale of usage of camera surveillance in Jersey by the States of Jersey, commercial and non-commercial agencies.

Public Sector CCTV: survey

9  The Panel carried out a survey of the use of CCTV systems all States departments. This

showed that the States currently operate more than 1,300 CCTV cameras and 10 Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) cameras. (see appendix for detailed results)

10 The principal purposes given for operating CCTV systems range from:

• the prevention, investigation and detection of crime;
• the gathering of evidence and the prosecution of offenders;
• monitoring the security of premises and deterring intruders;
• discouraging vandalism and antisocial behaviour;
• the protection of staff from aggression or malicious allegations;
• searching for missing or vulnerable persons;
• the improvement of customer services;
• personnel and employee administration.

11 Some departments have specific requirements, for example:

• the States of Jersey Police (SOJP) and the Jersey Customs and Immigration Service (JCIS) monitor detainees held in custody cells at Police Headquarters (15 cameras) and the harbour (15 cameras);
• HM Prison La Moye operates 245 cameras for the protection and security of staff and prisoners;
• The ports of Jersey require CCTV to meet national security regulations at the ports of Jersey;
• Transport and Technical Services have 187 cameras monitoring vehicle movements and congestion in car parks;
• CCTV is fitted as a standard safety feature standard on all modern fire engines.

Town Centre CCTV: current system

12 While the majority of cameras operated by the States of Jersey are focused on the

interior and immediate surroundings of buildings for security purposes, the States of Jersey Police operate a network of 23 cameras in the open public space in the town centre. The stated purposes of this system are:

• The reduction, prevention and detection of crime and criminal activity
• Evidence gathering
• Policing displays such as Liberation Day, Battle of Flowers
• Searching for missing/vulnerable people

13 The cameras are located at strategic points and monitor activity in a range of streets

throughout St Helier, focussing predominantly on hot spots' in the night time economy where large numbers of people tend to congregate outside clubs and bars at the weekends.

14 The States of Jersey Police also have access to other public space cameras: they

operate joint systems with the Jersey Customs and Immigration Service at the Airport (21 cameras) and St Helier Harbour (6 cameras) and can access systems in the public parks (Millennium 10 and Howard Davis 6) as well as private systems at locations such as Les Quennevais precinct and Bonne Nuit harbour.

15 The first town centre system for St Helier, comprising 12 cameras, was implemented in

1995/6 with further cameras added at various points in time, for example with the development of the Waterfront.

16 In Jersey the States of Jersey Police took the initiative to establish town centre

surveillance cameras in the absence of any clearly defined alternative body. As a consequence, and unusually, the Police have lead responsibility for the Town Centre Network – in the UK town centre systems are operated by the local authority, although police forces often have joint control rooms.

17 In the UK broader functions, such as traffic management and parking control, are often

included with Town Centre CCTV network. The latter has been controversial in the UK where councils have been accused of raising revenue through spying on motorists.[1] In Jersey the cameras in the town centre are not used to manage the flow of traffic nor to deal with illegal parking.

18 The cameras in the town centre are operated on a continual basis with live feeds to

monitors in a room situated next to the Force control Room at Police Headquarters. The screens are only actively monitored by civilian support officers in the Force Control Room at busy periods. The Honorary Police assist the States of Jersey Police at weekends. Officers in the Force Control Room can access the cameras easily at any point in response to particular events.

19 For the most part the focus of the cameras is pulled back to give a broad, general view of

the streets; however, operators can pan, tilt and zoom (x30) the cameras in order to pick up particular incidents and track individuals.

20 Key Finding: By the nature of the location of cameras in the Town Centre CCTV system,

there is a possibility for some cameras to pan and tilt so that they can look through windows into private accommodation. We observed this possibility during our visit to the Police Control Centre. Police CCTV operators are trained to block out such views; nevertheless we believe that it is essential that property owners or tenants are made aware of the possibility of their being overlooked. The Police told us that property owners in this situation were fully aware of the cameras as there was no attempt to hide them. It is conceivable however that as tenancy change new residents may not be alerted to the cameras.

21 Recommendation: The States of Jersey Police should issue regular notification to any

property owners where Town Centre CCTV cameras are capable of looking through windows reminding them of procedures to preserve privacy.

Town Centre CCTV upgrade

22 The States of Jersey Police are currently in the process of renewing and upgrading the

Town Centre system which has been in place since 1995 and is operating with outdated components which are now of poor quality and are difficult to replace. The project will include the replacement of the current analogue system for digital cameras and recording.

23 The CCTV upgrade project has been ongoing since 2010; however, delays to the

planned new Police Headquarters has affected the CCTV upgrade project as it was originally planned not to replace the Town centre system until the new headquarters was operational. However it has now been agreed to start replacing the system from the end of 2013. The project will be carried out in phases due to the complexity of the project. The first stage (end 2013) will be to replace the recording system. Stage two (Q2 2014) will see the replacement of the town centre cameras, like for like. The zoom capability of the new cameras will be on a similar level to the current system (x30). Mega pixel capabilities would require high storage facilities and would be beyond the current budget. There is no capacity for retrospective zoom. There is no plan to introduce analytics (eg tracking or facial recognition) at this stage – the system however will be capable of adding analytic features in the future (see further discussion on analytics below).

24 The new cameras will not be linked to the proposed new ANPR system (see further

discussion on ANPR below).

25 The Police are currently looking at the possibility of wireless transmission of images back

to Police Headquarters which will reduce ongoing revenue costs. There is a downside to wireless transmission which might be less reliable than the current fibre cable system.

26 The Police have also identified an operational desire to increase CCTV coverage in the town area with the possible addition of six cameras in areas identified as potential hot spots not covered by existing cameras. This development will take account of the changing topography of the St Helier night time economy, for example the location of new night clubs while others have disappeared. Cheapside, Snow Hill and St Aubin Harbour area are other potential sites; however, no firm decisions or sites have yet been identified. This element of the project is subject to confirmation of further funding and

public consultation on the proposed new locations. Funding for an extension to Castle Quays, however, has already been agreed under a planning obligation.

27 We were informed that, to date, the project has focussed on the technical elements of

the new system. Ongoing project planning will include, in due course, an impact analysis, based  on  incident  analysis,  victim  survey  information  and  consultation  with  key stakeholders such as proprietors of bars and clubs.

28 The CCTV upgrade project has been linked with similar upgrades to replace existing

cameras and install additional cameras for States of Jersey Police systems at the Airport (25 cameras) and St Helier Harbour (28 cameras).

29 In the early stages of the project it was anticipated that a £40,000 CSR saving could be

achieved;  however,  this  has  now  been  revised  and  no  significant  savings  will  be achieved. Instead the project has been designated a capital project.

30 An application was made to the Criminal Offences Confiscation Fund (COCF) to fund all

three systems. The following funding was requested:

• Town Centre   £400,000
• Airport  £100,000
• Harbour  £80,000
• 10% contingency  £58,000

31 An additional sum of £25,000 was found from savings on a previous project. This was

used for the custody suite and renewal of the Police Headquarters estate requirements. 32 We  asked  the  Acting  Chief  Inspector  to  describe  how  the  States  of  Jersey  Police

intended to engage with the public on the forthcoming extension of the town CCTV

network. He replied that appropriate public consultation would be planned once the

technical  elements  of  the  project  had  been  finalised  and  he  promised  to  keep  us

informed.

33 Our advisers commented: Further clarification is required concerning the evidence used to inform decisions over camera deployment and network expansion. Evidence collected thus far points to a high value placed on tacit and experiential judgment. These are

appropriate forms of information although one would expect such information to be supplemented by more objective measures such as offence mapping and public engagement.'

34 Key Finding: The States of Jersey Police are at an advanced stage in their project to

replace, upgrade and extend the current Town Centre network of CCTV cameras. This project should have involved the preparation of a detailed business case demonstrating the cost effectiveness of CCTV as a crime prevention measure. The Police however have assumed that the benefits of CCTV are well known and accepted. The Police must urgently revise their code of practice, improve their evaluation mechanisms which have been neglected in recent years and must provide the public with a clear statement about the functions and capabilities of their proposed new system as well as a privacy impact assessment for any proposed new locations.

35 Recommendation: Before any extension to the current system the States of Jersey

Police must

• provide the public with a clear statement about the functions, capabilities and purpose of their new CCTV system;
• re-evaluate the justification for each of their current sites; and
• publish an privacy impact assessment statement for any proposed new locations.

Other States of Jersey Police developments

Automatic Number Plate Recognition

36 The States of Jersey Police currently use a mobile Automatic Number Plate recognition

(ANPR) camera fitted to an unmarked van to alert for vehicles of interest, such as those driven by suspected disqualified drivers. The system works best when the vehicle with the ANPR reader is stationary and the cameras are set to record vehicles which pass it by. Once an alert is read the ANPR operator then radios another police unit(s) further down the road to stop the vehicle. The Roads Policing Unit commented that the system can be resource intensive and in recent times other commitments had taken preference over this system.

37 The intelligence databases employed by the ANPR system are managed by the Force

Intelligence Bureau. They receive intelligence which can then be loaded on the database in respect of uninsured drivers, wanted individuals (for example, arrest orders from the court and disqualified drivers) and stolen vehicles (albeit few in number in Jersey).

38 The current system has not been used effectively and its recent use has been restricted.

The Roads Policing Unit commented: We tended to have too much information on the system which meant that we were getting a lot of "hits" which did not result in any prosecutions/ arrests. Should the ANPR be re-introduced under a different format consideration should be given to drastically reducing the number of vehicles on it and maintaining the accuracy of the system.'

39 The Police are reviewing this facility with a view to establishing a static network

predominantly based around St Helier with links to systems operating at the ports and being developed for car parks (see further discussion below).

40 The Jersey Customs and Immigration Service also use ANPR to record all vehicle

movements in and out of the Island. Transport and Technical Services are currently trialling the use of ANPR for a new vehicle parking charge system.

41 The States of Jersey Police are examining a proposal to replace their current mobile

ANPR facility with a static ANPR system situated on the main roads entering St Helier which would be capable then of monitoring virtually all vehicle movements through the town. The project is at an early stage: there are no firm plans for this but funding has been identified through the Criminal Offences Confiscation Fund (COCF).

42 As previously noted, the system has significant resource implications for the States of

Jersey Police if it is to be used more effectively than the current system. The Police Officer responsible for the project commented: We need the ability to deal or at least to consider dealing with whatever may be pinging' at that time, hence the requirement for a real tight set of databases operating at any one time i.e. intelligence led, aligned to priorities at that time etc.

43 The fixed system would have a direct feed into the Police Force Control Room. It would be linked to the ANPR systems operated at Elizabeth Harbour by the Customs and

Immigration Service and may be linked to the car parks operated by Transport and Technical Services (subject to approval of this system following the current trial).

44 This form of ANPR system has proved controversial in the UK. The installation of seven

ANPR cameras around the town of Royston by the Hertfordshire Constabulary was dubbed a Ring of Steel' and criticised by privacy campaigners for infringing car drivers' rights.

45 The UK Information Commissioner found that the Royston scheme was unlawful',

breaching the first principle of the Data Protection Act (processing personal data fairly and lawfully) and excessive', breaching the third principle of the Act (relating to the amount of data collected; personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose or purposes for which they are processed').

46 Hertfordshire Constabulary were issued with an enforcement notice ordering the force to

stop processing people's information in this way, unless they could justify the ANPR cameras use by way of a proper privacy impact assessment, or similar such assessment.[2]

47 In response, Hertfordshire Constabulary said that the enforcement notice was

unnecessary. They would continue to use the system which had been effective in cutting crime but would ensure that they gave an adequate explanation as to why it was necessary.[3]

48 The concerns about ANPR relate to the use of data matching. The UK campaign group Liberty expressed concern that the use of ANPR has expanded enormously without any real public debate or knowledge: This technology, originally used to monitor unregistered vehicles, is now routinely being used by the police to locate vehicles (and their owners) that might appear on other – and often dubious – police databases. There is almost no binding regulation about how this technology is to be used, who can be targeted using it,

how long images are to be stored for and for what purpose. A database of this magnitude raises real privacy concerns and requires strong regulation.'[4]

49 Our advisers commented: This issue has received increasing attention in European data

protection legislation. Clarification is required concerning the matching of CCTV images to data held on formerly distinct databases and what happens to new information that is crated from the merger of these different information systems. This is not covered by existing Codes of Practice.'[5]

50 Charles Farrier, of NO-CCTV, provided the Panel with a recently published report entitled

What's wrong with ANPR'. In this paper he suggests ways in which ANPR might be used without the need to include mass surveillance capabilities. He maintains that it is possible to use the ANPR cameras for the stated aims, namely enforcement of motoring issues such as unpaid tax or insurance as well as stopping vehicles of known wanted criminals without tracking the movements of law abiding citizens. It is not necessary for the system to store any data.

51 Key Finding: A new fixed ANPR system potentially provides the States of Jersey Police

with a capability to monitor virtually all traffic movements in and out of St Helier. The system which could be joined up to ANPR systems at Elizabeth Harbour and car parks can potentially be linked to an extensive database holding significant information on Islanders.

52 Key Finding: It is essential for purposes of transparency, particularly for new CCTV

systems being introduced, including the States of Jersey Police ANPR system, that the principles of data connectivity are established in the Data Protection Code of Practice and Guidance on the Use of CCTV.

53 Key Finding: The Jersey Data Protection Code of Practice and Guidance on the Use of CCTV should include a requirement to specify where the matching of personal data takes place, with whom and for what purposes. This is a requirement of European Data

Protection law. In this respect, data should only be matched with named databases (i.e. ANPR images with the official vehicle licensing database) and not be matched with other unnamed databases. There needs to be a mechanism to regulate this.

54 Recommendation: Before implementing their proposal for a fixed ANPR system around

St Helier, the States of Jersey Police should consult the public and publish a privacy impact statement.

55 Recommendation: The Data Protection Code of Practice and Guidance on the Use of

CCTV should include a requirement to specify where the matching of personal data takes place, with whom and for what purposes.

56 Recommendation: In accordance with the above recommendation, the States of Jersey

Police should state clearly what databases their ANPR system will access; connections to any new databases should not be made without providing clear justification and seeking approval from the Data Protection Commissioner.

Body Worn Video Cameras

57 The States of Jersey Police have recently been trialling six body worn video (BWV)

cameras. Forty police forces in the UK are already using these devices. As a result of the success of this trial, the Police are now considering extending the use of cameras to all officers on the beat, currently numbering about thirty. This announcement was made as the report was being finalised[6] so it has not been possible to include an examination of the report on this trial; however, this report will be studied by the Panel.

58 The BWV cameras are designed to enhance opportunities for evidence capture,

providing an impartial, accurate record of incidents attended by officers. They may help to secure a successful prosecution in cases where otherwise the police officer word was the only evidence.[7]

59 BWV cameras are an overt method of gathering evidence. Wherever possible the officer

will inform the subject that they are being recorded by CCTV. Officers are trained to avoid collateral intrusion', that is the unnecessary recording of third parties.

60 The Police expect that this system will be particularly useful in domestic violence

incidents where the victim is often reluctant subsequently to pursue a complaint. They will also contribute to a decrease in assaults on officers and raise professional standards among police officers. The Police officers are under increased scrutiny through the use of the cameras.

61 The BWV cameras are not in operation continuously: the police officer must trigger the

recording mechanism when they recognise that an incident or an appropriate interview with a subject is taking place. Data from BWV cameras can be downloaded at the police station and relevant incidents tagged for further investigation either by the officer or the reactive investigation team. There is an automatic electronic audit trail for the use of the images.

62 Recordings do not replace the need for formal written statements from victims or

witnesses but can be used as supporting evidence for the statements.

63 Civil liberty groups have given qualified support to BWV cameras because of their

potential to serve as a check against the abuse of police power. However, there are provisos: the recordings of interactions with suspects must be complete, that is they must not be edited on the fly' so that they only record what backs the police version of events; secondly, the back-office data storage system for video evidence must be secure, accessible to lawyers and defendants.[8]

64 We were provided in confidence with a copy of the States of Jersey Police Force Policy

on Body Worn Video. This provides detailed guidance to officers using the devices. In summary:

• The officer should record as much of an incident as possible

• The recording must be incident specific
• The user should make a verbal announcement to indicate why the recording has been activated, including date, time and location
• Persons present should be informed
• Recording must continue uninterrupted
• A verbal announcement should be made to indicate the end of the recording, including the reason for ending

65 In general, the BWV user should record entire encounters from beginning to end without

interrupting the recording. There may, however, be incidents where it might be necessary for the user to consider stopping the recording and examples are given in the guidance, such as sensitivity connected to faith, where filming in domestic circumstances could be an issue. The reasons for interrupting or ceasing to record an ongoing incident must be recorded in the officer's police notebook. The policy is clear that under no circumstances must any images be deleted; such action may result in disciplinary proceedings.

66 Key Findings: The States of Jersey Police are trialing six body worn video (BWV)

cameras. These cameras can protect both suspects and police officers as they are designed to provide an impartial, accurate record of incidents attended by officers. Experience elsewhere shows the introduction of these cameras has led to a sharp fall in complaints against officers.

67 There is a robust policy in place to ensure the integrity of video evidence, which has

been made available to the Panel. In line with our other recommendations, we believe that the States of Jersey Police should provide a publically available code of practice on the purpose and use of these cameras, including how personal data is processed.

68 Recommendation: the States of Jersey Police should provide a publically available

code of practice on the purpose and use of body worn video cameras, including how personal data is processed.

CCTV in the Private sector  

69 There are many more CCTV camera surveillance systems in the private sector operating in areas to which the public have access: supermarkets, the bus station, cinema, petrol

stations, banks, pubs, hotels, tourist attractions, community centres, schools and restaurants offices all make use of camera surveillance.

70 We spoke to one of the four principal security companies installing CCTV systems who

reported increasing interest in systems in the Island. A number of general electrical companies also sell systems but with limited back up. It is also possible to buy relatively cheap systems from the shelf at DIY stores or from the internet.

71 Retail stores use CCTV as a method of reducing the impact of theft on their business. In

Jersey most CCTV in stores is not continually watched over and so many thefts are not instantly detected. If however an item is found to be missing, it is then possible to review footage and see if the offence has been caught on camera.

72 The Chamber of Commerce, Retail and Supply Committee, said that CCTV had been

introduced into retail stores by many of its members in response to increasing instances of theft. They told us that retailers needed to use as many ways as possible to reduce the impact of theft on their business, the main defence being staff on the sales floor but CCTV was an important backup for them together with other methods, mainly security tagging systems and loss protection detectives[9].

73 A major supermarket chain told us that all their till transactions are monitored by CCTV.

Till loses have been reduced when cameras are placed above till points. Tills covered by CCTV also assist in any potential customer fraud situation such as stolen cheques.

74 CCTV also helps to protect staff. There is a potential for violent or abusive behaviour to

situations, such as the withholding of a credit card if asked to do so by the credit card company after a decline.

75 The Panel visited a major St Helier hotel which operates 156 cameras monitoring virtually all public space within the hotel, bar and its night club. The manager told the Panel that cameras are regarded by customers and staff as an expectation for the security of the hotel. We were told that CCTV had been effective in monitoring staff

transactions at the bar reducing till losses from staff fraudulently serving customers with extra drinks to virtually nil.

76 CCTV cameras are increasingly commonplace on all forms of public transport. Liberty

buses are fitted as standard with between 6 to 8 cameras, both inside and outside the vehicles. They monitor the safety of passengers, particularly accessing and leaving the buses; mitigate complaints or claims from customers and provide evidence in case of road accidents. A number of taxis drivers are now fitting their vehicles with cameras in order to enhance security for the drivers.

77 It is very difficult to gauge accurately the extent of CCTV coverage in the private

commercial sector in Jersey. Where images are recorded any business using CCTV camera surveillance is required to register their systems with the Data Protection Commissioner; however, the Commissioner told the Panel that she was sure that there are many more systems operating in the Island than are notified to her office[10].

78 Some businesses remain unaware of their obligations regarding CCTV. Efforts are made

by the Data Protection Office to inform businesses of the obligation to register their systems, particularly when omissions come to light; however, resources generally preclude proactive investigations into the policies and practices of most companies.

79 The States of Jersey Police has compiled its own register of premises with CCTV

availability. Whenever a crime occurs the police will investigate the location of CCTV in the vicinity to establish whether there might be relevant or recoverable CCTV footage. The list, however, is for the guidance of officers only and is not definitive.

80 Key Finding: A register or census of cameras and their purposes is currently absent. Creating a register could make it easier to ensure compliance to regulations and codes

of practice and place Jersey at the forefront of European best practice in this area. It would also enhance public awareness and confidence and enable political oversight. This register could be achieved through a short extension to the Data Controllers' statutory annual submission to the Data Protection Commissioner. This could comprise of a supplementary sheet, preferably one sheet of paper, capturing additional information, such as: the number of cameras in a system, their location, the existence of a Code of Practice, primary and secondary purposes, links to other databases and perhaps some aspects of their technical capability (the latter to differentiate between different types of CCTV).  

81 Recommendation The statutory annual submission by Data Controllers to the Data

Protection Office should be supplemented by additional information (as specified above). This should be collated into a CCTV register' which should be publically available.

82 Recommendation:  An annual review of the number and types of CCTV should be

presented to the Chief Minister for Home Affairs by the Data Protection Commissioner (based on the CCTV register). This would allow some political debate and oversight.

CCTV in Schools and Colleges

83 Many schools and colleges operate CCTV systems for the security of the premises and

to deter intruders or petty vandalism out of school hours. Not all schools, however, particularly those in the more rural areas of the Island, felt the need for this form of security.

84 Active monitoring does not take place: CCTV is not used to monitor entry to school

premises during school hours nor to monitor pupil behaviour.

85 One private school, however, uses CCTV to ensure effective safeguarding and counter-

bullying measures and has recently completed installation of cameras in all classrooms as well as in corridors and public spaces. No cameras were installed in areas where there was a reasonable expectation of privacy, such as changing rooms. CCTV was not used to monitor teaching in school.

86 The Panel invited the head teacher to discuss how the decisions had been taken to extend camera use in this way. He told us that the CCTV system had been introduced originally in response to requests from parents for the school to take effective action to deter illegal drug use on part of its external grounds (whilst the school was not in

session), also to combat a spate of vandalism to its buildings & vehicles which had occurred at night and at the weekend. Once installed the extended use of CCTV as a means of investigating cases of bullying where it was often a case of one student's word against another had seemed to be a logical step. CCTV was only used when necessary as back up to normal staff monitoring and person to person discussion with pupils. Following advice from the Data Protection Commissioner's office this use had been declared as part of the school's policy on the use of CCTV. No reservations had been raised by staff, parents or students regarding the extent of potential surveillance.

87 Key Finding: The primary purpose of CCTV systems is for the security of the premises

and to deter intruders or petty vandalism out of school hours, although not all schools have identified a need to install cameras. CCTV cameras are not used to monitor pupil behaviour. One school, however, does use CCTV in a much more extensive way and has found CCTV to be an effective means of safeguarding pupils when they are unsupervised. In this school cameras have been in installed in all classrooms. This is in accordance with Data Protection principles and has not given rise to any objections from parents, students or staff.

Technological advances: public sector

Current capabilities

88 It is beyond the scope of the Scrutiny review to examine in detail the technical quality of

CCTV systems and their images across States departments. This varies according to the priorities of each department. Almost all systems share fundamental capabilities: an ability to operate continuously, monitoring and recording activity within a given field as well as providing a live feed to screens within a control room and record activity within a given field. For the most part cameras are not actively monitored unless there are indications of specific interest in locations or individuals.

89 Many cameras are positioned in order to give maximum operational coverage without

quality recognition of individuals. Some cameras may be remotely operated and directed on to particular individuals or incidents through pan, tilt and zoom facilities in response to intelligence information. Individual recognition may be achieved within a certain distance (eg 50 to 100m) but will be reduced during hours of darkness.

90 Data can be retained, depending on storage capacity, for periods of some months but

will usually be overwritten or deleted automatically after a defined period (typically 30 days although we were told that many systems in Jersey retain images for much longer). Data can be retrieved from the recorded storage for evidential purposes and saved to video or disc.

91 A number of States systems, including the Town Centre network and SOJP and JCIS

systems at the Airport and Harbours are operating with outdated systems. The SOJP reported that the technology and components of the current analogue system, viewed by us, were soon to be obsolete, making servicing and repair difficult and costly. We also observed JCIS systems where the quality of images was poor and the technology used to review the CCTV footage was cumbersome and inefficient.

92 Modern high definition, digital CCTV systems provide an efficient management module

and high resolution images. Furthermore, they have many computer controlled technologies that allow them to identify, track, and categorize objects or persons in their field of view.

Advanced Video Content Analysis

93 Through Video Content Analysis (VCA) systems can detect unusual patterns of

behaviour in the environment or anomalies in a crowd of people such as for instance a person moving in the opposite direction in airports where passengers are only supposed to walk in one direction out of a plane. VCA also has the ability to track people on a map by calculating their position from the images. It is then possible to link many cameras and track a person through an entire building or area. This can allow a person to be followed without having to analyse many hours of film.

94 Facial recognition facilities are being developed which will allow individuals to be automatically identified from a facial database. This type of system has been proposed to compare faces at airports and seaports with those of suspected terrorists or other undesirable entrants. This form of mass surveillance has been ineffective to date because of the low discriminating power of facial recognition technology and the very

high number of false positives generated. Nevertheless, future developments will continue to improve the capabilities of CCTV surveillance.

95 No States department in our survey reported any intention to introduce analytic features

into their systems.

96 A major CCTV installer informed us that there was little interest from the commercial

sector in Jersey at present in high definition systems with advanced analytical features. However, the position might change in the future as such systems became more economical.

97 The States of Jersey Police informed us that these forms of advance analytics are not

being considered at present for the new Town Centre and Harbours and Airport systems. Such features are not regarded as operational requirements given the relatively low level of crime and public disorder in Jersey. Furthermore the costs of including such features within the design of the new systems would be substantial.

98 We were informed that the new digital CCTV system for St Helier would essentially be a

replacement for the existing analogue, fibre cable system. The zoom power would be similar to the current system (x30); mega pixel capabilities required high storage facilities and would be beyond the current budget. A wireless solution was under consideration as this could have financial savings over fixed fibre cables but there were risks of hacking or blocking and reduced reliability.

99 However, it should be noted that new modern digital systems will make it easy to

introduce advanced analytics in the future, whereas current analogue systems make this very difficult. The significance of the new system should not be underestimated or downplayed

100  Key finding: Modern digital systems, such as the system to be installed in the St Helier Town Centre, will offer the potential for advanced Video Content Analysis features, such as facial recognition, in the future. They will certainly make their introduction easy: the proposed new system could be seen as a stepping stone for more sophisticated mass surveillance. Such advances should be treated with caution. Privacy impact

assessments and public consultation must take place before any such capabilities are introduced by the public sector.

101  Recommendation: A commitment should be made by the Minister for Home Affairs

and the States of Jersey Police that no development of CCTV which provides in the future for advanced Video Content Analysis features, such as facial recognition, should proceed without instigating an informed public debate and seeking approval by the States.

9 Public attitudes towards camera surveillance

Online public survey

102  We conducted an online public opinion survey on the Scrutiny website to explore

public awareness and attitudes towards camera surveillance in Jersey. 46 responses were received between 25 June and 9 September 2013. A summary of the results of the survey are shown in Appendix Two of this report. A full report from the survey can be accessed on the scrutiny website.

103  The limitations of this survey should be noted:

• It is clearly only a very small sample of public opinion.
• Respondents were self-selecting – there was no attempt to ensure a scientifically balanced representation of the population as a whole.
• The survey did not test whether the respondents understanding of the technological capabilities of the CCTV systems or how they are used.

104  It is not possible therefore to draw specific conclusions from this survey with any

confidence; however, some general observations can be made.

105  The response to our survey showed general public support for CCTV and revealed

no strong evidence of concern among respondents about CCTV in public spaces:

• 65% disagreed with the statement that CCTV surveillance in public areas in our Island today was excessive;
• 59% disagreed with the statement that public expenditure on CCTV cameras should be reduced;
• 47 % however said that they did not want to see any additional CCTV

106  A commonly held view was reflected in one comment: If you have nothing to hide

you have nothing to fear from better security in both public and private places. I do not mind how many CCTV cameras are used as I feel they are there for my protection and security, not to spy on me or to intervene in my freedom of movement.'

107  There was more ambivalence about the potential intrusion of CCTV near homes

and in the work place: 47% of respondents agreed that CCTV near their homes infringed their personal rights to privacy and 55% agreed that the presence of CCTV in the workplace infringed their personal right to privacy. There was a strong feeling that information on surveillance and access to data collected were important (79% and 93% respectively).

108  A fully scientific survey into public attitudes to the deployment of CCTV in public

spaces was carried out in 2004 by the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO). The ICO found that CCTV in public places is not generally considered to intrude on personal privacy. This may be because individuals expect to be seen when out and about in public places, and they behave and dress accordingly. They are already on show', as it were. Being watched by a camera does not appear very different from being looked at by passers-by.'[11]

109  Key Finding: Public sector CCTV is generally perceived as benign, an anti-crime

measure which brings few disadvantages of which people are conscious. CCTV in public spaces is not thought to intrude on personal privacy, a concept associated with the home. However, there is no real evidence that the public have a good understanding of the technological capabilities of CCTV systems or how they are used.

Concerns relating to the extent and purpose of intrusion into people's lives

110  On the other hand, a number of people hold the view that the extent of mass

surveillance by the state, of which CCTV is just one overt element, should be a cause for concern.

111  Mr. M. Dun, whose topic proposal initiated our review, called for greater political

oversight of CCTV operations and identified the following key issues:

• The risks of discrimination in targeting types of individuals for observation;

• A requirement for operators to be trained in data protection and privacy issues;
• The capability of cameras to record conversations as well as images;
• The lack of public awareness and appropriate signage.12

112  Civil liberty groups argue that data protection legislation has failed to keep up with

technological changes and as a result there is a risk that unregulated CCTV may pose a threat to our way of life. The UK campaigning group Liberty comment: We are unlikely to wake up one morning with the feeling that we are suddenly under much more surveillance than the day before. This is because surveillance apparatus is assembled in a piecemeal way and often under the radar. Too much surveillance can fundamentally alter the relationship between the individual and the State and the experience of widespread visual surveillance may well have a chilling effect on free speech and activity.[12]

113  Charles Farrier, co-founder of No-CCTV, in his submission for our review

commented on the implications of mass surveillance by the State: The oft repeated but little understood catchphrase "nothing to hide, nothing to fear", consistently used to justify video surveillance, turns the usual law enforcement requirement of "reasonable suspicion" upon its head. In the case of surveillance cameras information is recorded regardless of the existence of specific cause. Cameras record continuously, as opposed to recording only selective incidents related to law enforcement activities, and so information on thousands of innocent people engaged in activities irrelevant to the supposed justification for the cameras is collected. The State is a particular special case for us because the State has the power to deprive people of liberty, has legitimate use of force and other things like that.[13]

114  The Data Protection Commissioner identified where she believed that CCTV might pose a threat to privacy. She said that for the individual the impact of CCTV surveillance

in public spaces was minimal, if any at all: images are not processed; they just sit there

12 Preliminary discussion with the Panel, 02.05.13

and nothing happens. If there is no incident, if nothing else is triggered, the images get deleted after a period of time. However, she went on to say: it is the implications of the

processing in terms of privacy, which is terribly important... if every time your face hit a camera something else was triggered.[14]

115  An example of the potential impact of CCTV surveillance on the privacy of

individuals is the case of John Catt, a pensioner who found that his car had been marked' by the police ANPR system. Following his attendance at peace demonstrations near Brighton he was regularly stopped and questioned by police under anti-terrorism legislation.[15]

116  Key Finding: In general the presence of CCTV cameras in public spaces is not

seen as an intrusion into privacy. However, new technologies have increased the scope and processing capabilities of camera surveillance and are often assembled in a piecemeal way without citizens being aware of their implications. Too much surveillance can fundamentally alter the relationship between the individual and the State.

Public engagement

117  In order to retain public confidence in the appropriate use of CCTV in public spaces

it is essential that the States of Jersey Police and other public sector CCTV operators engage with the public in an open and transparent way to explain the capabilities and limitations of their systems.

118  Our advisors noted in their interim report following the first set of interviews and site visits conducted in early May 2013: The ongoing provision of CCTV is dependent upon public support for systems. CCTV is controversial because it captures personal data and because it shapes behaviour (it has been designated by the European Parliament as a tool of social and political control'). It is important therefore that service providers and CCTV operators make the public aware of the existence and use of CCTV. This is a basic requirement in other parts of Europe. This can be achieved in a number of ways

and is particularly pertinent for those being surveyed. The requirement for public engagement could be embedded in a Code of Practice.'

119  Public engagement should occur in the following instances:

• via appropriate signage,
• consultation on camera location, especially in the case of new cameras or an expansion to an existing system (including links to new databases), and
• direct engagement with those domestic properties within view of the surveillance camera (this should include an invitation to visit the control room). This would also include parents at schools.

120  Currently, the main town centre system in St Helier does not have any public

signage. In this respect, the public do not know that the systems is a police' system used for operation issues, or who to contact in relation to the operation of the system and the processing of personal data. This is contrary to normal practice elsewhere in the UK.

121  The Information Commissioner's Code of Practice (2008) contains sections on

signage and how to effectively advertise the existence of CCTV surveillance in a given area. Signs should be visible and readable, contain details of the organization operating the system, the purpose of operating CCTV and who to contact about the scheme.[16]

122  We noted that many local authorities in the UK provide the public with extensive

information about public space CCTV camera systems. Cambridge City Council, for example, provides a range of relevant information and documents including an Overview providing details of the location and arc of observation for 139 cameras within the city centre and its car parks[17]. This compares to a single page on the States of Jersey Police website[18] which provides only general advice on the siting and use of CCTV but no information on cameras operated by the States of Jersey Police in the Town Centre.

123  We asked the States of Jersey Police whether there was any operational reason why information on the location of cameras should not be made publicly available. This is

a basic requirement in the UK and is in accordance with the Information Commissioner's Code of Practice. Acting Chief Inspector Williamson said that there was no intention of secrecy in the siting of cameras; however signage had not been considered necessary as the units were very visible and everyone knew that there were cameras in place.

124  He said that specific information on locations had been provided in a press release

at the time of the initial introduction of CCTV in St Helier, when public interest had been

high and again in 2001 and 2006 when the network of cameras had been increased. 125  He told us that, in the early days of CCTV, the States of Jersey Police had

introduced a system to routinely capture and publish data relating to the use and number

of incidents recorded via the town CCTV system. In essence, the Force Control Room

officers were required to endorse all individual incident reports (i-logs) whether CCTV

had been utilised or played a part in an arrest. This information was utilised to assess

some of the impact of CCTV and inform the public.

126  The 2006 States of Jersey Police Performance Report stated that Town CCTV

cameras actively monitored 2,035 incidents requiring police action, leading to the arrest of 437 offenders. Such data has not been routinely utilised since 2006. The Police had believed that the benefits of CCTV had been well established in the public mind by this time and it was no longer necessary to make a continuing case for their use.

127  Key Finding: The States of Jersey Police currently provide minimal information to

the public on the Town Centre CCTV system, the location of cameras and its operational procedures. Performance reporting which used to be included in States of Jersey Police Annual reports has been discontinued.

128  Recommendation: The States of Jersey Police should follow the example of local

authorities in the UK and provide extensive information on their website on the Town Centre CCTV system including a map indicating the location of cameras.  

129  Recommendation: Appropriate signage should be erected in the town centre

indicating that CCTV surveillance is taking place with a contact point for members of the public with queries.

10 The effectiveness and impacts of camera surveillance

The role played by camera surveillance in policing, community safety, transport and the criminal justice system

130  Policing: The States of Jersey Policing Plan 2013 states that CCTV is an essential

tool in protecting public safety and security through the effective deployment of Police resources. Where CCTV is available:

• Police resources are deployed where they are needed most, thereby making optimum use of available capacity to protect community safety
• Police can make swift, appropriate deployments and attending officers have prior knowledge of what has occurred, who is involved and their current location;
• Camera footage can help secure the swift conviction of offenders, thereby reducing costs associated with the investigation and prosecution processes.

131  Criminal Justice System: The Minister for Home Affairs told us that he was very

positive about the benefits of CCTV within the criminal justice system: From the standpoint of a former Magistrate', he said, the evidential value was massive, both in terms of proving the prosecution case but sometimes in terms of proving the defence case because it does have this element of objectivity'[19].

132  The Judicial Greffe and Magistrate's Court Greffe added that CCTV was capable of

providing objective evidence of an incident whereas a witness' recall might be partial or confused. CCTV was generally used within the criminal justice system as part of corroborative evidence to show a person's movements in the vicinity of an incident. It could also be used to provide the context for an incident, for example CCTV was used by the defendant in the Royal Court in a recent assault case to demonstrate that his actions were not as serious as had been alleged. In some cases CCTV may be critical to the outcome of a case. Generally however it is only part of the evidence provided by the prosecution.

133  Community safety: An example of the use of CCTV to enhance community safety

was provided by the Housing Department in its Community Newsletter in 2006. The Department compared the amount of complaints relating to anti-social behaviour from five large family estates with CCTV compared with five similar estates without CCTV and found 26 complaints in the former compared to 45 in the latter. They concluded that this showed that CCTV could work as a deterrent and reduce reports of anti-social behaviour by a significant amount[20].

134  In response to a request for further detail on how CCTV had been used to assist

with investigations into anti-social behaviour on Housing estates the department provided the following information:

In 2012 there were 8 requests by the Police to review our CCTV regarding incidents they were investigating, 4 were positive results, and 4 negative results.

In 2013 there were 13 requests by the police to review our CCTV regarding incidents they were investigating, 12 were positive results, and one was a negative result.

Apart from the above we do receive requests from our contractors and residents regarding incidents, however these are not recorded separately as if there is any CCTV footage the incident is reported directly to the Police as a complaint. This year there was one request from one of our contractors that led to a positive result, and two from our residents - one positive and the other negative.

135  A respondent to our online survey also saw CCTV as an answer to community safety worries on a housing estate: I would like to see moveable, flexible solutions to CCTV as well as being able to monitor key areas. For instance we had a problem with our neighbours and with cars driving through our (Housing Trust) estate and for our own safety. The Housing Trust have not responded to the request for signs encouraging safe, slow driving or signs that alert drivers to children playing. They have also not been able to mention anything about antisocial and sometimes aggressive behaviour of my neighbours leaving the only option open to us as the police. In particular the police

cannot do anything about traffic offences within our estate as it is a private area apparently (a poor excuse from all I think). CCTV on even a temporary measure would help deter inappropriate behaviour and driving before a child or other person gets seriously hurt. It would also deter other anti-social activities and ultimately could provide evidence if need be on how a neighbourhood 'community' dynamic could be improved. Doing this as a neighbour won't send out the best cohesive message, but a third party ability would.'

136  CCTV cameras have been erected by private organisations in public areas, for

example Les Quennevais Precinct car park and Bonne Nuit Harbour, in response to incidents of malicious damage.

137  Car parks: Research into the effectiveness of CCTV cameras referred to below[21]

has found that CCTV is most effective in reducing crime in car parks. All multi-storey car parks in St Helier together with two surface car parks, the Esplanade and Snow Hill, are monitored by CCTV cameras. Two privately operated car parks at the Waterfront and Kensington Place also operate CCTV systems. In Jersey their principal uses are to monitor illegal parking and overstaying and are used to ensure smooth traffic flows. CCTV footage is sometimes requested by members of the public in relation to insurance claims for accidental damage.

138  Transport:  CCTV surveillance is a common feature in all forms of transport,

especially internationally. CCTV cameras at the Airport and Harbour are essential to meet national and international security requirements. Cameras are also becoming increasingly visible in our buses and taxis.

139  Bus travel: The General Director, Liberty Bus, told us that CCTV cameras installed

on their buses had improved the security of passengers, particularly on night time services where it was no longer necessary to provide additional security presence.

140  Taxis: A number of taxi drivers in Jersey are now fitting their vehicles with CCTV cameras in order to improve their protection from assault by passengers. Others are

opposed to this development on the grounds that the taxi space is considered a private area by customers.

Evidence for the effectiveness of camera surveillance in preventing and detecting crime and promoting public safety

141  There is an overwhelming view among operators that CCTV provides a vital

function in enhancing public safety and reducing crime and disorder in Jersey. Many witnesses, including the States of Jersey Police and the Magistrate's Court, gave us anecdotal evidence, demonstrating the impact of CCTV in the efficient use of police resources and gains in reducing court proceedings, but robust evidence, backed by statistical data, for the reduction and prevention of crime is hard to find.

Research: Campbell Collaboration

142  There is an ongoing debate across Europe about the effectiveness of CCTV. In

December 2008 a report was published by the Campbell Collaboration which examined a range of studies looking at scientific evidence for the effects of CCTV on crime. The report focused on CCTV in public space where the prevention or personal and property crime was among the primary objectives. The main objective of this review was to assess the available research evidence on the effects of CCTV surveillance cameras on crime in public space. In addition to assessing the overall impact of CCTV on crime, this review also investigated in which settings (e.g., city and town centres, car parks), against which crimes, and under what conditions it was most effective.

143  The reviewers noted that CCTV was the single most heavily funded crime prevention measure operating outside of the criminal justice system. It accounted for more than three-quarters of total spending on crime prevention by the British Home Office. The authors called for more high-quality research on the topic in order to demonstrate whether such large sums of money had been well spent: In recent years, there has been a marked and sustained growth in the use of CCTV surveillance cameras

to prevent crime in public places in many Western nations. This growth in CCTV has come with a huge price tag. In the U.K., CCTV continues to be the single most heavily funded crime prevention measure operating outside of the criminal justice system. It is estimated that more than £250 million (approximately $500 million) of public money was spent on CCTV over the ten-year period of 1992 to 2002. This figure could very well be an underestimate. For example, between 1999 and 2001 alone, the British government made available £170 million (approximately $340 million) for "CCTV schemes in town and city centres, car parks, crime hot-spots and residential areas". Over the last decade, CCTV accounted for more than three-quarters of total spending on crime prevention by the British Home Office.[22]

144  In giving the background to this review the reviewers noted the lack of high quality

independent research into the impact and effectiveness of CCTV: A key issue is how far funding for CCTV in the U.K. has been based on high quality scientific evidence demonstrating its efficacy in preventing crime. There is concern that this funding has been based partly on a handful of apparently successful schemes that were usually evaluated using simple one group (no control group) before-after designs, done with varying degrees of competence, and done with varying degrees of professional independence from the Home Office. Recent reviews that have examined the effectiveness of CCTV against crime have also noted the need for high quality, independent evaluation research.[23]

145  The reviewers considered a number of views which are commonly held regarding

the impact of CCTV on crime including:

• Potential offenders being deterred by an increased perception that their actions would be detected;
• Increased use by pedestrians of the areas under surveillance by CCTV leading to an increased probability of detection;
• Potential victims being encouraged to take additional security precautions
• Police and security personnel being directed to intervene
• CCTV signalling improvements in the area and hence increasing community pride, community cohesion, and informal social control;
• CCTV encouraging increased reporting of crimes to the police

• CCTV in combination with other interventions such as improved street lighting.
• CCTV causing crime to increase, for example by giving potential victims a false sense of security.
• CCTV causing crime to be displaced to other locations, times or victims.

146  In its conclusion the Campbell Collaboration report described the effect of CCTV on

crime as modest but significant'. CCTV is most effective in reducing crime in car parks, is most effective when targeted at vehicle crimes (largely a function of the successful car park schemes), and is more effective in reducing crime in the United Kingdom than in other countries[24].

147  The reviewers suggested that, in contrast to its current broad application, CCTV

usage should be focused only on the specific targets against which it is shown to be most effective It is plausible to suggest that CCTV schemes with high coverage and other interventions and targeted on vehicle crimes are effective. Conversely, the evaluations of CCTV schemes in city and town centers and public housing measured a much larger range of crime types and only a small number of studies involved other interventions. These CCTV schemes, as well as those focused on public transport, did not have a significant effect on crime.'[25]

Metropolitan Police Report

148  Doubts about the effectiveness of CCTV were raised by a Metropolitan Police

report in 2009 which warned that the police had to work harder to improve the use of CCTV in the fight against crime to give the public confidence in the use of CCTV. The report noted that there were more than one million CCTV cameras in London and the government had spent £500m on the equipment; but in 2008 only 1,000 crimes were solved using CCTV images because officers failed to make the most of potentially vital evidence.

149  The report said that people were filmed many times every day and had high

expectations when they became victims of crime but suggested that the reality was often disappointing as, in some cases, officers did not bring criminals to justice even after they were caught on camera and identified. CCTV played a role in capturing just eight out of 269 suspected robberies across London in one month.

150  Detective Chief Inspector Neville, the author of the report, is leading a scheme

aimed at making the investigation of CCTV evidence as professional as fingerprinting and DNA technology[26].

NO-CCTV

151  Mr. Farrier said that decisions installing or extending CCTV should be based on

evidence. If the States of Jersey Police genuinely believed cameras performed as they claimed, why, he asked, would they not provide evidence to support this? Relevant information should include:

1. the number of arrests actually made as a result of CCTV evidence,  
2. the number of cases proceeding to prosecutions  
3. what form of intervention was actually played by CCTV (for example whether it was a contributing factor or essential factor)
4. whether prosecution cases were successful or not
5. whether CCTV actually assisted with early guilty pleas.

152  Mr. Farrier said: When you did have the police giving evidence, they were talking

about collecting the figures for a while and then not collecting figures, that they had neglected those. I would urge them to collect those figures again but to break them down in a more detailed way, to look at how often are the cameras used, what are they used for, how many of those cases go to court and in those cases to what degree can we track that through and see it moving forward. I am sure nowadays the ability to track this stuff is easier than it once was because, as I say, so much is digital anyway[27].  

153  Mr. Farrier claimed that the benefits of CCTV had been overstated by the UK Home

Office to boost the false image that cameras are effective and to support the huge investment in camera technology. However, he said, all studies to date conclude that cameras are not effective. [28]

154  In his written submission Mr. Farrier criticised the way in which the UK government

had handled the Campbell Collaboration report which had systematically examined research into the effectiveness of CCTV because they chose to quote extensively from the synopsis of the report misleadingly using the word crime' instead of car crime' .

155  Mr. Farrier pointed out that, contrary to general perception, CCTV did not provide

incontrovertible evidence for events. CCTV is presented in court, he said, as some form of forensic evidence; however, this was not the case. I think that the problem with the way that C.C.T.V. evidence is introduced into courts is that it is presented as though it was some sort of forensic evidence, that it was the same as forensics. The problem is we have an adversarial court system and there is no challenge on C.C.T.V. We often hear people saying that C.C.T.V. proves that we can see what is happening but, you know, it is in the eye of the beholder. We have criminal defence solicitors that we talk to at No CCTV who will tell us that they have seen C.C.T.V. played where defence solicitors have said: "That clearly shows my client not attacking somebody" and the police say: "That clearly shows your defendant attacking somebody" but there is no real way of challenging that evidence. If fingerprint evidence is produced in court, that is forensic evidence, you bring in an expert, the expert can be challenged in the adversarial system. C.C.T.V. is not and that is a problem in the court system, I think.'

156  Mr. Farrier said that the public were too easily persuaded about the effectiveness of

CCTV. When asked how to shift that kind of opinion, he replied:

I think by some honesty from politicians and honesty about the figures and the scale of what is really happening here, for people to understand ... If you talk to policemen, they will often say it is not a silver bullet, it does not do everything. It is not superb, it does not solve all the world's problems, but an awful lot of the general public think it does. If you talk to members of the public about C.C.T.V., they will want more cameras, more cameras, more cameras. Why do they want more cameras? Because they think it works. So they have got unrealistic expectations of cameras.[29]

157  In his written submission Mr. Farrier suggested that the following questions should

be the starting point for any discussion regarding surveillance technology:

• What is the problem to which this technology is the solution?
• Whose problem is it?
• What new problems might be created by solving the original problem?
• What other less intrusive solutions have you tried?
• Do you have proof that cameras will assist?
• How will you measure the success or failure of the cameras?
• If the cameras do not assist how long will it be before you take them down?[30]

Jersey Human Rights Group

158  In a submission to our review the Jersey Human Rights Group (JHRG) stated that

they had real concern that public support for police CCTV was based on a false impression of effectiveness. In their view the position of Home Affairs and the States of Jersey Police appeared to be from the evidence given in the public hearings: CCTV has been in extensive use, both in the UK and Jersey for several years without generating any problems. The public do not complain about it; on the contrary it provides the public with a sense of security. We do not have to worry about it anymore.'[31]

159  The JHRG called for a study to address the following broad questions of whether

state surveillance is generally:

• Socially beneficial, ie reduces crime and /or improves the solving and conviction of crimes

• Risky, because of the additional power and knowledge that it gives the States; and the related question of how it should be regulated and by whom;
• Cost effective (or to put it another way – could the resources consumed by CCTV be used more effectively in other ways); or
• Undesirable because of the inevitable loss of privacy33

160  We trust that our review, together with the contribution of our advisers, goes some

way to address the above questions; albeit in our view there can be no definitive or simple answer to the issues raised by the JHRG which have been the subject of numerous academic studies. Reference is made in Appendix 3 of this report for the interested reader to a number of key documents relating to operation, standards and data handling in relation to CCTV published by local authorities, national government and the private sector.

Evaluation mechanisms

161  Our advisers highlighted the problem of the lack of mechanisms in the Jersey public

sector to monitor the long-term effectiveness of cameras: During one public hearing the States of Jersey Police representative argued that it would be too expensive' to monitor the effectiveness of cameras. It would also be possible to argue that simple evaluation could prove less expensive than new inappropriately or ineffectively sited camera installations. Moreover, if understanding of the uses of CCTV is limited, then it would follow that knowledge over the extent to which systems are used properly is also restricted.

162  In other domains, notably education, once budgets have been devolved to their

discretionary holders there appears to be little reflection on how surveillance cameras are operated nor any analysis of their efficacy. If the cameras are not proven to be offering security then, arguably, incursions into privacy become less justifiable.

33 Ibid

163  They concluded: We accept that evaluation processes may be complex and

onerous but, equally, some simple measures could be introduced to improve this situation. Given this lack of analysis, the police controlled CCTV system does not meet the requirements laid out in Jersey's CCTV Code of Practice and cannot be said to be fully compliant in this regard.'[32]

164  The advisers made the following suggestions: Part of the problem, is that CCTV

has multiple purposes and is just as useful in directing police resources as it is in deterring and detecting crime. For this reason, we suggest that CCTV data controllers are very specific about the purpose of systems. If they are more specific about the purpose of systems then these systems become easier to audit and evaluate and political accountability and oversight can be achieved.